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Chapter 1
Dissertation Introduction
Women constitute around half of the world’s population, they represent 40 percent of the global
labor force and make up the majority of higher education graduates. The principle of equal pay
is reflected in numerous legislations. Nevertheless, women’s labor force participation is lower
and they earn, on average, less than comparable male counterparts. Looking at the develop-
ment over time one can observe the tendency that women catch up, with respect to educational
background and labor force participation rates, but gender differences in labor productivity and
earnings are remarkably persistent. These differences appear to be a result of different economic
and social mechanisms. In particular, a non-random distribution of men and women along differ-
ent occupations, sectors and firms can be observed. Women are concentrated in low-productivity
jobs, they are overrepresented among unpaid family workers and rise less often to high status
positions (World Bank, 2011).
It is beyond dispute that it follows ethical reasons to promote gender equality. Moreover, narrow-
ing the gender gap in labor market participation and outcomes also has considerable economic
relevance for a society. In 2012 the World Bank devoted its annual publication, the World De-
velopment Report, to the topic of gender equality. This report points out that ”First, gender
equality matters intrinsically, because the ability to live the life of one’s own choosing and be
spared from absolute deprivation is a basic human right... [and further, SS] matters instrumen-
tally, because greater gender equality contributes to economic efficiency and the achievement of
1
2 CHAPTER 1. DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION
other key development outcomes”(World Bank 2011, p.3). The authors further argue that female
labor force participation promotes equity and strengthens the economic and social position and
the empowerment of women. Gender equality is therefore important for socio-economic devel-
opment and to avoid women being caught in a productivity trap that imposes costs on women’s
welfare and economic empowerment.
It is important to understand which mechanisms drive gender differences in labor market behav-
ior in order to identify policy measures that help to promote equity. Over the last decades, the
analysis of gender differences in the labor market has drawn considerable attention in economic
literature. During the 1960s, the work on family economics and the New Home Economics by
Becker and Mincer contributed to explanations of labor force participation decisions of women
(e.g. Mincer, 1962; Becker, 1965). Lower participation rates of women were attributed to their
comparative advantage in home production, and lower investment in human capital was ex-
plained by lower returns for those who spend less time in the market. Fertility-related aspects
and unpaid home work are central aspects in this argumentation. Other theories explain the
sources of gender differences in labor market outcomes as a result of differences in skills or pref-
erences. The hypothesis of compensating wage differentials, for example, states that jobs which
require employees to be tolerant of dirt or danger will offer a wage premium, which will mostly
be accepted by men. Women, on the other hand, accept wage cuts in return to family friendly
working arrangements, or interpersonal and other non-wage aspects (Filer, 1985).
In human capital based theories, discrimination may be seen as the residual in labor market
outcomes that remains after controlling for observable differences. Other theories exist, that
explicitly state assumptions on the mechanisms underlying discriminatory actions, which can be
broadly divided into two classes, namely taste based and statistical discrimination. Models of
the first type rely on a competitive framework and shed light on employer considerations that
may lead to differences in pay based on employers’ or customers’ taste of discrimination (Becker,
1971). Statistical discrimination, as introduced in the seminal papers of Phelps (1972) and Ar-
row (1973), is based on the problem of imperfect information about employee attributes. For a
3more detailed outline of theories on group-specific differences in the labor market, see Altonji
and Blank (1999). Previous empirical and theoretical studies cover a wide range of research
questions concerning gender differences in employment and wages, and how they are related to
differences in characteristics, and labor market treatment based on these characteristics. Among
other things, the discussion on gender differences concerns topics such as labor force attachment,
occupational choice and career development. The gender wage gap, however, is probably the
most widely researched phenomenon.
Generally, the reasons for gender differences in wage that have been identified by economic
research can be classified according to two major lines of argumentation: discrimination and
differences in human capital. The latter captures approaches like occupational choice and re-
sulting segregation patterns, or the effect of (family-related) career interruptions. As a third line,
newer explanations refer to differences in non-cognitive skills and psychological traits such as
risk aversion or different attitudes toward competitiveness. Blau and Kahn (2016) provide a de-
tailed survey on the existing theoretical explanations and current empirical evidence. A popular
method for exploring gender wage differentials are decomposition techniques (see Fortin et al.,
2011, for an overview). These methods have in common that they decompose the difference in
wages into a component that results from differences in the observed characteristics, and a sec-
ond one that reflects differences in the reward to these characteristics. The second component,
also called unexplained part, is often attributed to discrimination. This interpretation is flawed
as it misses the point that the unexplained part also captures unobserved group differences in
productivity and tastes. Furthermore, different characteristics as captured in the so-called ex-
plained part can also be the result of discriminatory barriers at the labor market. Occupation
and industry are two categories that lead to a substantial drop in the gender-specific wage gap
once they are controlled for (e.g. Gartner, 2016, for Germany). The question of whether occupa-
tional choice, and the sorting of sexes along different sectors, is driven by taste or by barriers in
access to the respective positions leads to another area of research that has found wide interest
in economics and social sciences, namely gender-specific occupational segregation.
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The unequal distribution of men and women along occupations is important for understanding
the evolution of the gender wage gap. The continued segregation of labor markets contributes
to gender differences in earnings. Yet, while it is widely found to be a source of the wage gap,
it could also narrow it due to the movement of women into higher paying male-dominated occu-
pations (Blau et al., 2013). Segregation describes the non-random sorting of individuals along
horizontal and vertical dimensions of the labor market, i.e. along occupations or hierarchies.
Several statistical concepts exist to describe segregation, among which the calculation of seg-
regation indices is very popular (see Flu¨ckiger and Silber, 1999, for a summary of segregation
measures). An accurate calculation, however, hinges on the availability of suitable data with
detailed and comparable occupational categories. Besides the effort to quantify the extent of
segregation, economic research offers explanations for its occurrence and assesses the conse-
quences of segregated structures, such as on the extent of the gender pay gap or on the economic
performance of teams or establishments.
Statistical analysis reveals that the amount of occupational segregation in the U.S. labor mar-
ket was relatively stable until the 1960s and since then has slightly decreased over time (Blau
et al., 2013). For Germany, considerable differences between East and West Germany can be ob-
served, but the overall trend reveals a very stable level of occupational segregation, irrespective
of other labor market trends (Busch, 2013). Theories explaining occupational segregation are
concerned with different occupational choices. Human capital theory explains gender differences
in occupational choice by differences in preferences and differential investment in human capital.
Other arguments trace back gender-specific occupational choices to socialization processes. Be-
sides supply-side oriented explanations, institutional characteristics are found to be influential
as well. A non-random sorting of individuals across firms can contribute to the reproduction of
segregation. Hinz and Schu¨bel (2001) were among the the first to calculate segregation measures
at the establishment level with German data. As shown by Achatz et al. (2010) establishment
characteristics explain a substantial part of the observed heterogeneity in the segregation levels
of German firms.
5Knowledge about the driving factors of segregation is of high relevance for policy makers. Foster-
ing a reduction in overall segregation may be a starting point to reduce labor marker inequalities.
While policy measures with respect to vertical segregation, as female quotas on boards or trans-
parency in wage setting processes, have recently been discussed in the public sphere, horizontal
segregation is of high relevance as well. Not only are status and career development possibilities
lower in female-dominated jobs, reducing horizontal segregation might also help to narrow the
gender wage gap (e.g. Leuze and Strauß, 2016). Through increased gender diversity in teams,
a reduction of segregation may also help to increase economic performance; however, empirical
evidence on the effect of diversity on team performance leads to ambiguous results (Azmat,
2014).
The underrepresentation of women in high status positions is a special case of vertical segrega-
tion. Apart from being a potential driver of the wage gap, gender difference in career development
should be studied in more detail because it has implications on spheres outside of the wage level
as well. Career progression is linked to wage growth, status and job satisfaction. Differences in
career transition patterns between men and women are important for identifying the factors that
hamper women’s career progression. The literature on career development of men and women
covers a large range of aspects such as differences in promotion, wage growth or job mobility.
The relationship between the latter is described by the ‘job shopping’ theory, which states that
employees benefit from early job mobility (Johnson, 1978). Mobility, in this case, covers job to
job transitions, irrespective of the change in rank. Gender differences in the representation of
high status positions, however, have been addressed in a large number of studies. Of particular
concern is the representation of women in top management positions or on boards, as promoting
a female quota for such position is heavily discussed among policy makers (e.g. Smith and Smith,
2015). Apart from the effect on the individual women, such as an increase in status and pay,
economic research raises the question of whether female representation may have an effect on
performance. As outlined by Joecks et al. (2013), empirical evidence on the effect of increasing
female representation on performance is mixed.
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When it comes to explaining gender differences in career progression, fertility-related aspects
are found to be one major driver. Family obligations may not solely disadvantage women’s ca-
reers, but adversely benefit men’s, further increasing gender differences in the workplace. Being
married, for example, reduces women’s transition probabilities to higher ranked jobs while it
positively influences men’s transition probabilities, as shown by Granqvist and Persson (2005).
They also find negative effects of career interruptions due to child birth on women’s career mo-
bility. Some authors claim the exclusion of women from high earnings and high status positions
to be the result of an existing ‘glass ceiling’ to women’s career perspectives (e.g. Arulampalam
et al., 2007). Another well known concept is the one of the ’glass door’ describing the non-
random selection of women into lower paying firms (Javdani, 2015). This shows that taking the
organizational level into account is a crucial factor for the analysis of gender differences in labor
market outcomes.
This idea is not new. In their seminal paper, Baron and Bielby (1980) call for bringing the firms
back in: Organizations should be regarded as corporate actors that employ men and women
for certain positions, open up career opportunities and show preferences for a gender-specific
selection of staff for their positions. Understanding the firm as social unit is central in ap-
proaches to organizational theory. Also in processes like segregation or career development, as
discussed above, organizational culture and demographics may play a central role. Bringing
this into the analysis can explain a lot of observed heterogeneity in outcomes. A closer look at
the effects of organizational characteristics is also interesting for policy recommendations. The
implementation of gender mainstreaming measures such as formalized recruitment procedures or
the provision of childcare facilities can be fostered by political incentives. Conducting firm level
analyses, however, requires databases that provide firm characteristics as well as information on
individuals. As discussed below, such data only became available in recent years.
This thesis sheds light on different aspects of sources and consequences of gender differentials
in the German labor market, whereby the effect of organizational characteristics is particularly
considered. The first study (chapter 2) is concerned with an investigation of horizontal occupa-
7tional segregation within firms and aims at identifying organizational factors that influence the
level of intra-firm segregation. It is followed by an investigation of gender differences in career
trajectories as possible driver of vertical segregation (chapter 3). Again, organizational charac-
teristics are taken into account as far as is available in the data. Finally, I look at the gender
wage gap and its relationship to the unemployment rate in local labor markets (chapter 4). The
gender wage gap is not only calculated at the level of local labor markets, but also intra-firm
wage gaps are investigated. This sheds light on the glass door hypothesis, and further shows that
firm heterogeneity heavily influences the level of the gender wage differential. Accounting for
the relationship with the unemployment rate offers a very different approach to explain gender
differences in pay, apart from the issues discussed before.
As the empirical evaluations carried out in all three studies are based on German data, it is
worth looking at some key figures and particularities of the German labor market. According to
the Federal Agency of Employment, labor force participation rates, especially those of women,
rank among the highest in Europe (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, 2015). The gender gap in em-
ployment rates narrowed, but still exists (see figure 1.1).
Source: Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2015)
Figure 1.1: Employment rates of women and men in Germany
Men and women are differently distributed across sectors, types of jobs and working time ar-
rangements, as shown in figure 1.2. Women are disproportionately employed in the tertiary
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sector, while this is the fact for men in agriculture. While men make up the majority of self
employed and employees subject to social security, women are overrepresented in marginal em-
ployment. Part-time arrangements are mainly a women’s field.
Source: Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2015)
Figure 1.2: Distribution of women and men across sectors and working time ar-
rangements
The unemployment rates of men and women converged in recent years, with the female unem-
ployment rate being lower than that of their male counterparts. However, the share of long term
unemployment is higher among women. According to the Federal Statistical Office women’s
wages were, on average, 22 percent lower than men’s in 2014 (Federal Statistical Office, 2016).
A particular feature of the German labor market is the ongoing division between the eastern
and western part. Even after 25 years of reunification, considerable differences exist between
East and West Germany, such as differences in participation rates, hours worked, unemployment
and especially with respect to gender differences in the labor market. Historically, women in the
German Democratic Republic experienced greater equality in the labor market than their West
German counterparts because both sexes were expected to be in paid work. While in West Ger-
9many, women tended to work unpaid at home, whereas men followed the traditional breadwinner
model, East German women had participation rates of 89 percent, compared to 92 percent for
men (Rosenfeld et al., 2004). This was largely driven by the fact that labor market participa-
tion varied little by parental or marital status, which was expedited by employment structures
and policy norms, and probably accompanied by different social norms and values concerning
childcare. After 1989, a rapid transformation of employment structures could be observed, but
the historically different background still continued to have an effect. Men’s participation rates
converged while the gender gap in participation rates remained smaller in East Germany, which
may indicate differences in cultural legacy, such as in attitudes towards full-time homemaking.
Today, mainly differences in maternal full-time employment can be observed, which is consid-
erably higher in East Germany (Holst and Wieber, 2014). The structural differences between
the East and West German labor market are not the focus of this thesis. However, they have
to be considered carefully in empirical applications by controlling for location or restricting the
sample to either one of the regions.
A central issue in analyzing gender differences in the labor market, especially when focusing
on differences in pay, is data availability. Studies based on individual survey data can provide
useful information on personal characteristics, but they lack variables related to the employer.
Further, a potential pitfall of such data is that the wage information may not always be given
or may possibly suffer from response bias. For a long time, studies on the German labor market
concentrated on either employees or organizations. This was due to a lack of data access. Link-
ing employer and employee data is a matter of high concern regarding data protection laws.
However, in 2004 a new data set became available in Germany that offered new possibilities of
simultaneous analysis of the supply and demand side of the labor market: the Linked Employer-
Employee Data Set of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). This unique data set
combines highly reliable individual level information from the process-generated data of the
Federal Employment Agency (BA) with the IAB Establishment Panel, which covers a range of
organizational characteristics. The data are provided by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the
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BA at the IAB. To ensure a regulated procedure that keeps track of all data protection issues,
data access is only possible via on-site use and subsequent remote data access. Information on
individuals is taken from the IAB’s Integrated Employment Biographies, in which data from
different sources are merged to cover all employees subject to social security, as well as marginal
part-time employment, recipients of social benefit, registered jobseekers and participants in em-
ployment measures. A detailed description of the data sources and the sampling procedure can
be found in Heining et al. (2013). Using these data, one can construct complete employment his-
tories covering employment and non-employment spells. For the employment spells information
is available on, among others, the occupation and daily gross wage as reported by the employer.
Data on establishments1 are taken from the IAB Establishment Panel (IABEP). The IABEP is
a representative annual survey of German establishments on employment policy-related subjects
with shifting priorities that covers all industries and firm sizes. Data are available from 1993
onwards for West Germany and since 1996 nationwide, including East Germany. All establish-
ments with at least one employee liable to social security represent the population of the panel.
Out of these approximately two million units, a disproportional stratified sample of around
16,000 establishments is surveyed. The sample is drawn from the establishment file as of 30th of
June of the previous year and stratification is based on federal state, industry and establishment
size. As large establishments, small federal states and small industries are overrepresented in
the sample, weighting factors are provided for cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis. Inter-
views are carried out by TNS Infratest in the form of face-to-face interviews. Response rates
vary between 63 to 73 percent, being even higher in establishments that continue to be part
of the panel. Each establishment receives an establishment number as unique identifier. This
number serves to identify an establishment as a survey unit throughout the years and to merge
the individual employment data. Most establishments are interviewed every year, so that the
resulting longitudinal structure allows panel analyses. Each wave of the questionnaire includes
items on general information on the establishment, employment structure and development,
1An establishment ”denotes a regionally and economically separate unit, in which employees liable to social
security work”(Fischer et al., 2009). Note that throughout the text the terms establishment, firm and organization
are used interchangeably.
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business policy, innovation and investment, vocational training, wages, and working time. Gen-
erally, these questions are identical over the year in order to form a longitudinal panel and depict
developments over time. Additionally, specific blocks are incorporated at certain intervals and
varying current focus subjects are included every year. Of peculiar interest in the discussion of
gender differences, are questions on gender mainstreaming that were part of the 2004 and 2008
questionnaires. A detailed description of the data and sample design can be found in Fischer
et al. (2009).
The LIAB allows analyses at the establishment level taking into account very detailed back-
ground information that capture a large amount of firm heterogeneity. Though, for analyses
covering individuals’ social background and fertility history, these data are not suitable. A use-
ful alternative is offered by the ALWA data set from the IAB, which will be used in chapter 3. A
full description of the data is provided in Kleinert et al. (2011). The ALWA data (the name de-
rives from the German study name Arbeiten und Lernen im Wandel) result from a retrospective
life course study that was carried out in 2007 and 2008 and made available in 2010. A major
advantage of the ALWA data is that they provide detailed information on education and em-
ployment, partners and children, and the history of habitation in one data set. This allows the
analysis of various dynamic processes in life, such as employment transitions or family formation.
The data were sampled from the underlying population of the birth cohorts 1956 to 1988 with
a primary residence in Germany. The survey was conducted via computer assisted telephone
interviews with retrospective longitudinal designs. The interview design consists of different
independent models in which the interviewee reports on aspects of educational and employment
throughout their lives. Anchoring and memory strategies help to complete the information and
fill possible gaps. Corrections are done in cooperation with the respondent. This questionnaire
design allows an extraordinary large range of topics to be covered and ensures consistency of
the data. Due to the complete life-course information, which is given in monthly intervals, the
data can be recoded to a longitudinal structure and offer the possibility to conduct, for example,
panel or survival analyses.
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It should be mentioned at this point that other data sources for the German labor market
are available than those described above; for example, the widely used German Socioeconomic
Panel (GSOEP) conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research or the Mikrozensus
provided by the Federal Statistical Office. However, most of them suffer from one or another
limitation. The Mikrozensus for instance provides detailed information on living conditions, but
cannot be used for panel analysis and offers only an interval coded income variable. For the
purpose of the text at hand, the LIAB and ALWA data turned out to be most suitable.
I conclude this introductory chapter by giving a brief overview of the three studies contained in
this thesis.
Chapter 2: Occupational Segregation and Organizational Characteristics - Empirical Evidence
for Germany
Chapter 2 studies the extent of occupational gender segregation in Germany with a particular
focus on the influence of organizational characteristics on the extent of firm level segregation.
Based on the 2004 and 2008 survey waves of the LIAB, the corrected dissimilarity index is cal-
culated for each establishment following Carrington and Troske (1997). This index captures the
amount of segregation, while accounting for a random distribution of men and women among
occupations in small firms, which would otherwise lead to an overestimation of segregation
due to random deviations from evenness. To identify the effect of firm characteristics on the
extent of segregation inside establishments while accounting for possible unobserved heterogene-
ity, different panel data models are applied. As explanatory variables, a set of organizational
characteristics is taken into account, as derived from theoretical considerations as well as from
previous empirical evidence. Our main variables of interest are the implementation of gender
mainstreaming measures and formalized recruitment procedures, as well as the share of part-
time workers. The latter has been a concern of theoretical work, but no significant effect has
been found in empirical studies so far. We argue, that effects of part-time work and human
resource policies cannot be interpreted in isolation from organizational demographics. Consid-
ering the female share in the workforce as a moderating variable leads to the result that in a
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male-dominated workforce an increase in the share of part-time employment is associated with
lower segregation levels. In the case of a high female share in the workforce, however, the
part-time share is positively related to the level of segregation. This suggests that part-time
employment can help to integrate women into a male-dominated workforce, but does not offer a
lead in for men. Similarly, we find an overall negative effect of the female share of the workforce
on the level of segregation within firms. This result confirms the assumption that men access
female-dominated spheres more easily than women enter a field dominated by men. The study
reveals that substantial variation in the amount of segregation is found across establishments
in the German labor market. Organizational characteristics can explain a large share of these
differences. In particular, organizational demographics have to be considered carefully, as they
moderate the effect of other influential factors.
Chapter 3: Potential Parenthood and Career Progression of Men and Women - A Simultaneous
Hazards Approach
In chapter 3, we will analyze individual career trajectories of men and women in Germany. The
goal of this study is to analyze the determinants of career transitions and to trace back gender
differences in the career progression patterns. Job transitions are categorized into upward, down-
ward or horizontal movements according to a change in personal responsibility, or alternatively
in terms of a change in job prestige as measured by the SIOPS scale. Our particular focus is
on the association of job changes with individual fertility. In contrast to most of the literature,
we focus on potential rather than realized fertility. Our analysis is based on a rich data set on
the life histories of people living in Germany. The ALWA (Working and Learning in a Changing
World) data set from the Institute for Employment Research contains the life histories of more
than 10,400 individuals. Besides information on schooling and training, we have detailed insight
on labor market behavior as well as on processes of family formation and regional mobility, all
on a monthly basis. We estimate a mixed multivariate proportional hazard model with compet-
ing risks. The three job transition equations are modeled simultaneously with the pregnancy
hazard, which enters as regressor in the career equations. As further explanatory variables, we
consider socioeconomic variables (educational and work history, partnership) as well as regional
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information based on the person’s history of habitation. We also consider the dependence of
career transitions on the time already spent in given or in previous career levels (duration de-
pendence and lagged duration dependence), and we allow for unobserved heterogeneity that
might be correlated among the different destination states. Our findings generally suggest lower
career mobility for women, even after controlling for relevant socioeconomic characteristics. The
results of the mixed multivariate proportional hazard models indicate that the relevant factors
influencing the career transitions follow different mechanisms for men and women. We find a
significant negative relationship between the contemporaneous probability of having a child and
horizontal career transitions for women, and a positive significant association of the hazard of
parenthood with upward career transitions for men. These effects persist if we apply fixed effects
panel data models allowing for correlation of individual parenthood hazards with unobserved
individual characteristics. Independent of their sources, the results suggest clear gender differ-
ences in the relationship between career patterns and potential fertility.
Chapter 4: Mind the Gap - Gender Wage Gap and Unemployment Rate in Local Labor Markets
Chapter 4 addresses the relationship between the gender wage gap and the local unemployment
rate. Looking at the differences in mean wages within German districts, one finds considerable
variation in the local gender wage gaps. This suggests that labor market conditions may serve
as an explanation of the gender wage gap, in addition to traditional approaches like differences
in human capital characteristics or discrimination. The wage curve, introduced by the semi-
nal paper of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), describes the inverse relationship between wages
and regional unemployment. Empirical evidence suggests that gender-specific wage curves exist.
This is why I conclude that the wage gap should also be related to the local unemployment rate.
To examine this relationship empirically, I use a linked employer-employee data set (LIAB from
the IAB) which combines wage information from the Federal Employment Agency with plant-
level data from the IAB establishment panel. The sample is restricted to West Germany from
2002 to 2008. I calculate a human capital-adjusted gender wage gap at the level of local labor
markets (German Landkreise) as well as at the firm level. The calculation is done based on
time- and region-specific wage curves. At the district level, I also apply a reweighting approach
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to explore the wage differential along the distribution. The resulting adjusted wage gaps are
then related to the local unemployment rate and, in case of the intra-firm wage gaps, also to
firm characteristics. The models are further extended by the effect of the unemployment rate
in the commuting area to capture possible spatial effects of unemployment on the wage gap.
The estimation results suggest that the gender wage gap is negatively associated with the local
unemployment rate. According to the wage curve literature, an increase in the unemployment
rate goes along with lower wages. The drop in wages will be more pronounced for men, which
provides the intuition for the effect of the unemployment rate on the wage gap. The negative
effect can be rationalized by the efficiency wage theory. Employers may pay a lower wage
premium for men, whereas for women’s wages the adjustment is less pronounced. Empirically,
I find a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the gender wage gap at the
district level as well as for the intra-firm wage gap. The spatial unemployment rate, however,
turns out to be positively related to the level of the gender wage gap. The effects survive using
different measures of the gender wage gap, as the raw gap or human capital-adjusted wage gaps
with different underlying wage functions. It is worth noting that organizational characteristics
can explain a substantial share of the gap within firms and interact with the effect of the
unemployment rate. Taken together, I believe that my results contribute to the literature on the
gender wage gap because, to my best knowledge, the implications of the wage curve approach
have not been considered in this context so far. Considering the local unemployment rate
might offer an explanation of the part of the gender wage gap that cannot fully be accounted
for by productivity differences, human capital, or other observed factors and that is otherwise
commonly attributed to discrimination.
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Chapter 2
Occupational Segregation and
Organizational Characteristics -
Empirical Evidence for Germany
2.1 Introduction
Occupational gender segregation, i.e. the unequal distribution of men and women across dif-
ferent positions and fields of the labor market, is a well-documented phenomenon. A relatively
high and stable level of segregation can be confirmed for the German labor market, particularly
in comparison with other European countries (European Commission, 2010). Despite the equal-
ization of women and men in many respects in and around the labor market, for example in
labor market participation rates and the investment in education and training (e.g. Ju¨rges and
Schneider, 2011), the level of segregation appears to be rather persistent. Job preferences that
differ between men and women hold as a supply-driven explanation of segregation. However,
the demand side of the labor market can be examined as another potential source, which is why
we put the firm at the center of our study.
The level of segregation within firms shows substantial variation across sectors and organiza-
This chapter is based on the article ’Occupational Segregation and Organizational Characteristics. Empirical
Evidence for Germany’ by Stefanie Seifert and Eva Schlenker.
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tional types. This suggests that firm characteristics may be related to the level of work force
segregation. Therefore, the aim of our paper is to investigate the level of within firm occupa-
tional segregation and to relate it to organizational characteristics in order to identify levers
that can facilitate the reduction of segregation. Identifying these levers is particularly relevant
since segregation reflects a dimension of social inequality. As separation based on different po-
sitions along the occupations and hierarchies goes along with different career trajectories and
remuneration, segregation can be seen as an obstacle to equal opportunities between genders.
Consequently, ways to promote more gender parity among employees are a question of high
political and social relevance. Moreover, if we assume a productivity increase for mixed-gender
working groups (empirical evidence is found, for example, by Lee and Farh, 2004), ways to re-
duce segregation can be of economic interest for companies.
Our paper studies the factors influencing the level of occupational gender segregation in German
firms based on the 2004 and 2008 survey waves of the Linked Employer-Employee data set from
the IAB (LIAB). The relationship between the extent of firm level segregation and organiza-
tional characteristics - such as the number of employees, the industrial sector, or organizational
demographics - has its theoretical foundation in organizational sociology (see Acker, 1990) as
well as in economic approaches, such as the theory of statistical discrimination.
Empirical evidence for the German labor market can be found, among others, in Achatz et al.
(2010) or Hinz and Schu¨bel (2001). The aim of our contribution is, first of all, to verify the
relationships found in these studies using recently available data and to extend the econometric
models by further explanatory variables of interest. The data structure of the LIAB allows
us to calculate segregation indices at the firm level and to perform subsequent estimations of
panel data models that control for numerous organizational characteristics. Our focus is on the
association of measures of gender mainstreaming and formalized recruitment procedures with
the extent of segregation within establishments. By studying these two potentially influencing
factors, we can show whether there is a systematic connection between measures in the field of
human resources and organization on the one side and the internal level of workforce segregation
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on the other side. Our paper also considers a new aspect of modeling the interdependent effect of
the proportion of part-time positions and the female share in the workforce. So far, no significant
influence of the proportion of part-time positions has been found in empirical investigations (e.g.
Achatz et al., 2010). We assume, however, that the true effect of part-time work only reveals if
the share of women in the organization is considered simultaneously in the estimation. To our
best knowledge, an interaction of both factors has not been empirically tested yet. This chap-
ter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of the theoretical background as
well as the present state of research on horizontal segregation. Section 2.3 introduces the data
and section 2.4 explains possible measures of horizontal segregation and describes the econo-
metric framework. Section 2.5 presents the findings regarding the extent of horizontal gender
segregation as well as the estimation results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Gender segregation in the labor market describes the different distribution of men and women
across occupations or occupational positions. One can distinguish between two dimensions - hor-
izontal and vertical segregation (see Blackburn et al., 2002) - and one can define these measures
at different levels, i.e. at the labor market or within firms. Horizontal segregation describes
the distribution of men and women across different firms, occupations, or industries. However,
the hierarchical level or the degree of responsibility is not considered. When being measured
at the labor market level, it demonstrates to what extent the gender ratio of the labor force is
reflected in each firm, occupation or industry. In contrast, segregation within a single company’s
workforce can be interpreted as a difference in opportunity structures within that organization
(Handl, 1984). Vertical segregation, as the second dimension of segregation, refers to the cor-
porate rank hierarchy of employees, which depicts the gender inequality that comes along with
higher income and differences in organizational power (e.g. Allmendinger and Podsiadlowski,
2001). In the following, we focus on the analysis of the extent of horizontal segregation while
choosing the firm as the unit of analysis. Aspects of vertical segregation are incorporated as
potential explanatory factors.
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Theoretical approaches that explain the emergence of segregation can be divided into supply- and
demand-oriented theories. Theories focusing on supply-side explanations claim that horizontal
gender segregation can be attributed to individual characteristics, pre-professional constellations
originating from outside the work environment as well as different preferences between men and
women. Approaches are, for instance, the theory of human capital (Becker, 1964) or preference
theory (Hakim, 1998). As opposed to this, demand-oriented approaches emphasize the existence
of social control mechanisms, structural constraints and barriers on the level of the labor market,
that make it more difficult for women to enter professions dominated by men. Moreover, such
approaches imply that employers practice discrimination and personnel selection, hampering the
entry of women into professions dominated by men and vice versa (for an overview see Busch,
2013). Apart from the role of the employer, demand-side approaches stress the organization’s
role as a social unit (see Achatz et al., 2010). This requires taking a firm level perspective,
which, in the field of segregation research, has mostly been neglected in early studies. The start-
ing point is to regard organizations as corporate actors that employ men and women for certain
positions, open up career opportunities and show preferences for a gender-specific selection of
staff for their positions (Baron and Bielby, 1980).
So far, several empirical studies have analyzed the relationship between different organizational
characteristics and the extent of occupational segregation in the tradition of organizational
theory. One of the most widely discussed factors is the firm size, measured by the number
of employees. A higher number of employees goes along with the implementation of human
resource policies, e.g. a formalization of recruitment procedures which impedes gender based
discrimination. In addition, gender-homogenous recruitment simply becomes more difficult as
the size of the company increases (e.g. Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs, 2001). For German es-
tablishments, Hinz and Schu¨bel (2001) show that the number of employees has a significantly
negative influence on the extent of occupational gender segregation.
Further, organizational demographics, i.e. the structure of the workforce, are empirically found
to influence the level of segregation within a firm. Special attention is drawn to the effect of the
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workforce’s gender ratio. Based on German data, Achatz et al. (2010) find a negative effect of
the proportion of women in the workforce (also Achatz, 2008; Allmendinger and Podsiadlowski,
2001; Beblo et al., 2008; and Bansak et al., 2012, for effects at labor market level in the USA).
This can be interpreted as an indicator of men having easier access to professions dominated by
women, while male-dominated occupational fields have strong entry barriers for women (Achatz
et al., 2010).
It can be assumed that further diversity categories - apart from gender - are connected with
segregation (see theories on intersectionality, e.g. Sieben and Bornheim, 2011). In our analysis,
we consider the age structure of the workforce. This is based on the theoretical assumption
that older cohorts might initially have a higher proportion of men. Moreover, it can be argued
that preferences concerning occupational choice and the employment behavior of women have
changed over the past decades. Therefore, one can assume that younger women who have started
their work life during the last years tend to fill more full-time positions as compared to older
women.
The proportion of part-time employees is another characteristic feature of the workforce whose
influence on the level of segregation is theoretically discussed. A high proportion of part-time
employment can be seen as an opportunity to enable women to enter male-dominated occu-
pational fields. However, Achatz et al. (2010) are not able to show significant effects of the
part-time share on the level of occupational segregation. We assume that the direction of the
effect depends on other variables of organizational demographics. Instead of facilitating a gender
balanced workforce, the offer of part-time work in an environment already dominated by women
might actually enforce segregation, as there is no ‘lead in’ for men. The direction of the effect
of the part-time share on segregation thus changes depending on the proportion of women in
the workforce (this mechanism is theoretically discussed in Allmendinger and Podsiadlowski,
2001). We model the moderating effect of the organizational demographics by considering the
interactions of the proportion of women and the share of part-time positions with regard to the
respective workforce in our empirical framework.
22 CHAPTER 2. OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION
Empirical evidence suggests that a firm’s legal form influences the level of segregation: For cor-
porations under public law in Germany, a higher degree of formalization can be expected leading
to lower segregation on average as a discriminating recruitment policy is more difficult to main-
tain (e.g. Achatz et al., 2010). It can further be argued that due to different legal conditions the
exogenous pressure on the organization varies in strength. Following the argumentation above,
we also expect less pronounced segregation structures in firms which have a lower organization
age. The age of the organization is assumed as an influencing factor here, as younger firms are
exposed to particularly strong legal and social pressure when it comes to gender equality (see
Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs, 2001, for the USA).
International evidence exists that the industrial sector in which a company operates serves as
another distinguishing feature for the extent of occupational segregation (among others OECD,
2012). This is driven by the varying distribution of men and women across different occupa-
tional fields as well as different corporate cultures within the industrial sectors. Furthermore,
a company’s location can influence the level of segregation. Especially in the case of Germany,
distinguishing between organizations located in East and West Germany is crucial in identi-
fying the driving factors. In this context, many studies have provided empirical evidence for
the differences between West and East German firms indicating a higher level of segregation
in East Germany (e.g. Falk, 2002; Trappe and Rosenfeld, 2001). For the time immediately af-
ter reunification, a higher level of segregation in East Germany can be interpreted as a result
of the state-controlled labor force distribution in the former GDR, where, despite high female
employment, women more frequently worked in typically female occupational fields than their
West German counterparts (see Busch, 2013). The fact that these differences increased shortly
after reunification and have remained consistent until today is connected to the decline of the
proportion of women in total employment in East Germany and implies transformation-related
reasons in the form of changes in the occupational structure (see Falk, 2002). All factors dis-
cussed above have been subject to international research and their relationship to the extent
of occupational gender segregation has been empirically confirmed. We therefore consider the
discussed factors as control variables in our analysis.
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However, less attention has been paid to the relationship between segregation and formalized
recruitment processes as well as gender mainstreaming policies, presumably because of the lim-
ited availability of data. At the international level, the studies of Stainback and Kwon (2012)
and Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs (2001) analyze the effects of formalized processes in organi-
zations. They find that formalization can promote a balanced gender distribution under certain
conditions. Thereby, a well-known theoretical argument is that the less formalized organiza-
tional routines are, the more room is left for “cronyism, subjectivism, sex stereotyping and bias”
(Reskin and McBrier, 2000, p. 214) in recruitment processes, job assessment, or in promotion.
Further, we look at the implementation of active gender mainstreaming measures. While some
studies discuss these as a form of formalized personnel routines, possibly due to data restrictions,
we consider them as an independent factor. In their study, Stainback and Kwon (2012) show a
negative effect of equal opportunity measures on horizontal segregation for South Korean data.
A negative association between the implementation of gender mainstreaming and horizontal seg-
regation in Germany also results from the bivariate analysis carried out by Beblo et al. (2008).
Achatz et al. (2010) assume a causal relationship, however, the authors cannot verify this empir-
ically as their analysis is based on data without information on whether gender equality policies
exist. We close this particular research gap by using other waves of the same data set for our
analysis which include variables for the implementation of gender mainstreaming. Using these
waves of the LIAB, we are also able to identify the degree of formalization in organizations and
to analyze its effect on the extent of firm level gender segregation.
Using American data, Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs (2001) analyze the influence of bureau-
cracy. They find that bureaucratization in general does not lead to a reduction of segregation,
but that the direction of effect depends on other organization-specific variables such as man-
agement culture. A corresponding interdependence of formalization and other organizational
characteristics for Germany is also assumed by Allmendinger and Podsiadlowski (2001). Conse-
quently, we will empirically consider the interaction of the gender ratio in the workforce and the
degree of formalization. Another determinant of the level of occupational segregation, which,
from our point of view, has not been sufficiently studied yet, is vertical segregation. Stainback
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and Kwon (2012) also analyze this connection and find a positive relationship for South Korean
data. We assume a connection between horizontal and vertical segregation (see Blackburn et al.,
2002), yet, the exact direction of the effect is theoretically ambiguous and should be investi-
gated in empirical studies. It is possible that the gender ratio in leadership structures has an
effect on horizontal segregation, or that horizontal segregation entails inequalities in the vertical
dimension. The latter is based on the assumption that wage discrimination despite equal work
performance is easier when men and women do not work in the same professions than it is
with work in comparable fields (Ludsteck, 2014). Thus, we consider the share of women in top
management positions, serving as an indicator of vertical segregation, as an explanatory factor
in our model. Further research in the field of gender segregation, which is not reviewed here,
refers to the empirical investigation of supply-side theories as well as studies on the consequences
of occupational segregation, such as the gender pay gap (e.g. Busch, 2013; Gartner and Hinz,
2009). In the following, we will concentrate on the empirical investigation of factors explaining
firm level occupational segregation.
2.3 Data
This study uses the cross-sectional model of the Linked Employer-Employee Data (LIAB) from
the IAB.1 The LIAB data link process-generated personal data of the Federal Employment
Agency and of the social security system with data from the IAB establishment panel (IABEP).
The IABEP is a representative, disproportionately drawn random sample of establishments
with at least one employee subject to social security contribution. The annual panel survey
(reference date 30th of June) covers recurring information on firm size, workforce structure,
or turnover, but also alternating selected issues such as gender mainstreaming. The process
data consist of employee and benefit notifications as of 30th of June, covering those persons,
who at that time were employed by an establishment panel firm. Not included are therefore
occupational groups such as self-employed, civil servants, or those in minor employment. A
detailed description of the data can be found in Heining et al. (2013). The LIAB offers the
1Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employ-
ment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and subsequently remote data access.
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exceptional opportunity to analyze workforce characteristics in combination with establishment
characteristics so that labor supply and labor demand can be viewed simultaneously. For the
analysis at hand, the waves of 2004 and 2008 are used as these waves of the IAB establishment
panel contain additional questions on gender mainstreaming. Our sample is restricted to firms
with more than 20 employees who are subject to social security contribution, since gender
segregation is largely influenced by random fluctuations in smaller businesses. For technical
reasons, only firms with a workforce consisting of both men and women and firms with more
than one occupational group are included in the analysis. Table A.1 in the appendix shows the
descriptive statistics of the data for the years 2004 and 2008.
2.4 Econometric Framework
Calculation and correction of the dissimilarity index
In order to gather and quantify the gender-related segregation in the labor market, various
concepts for the operationalization and measurement of the unequal distribution of the sexes
across occupations exist. Segregation indices constitute one possibility of condensing the extent
of segregation to a single key figure. The existing literature on index measures of occupational
segregation is comprehensive and offers numerous approaches (for an overview see Flu¨ckiger and
Silber, 1999). For this article, we decided on the dissimilarity index introduced by Duncan and
Duncan (1955). On the one hand, this index captures the horizontal dimension of segregation
that we are interested in, and on the other hand, it is in widespread use in the current literature,
facilitating the comparison of our results. The dissimilarity index at the labor market level is
defined as
DI =
1
2
∑
j
∣∣∣Fj
F
− Mj
M
∣∣∣ (2.1)
with j = 1, . . . ,m occupations, where Fj (Mj) states the number of women (men) in occupation
j and F (M) the total number of females (males) in the labor market. For the calculation of
the value at the establishment level (DIi), we adapt the formula.
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The segregation within an establishment is calculated as
DIi =
1
2
∑
j
∣∣∣Fij
Fi
− Mij
Mi
∣∣∣ (2.2)
with i = 1, . . . , n establishments and j = 1, . . . ,m occupations, whereby the size of the workforce
is chosen as the reference value. Thus Fij (Mij) stands for the number of females (males) in
firm i and profession j, and Fi (Mi) denotes the number of females (males) in firm i. In order
to receive a meaningful value for Germany as a whole, the index values are averaged over all
firms using weighting factors (DIi)
2. The dissimilarity index is normalized to the [0; 1] interval,
with the value 0 showing that the same gender ratio can be found in all professions. The value 1
indicates complete segregation, i.e. either only women or only men are present in each profession.
A limitation of the index is that a random allocation can correspond to nonzero segregation in
the case of small group sizes. For the application of the dissimilarity index at the establishment
level, it follows that in firms where certain professional groups are poorly occupied, a strong
segregation might be measured even if men and women were randomly distributed (given the
gender ratio of the workforce). This issue has been addressed by Carrington and Troske (1997)
who show by simulation that it is necessary to control for random deviations from evenness. To
account for this problem, they develop a corrected version of the dissimilarity index, which we
will use in our study to account for possibly small occupational group sizes. Based on a random
distribution, a hypothetical index value (DI∗) which depends on the number of employees for
a given size of the professional group is initially simulated. The corrected dissimilarity index
(DIcor) then results from the deviation of the measured value (DI) from the hypothetical index
value (DI∗) and is defined in the [−1; 1] interval:
DIcor =

DI−DI∗
1−DI∗ for DI ≥ DI∗
DI−DI∗
DI∗ for DI < DI
∗
(2.3)
2 For descriptive statistics on DIi we use the weighting factors of the cross-sectional data provided by the
IAB establishment panel. These weighting factors are necessary as the IAB establishment panel is based on a
disproportionate sample regarding the characteristics establishment size, industrial sector and federal state.
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We calculate the corrected index first at the level of the labor market (DIcor) and also indi-
vidually for each establishment (DIi,cor). The correction allows us to capture the systematic
extent of horizontal segregation. Random influences are controlled and no longer lead to an
overestimation of the actual extent of segregation.
Estimation strategy
The aim of this study is to describe not only the extent of gender segregation in German
firms and on the labor market as a whole, but most importantly the influence of organizational
characteristics on segregation. To control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, we
exploit the panel structure of the LIAB. Using the data of the survey waves from the years 2004
and 2008, we are able to carry out different estimations that exploit the within and between
variation in the data. We estimate a model of the following form
DICORit = β0 + β1formalismit + β2formalismit × FSit + β3mainstrit
+β4mainstrit × FSit + β5ptsit + β6ptsit × FSit + β7FSit (2.4)
+β8topshareit + β9topshare
2
it + β10topshare
3
it +Xitα+ ci + uit.
DICORit marks the corrected dissimilarity index as described in equation (2.3) in establishment
i at time t, which is normalized to a [0; 1] interval.3 formalismit and mainstrit are dummy
variables that take the value 1 if establishment i at time t uses formalized recruitment proce-
dures or applies gender mainstreaming measures respectively. FSit marks the female share in
the workforce of establishment i at time t. ptsit denotes the proportion of part-time employees in
establishment i at time t. topshareit refers to the share of women in top management positions
in establishment i at time t. Vector Xit comprises the control variables: Location (East/West
Germany), age of organization, number of employees, year, share of graduates, share of female
3For the purpose of regression analysis we transform the index values to a [0; 1] interval. By linearly trans-
forming the corrected index, we can estimate fractional response models, which are characterized by the fact that
the dependent variable is limited to the [0; 1] interval. We make use of the fact that a linear transformation of
the dependent variable does not alter the signs of the estimated coefficients. The transformation is carried out as
DICORi = 0.5 + 0.5 ·DIi,cor.
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graduates, number of employees in typical male/female professions, mean age of employees, vari-
ation coefficient of employee age, number of occupational groups in the establishment, industrial
sector, legal form, collective bargaining, works council, downsizing indicator and a constant. ci
describes a time constant firm fixed effect. uit is the error term. The full description of regressors
is given in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: List of regressors
Variable Description
Year2008 Dummy variable: 1=2008; 0=2004
Female share (FS) Proportion of women in the workforce
Gender mainstreaming Dummy variable for application of measures promoting the equality
of men and women
Formalism Dummy variable indicating formalized recruitment procedures
Part-time share (pts) Share of part-time workers in the workforce
Topshare Share of women in top management positions
East Germany Dummy variable: 1=East Germany, 0=West Germany
Age of establishment Dummy variable defined as 1 when the establishment was founded
before 1990
Firm size Number of employees (logarithmical)
Share of graduates Share of employees with university degree
Share of female graduates Share of female employees with university degree
Female/male professions Percentage of employees typical in male/female professions, where a
profession is defined as a male/female profession when at labor market
level more than 70 percent of the employees in this profession are
male/female.
Mean age Average age of employees
Variation age Variation coefficient of employee age
No. of occup. groups Number of occupational groups
Industrial sector (17 categories)
Agriculture/forestry
Mining/energy
Food/luxury
Consumer goods
Investment goods
Inv./consumer goods
Building sector
Trade/manufacturing
Continued on next page...
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... table 2.1 continued
Traffic/news
Financial/insurance
Restaurants
Educational institutions
Health/social sector
Services for concerns
Other services
Civil service
Social insurance
Legal form (6 categories)
Individually-owned firm
Partnership
Limited liability company
Company limited by shares
Public corporation
Other legal form
Collective bargaining Dummy variable defined as 1 in case of collective bargaining
Works council Dummy variable defined as 1 if works council exists
Downsizing Dummy variable defined as 1 if the number of employees decreased
by a minimum of 10 percent compared to the previous year
By incorporating the interaction effects of the proportion of women in the workforce and the
proportion of part-time positions as well as interactions between the female share and gender
mainstreaming or formalism respectively, we can flexibly model the direction of the relationship
of these influencing factors and thus depict theoretically assumed interdependencies between the
independent variables.4
Regarding the estimation of our model, it should be noted that we cannot rule out that unob-
served heterogeneity between the firms exists, for example in the form of the corporate culture.
By using numerous control variables, we assume that the possibly existing endogeneity of the
explanatory variables is significantly reduced and that unobserved factors such as the corporate
culture can be seen as time-constant in the considered period and are therefore captured by the
4We have also estimated the models separately for establishments employing mostly white-collar or mostly
blue-collar workers. If the ratio of blue-collar to white-collar workers was more than 60/40 (less than 40/60),
an establishment was categorized as ‘blue collar’ (‘white collar’). The results do not show significant differences
in the direction of effects of the explaining variable between the two sectors. However, the coefficients differ in
strength. The results are available on request.
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firm fixed effect ci. To account for the problem of time-constant unobserved heterogeneity, we
use panel data models which explicitly control for the company-specific individual effects.
Following Wooldridge (2010), we treat the unobserved effect as a time-constant random variable
and write the basic unobserved effects model in the error form as
yit = xitβ + ci + uit, (2.5)
where xit is the vector that holds firm-specific observable variables, ci represents an unobserved
but time-constant heterogeneity term and uit is the idiosyncratic error term. Assuming contem-
poraneous exogeneity of the idiosyncratic error and that the unobserved effect is uncorrelated
with the regressors, one can consistently estimate the model using pooled OLS (POLS). Under
the stronger assumption of strict exogeneity (uit has to be uncorrelated with the regressors at
any time period), one can improve upon POLS in terms of efficiency by exploiting the structure
of the error term. Again, one has to assume zero correlation between the regressors and ci as
in the POLS model. This assumption, however, is critical. Allowing for ci to be arbitrarily
correlated with xit may be necessary in some cases.
To account for possible correlation between the heterogeneity term and the regressors, we can
apply a fixed effects model (FE). Under the strict exogeneity assumption the FE estimation leads
to unbiased estimates while allowing for an arbitrary correlation between xit and ci. However,
only the within variation is used for the estimation of the coefficients, which is why no effects of
time-constant variables can be estimated. The variables that we use are organizational charac-
teristics which predominantly show variation at the intercompany level. Yet, we observe little
variation within firms over time as most organizational characteristics remain stable and show
only few changes within a four-year period (e.g. industry and location only change in individual
cases). As a result, some effects cannot be estimated and others only on the basis of a small
number of cases with variation over time. Consequently, high standard errors of the estimators
and therefore missing significances occur.
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Alternatively, one can apply a Correlated Random Effects Model (CRE), which exploits both
within and between variation and can therefore estimate coefficients on time-constant regressors.
CRE allows for correlation between ci and the regressors, but distributional assumptions on the
unobserved effect have to be made. The coefficients on the time-variant regressors turn out to
be the same as in the FE approach. As CRE cannot improve upon FE in terms of validity in
our case, we have decided to omit the model. Random effects models (RE) or POLS regressions
are more suitable as they rely on the analysis of intercompany differences and less on within
variation. As discussed above, the problematic assumption for both estimation methods is, how-
ever, that the specific unobserved heterogeneity of the firms, i.e. the company-specific effect ci,
must not be correlated with the regressors. We cannot rule out that some of the regressors we
use are correlated with unobserved characteristics. To the extent to which that is the case, it
limits a purely causal interpretation of the estimated effects, which needs to be considered in the
discussion of the results. We decided to use both POLS and RE under these constraints, yet we
report the result of the FE estimation in the appendix. A direct comparison of RE and POLS
models shows that RE models, under the validity of all assumptions, estimate more efficiently
than POLS. However, strict exogeneity is required as identifying assumption in the RE model.
This can be problematic if we expect serial correlation in the variables. Such a correlation
structure might exist in our data as, for example, we cannot rule out a relationship between the
level of segregation in 2004 and the implementation of equality measures or formalized personnel
recruitment processes in 2008. In this case, POLS would be more suitable as it does not require
the assumption of strict exogeneity. Eventually, we decided to juxtapose the two models.
Besides unobserved heterogeneity, another aspect of our model has to be taken into account:
Our dependent variable is defined as a continuous variable in the [0; 1] interval. The effect of any
particular regressor cannot be constant throughout its range. This issue is already addressed
by the non-linear form of the interaction terms. Nevertheless, the predicted values of the POLS
or RE regression can still be outside the unit interval. To account for this, we additionally
estimate the model from equation (2.5) as a fractional probit model (FP) following Papke and
Wooldridge (1996). Thereby, the fact that the dependent variable, i.e. the corrected dissimilar-
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ity index, is of bounded nature is considered. Moreover, it allows outcomes at the endpoints by
using the standard normal cumulative density function as a non-linear link function, for which
0 ≤ Φ(·) ≤ 1. As proposed in Papke and Wooldridge (1996), we estimate this model using
a pooled Bernoulli quasi-maximum likelihood estimator. We report the result along with the
POLS and RE estimation results to account for the sensitivity of the structural form to non-
linear modeling. In the fractional probit model, the specification of the correlation structure
of the companies’ unobserved heterogeneity with the other explaining variables is analogous to
POLS and RE: Zero correlation between the regressors and ci is assumed. As in the linear
models, it is possible to relax this assumption. For that reason, we apply a panel data model
for fractional response variables (PFR) as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (2008). Here as
well, the standard normal cumulative density function is used as non-linear link function as in
the fractional probit model, but time averages of all regressors are additionally added to the
regression. This allows correlation between the regressors and ci, but distributional assumptions
on ci have to be made. Yet, because of the low variation over time in the data we used, the
limitations discussed above equally apply.
2.5 Empirical Results
The extent of gender segregation in German firms
On the basis of the LIAB, we calculated the dissimilarity index as introduced by Duncan and
Duncan (1955) (DI, DIi) as well as the corrected index by Carrington and Troske (1997) (DIcor,
DIi,cor) at the labor market and the establishment level for the years 2004 and 2008. We mea-
sure the (un)equal distribution of men and women across occupational groups. This grouping
was chosen because the more refined the breakdown of occupations, the larger the extent of
random segregation would be. For that purpose, we compile all three-digit occupational titles
to two-digit ones, which leads us to a maximum of 65 occupational groups per establishment
(see table A.1 in the appendix). Table 2.2 provides an overview of the calculated values of the
dissimilarity index at labor market level (DI, DIcor) and at establishment level (DIi, DIi,cor)
in the years 2004 and 2008.
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Table 2.2: Dissimilarity indices at labor market and establishment level by year
2004 2008
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Labor market level
DI 0.5481 0 7326 0.5437 0 6616
DIcor 0.5463 0 7326 0.5416 0 6616
Establishment level
DIi 0.5796 0.2852 7326 0.5695 0.2810 6616
DIi,cor 0.4211 0.3767 7326 0.4082 0.3691 6616
Source: LIAB, own calculation using weighting factors.
As measured in terms of the dissimilarity index by Duncan and Duncan (1955), segregation is
lower at the labor market level (0.5481) compared to the establishment level (0.5796) in 2004.
The same pattern is found in 2008 (0.5437 as opposed to 0.5695). Our results correspond with
the findings of previous empirical studies. For instance, Hinz and Schu¨bel (2001), who calculate
the index in accordance with Duncan and Duncan (1955), show that segregation is higher at the
establishment level than on the labor market as a whole. However, a different picture emerges
as soon as the corrected index is applied, as shown by, e.g., Achatz et al. (2010). Our results
confirm this finding. At the labor market level, the corrected DIcor yields a value of 0.5463
in the year 2004. With 0.4211 the value at the establishment level is lower. Also in 2008,
the segregation at the labor market level is higher than at the establishment level (0.5416 and
0.4082 respectively), measured by the corrected index. The comparison of the correction effect
at the labor market and establishment level shows that the seemingly higher segregation at the
establishment level measured by the uncorrected index can be explained with a higher random
distribution within the small units: While the correction at the labor market level effects change
only little - here each occupational group is represented by large numbers of employees - the
index drops substantially at the establishment level after correction. This result suggests that
the application of the correction procedure is necessary once the establishment level is taken
into account. Regarding the development over time, we cannot determine any relevant changes
between 2004 and 2008, neither for the corrected, nor for the uncorrected index.
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As reported in table 2.2, the level of segregation considerably varies between establishments.
In order to explain this observed heterogeneity, we first descriptively analyze the conditional
distributions of the DIi,cor by different organizational characteristics. It appears that the mean
level of segregation varies systematically with organizational characteristics such as firm size,
industrial sector or location. Features of organizational demographics as well as the existence
of formalized recruitment procedures and gender mainstreaming seem to be associated with the
level of DIi,cor.
5 Figure 2.1 shows the mean values of the firm level corrected dissimilarity index
by sector and year.
Source: LIAB, own calculation using weighting factors.
Figure 2.1: Corrected dissimilarity index by sector and year
In figure 2.2 one can see how the mean DIi,cor varies depending on the proportion of women in
the workforce. It is worth noting that with a very low proportion of women (≤ 0.1), the seg-
regation is substantially more pronounced than with a very high proportion of women (> 0.9),
even though there is the same asymmetry between the number of men and women. This can be
interpreted as an indication that men integrate more easily in female occupations than women
do in male occupations (see Achatz et al., 2010). Yet, this example reveals the limitation of
the bivariate analysis: The proportion of women in the workforce is not independent of other
organizational characteristics, such as the industrial sector. A clear statement about the actual
5For a detailed discussion of the bivariate relations see Seifert and Schlenker (2014).
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Source: LIAB, own calculation using weighting factors.
Figure 2.2: Corrected dissimilarity index by female share in the workforce and year
effects of the proportion of women in the workforce can therefore not be drawn solely based on
bivariate analysis.
Multivariate estimation results
The bivariate results are now to be verified by means of multivariate models. For that pur-
pose, we estimate three model types: pooled OLS, random effects, and fractional probit. In
each model, the dependent variable is the linear transformation of the corrected dissimilarity
index at the establishment level (DICORit in the [0; 1] interval). We compare the specification
presented in equation (2.5) with estimation results based on a functional form without interac-
tions in the variables related to the proportion of women in the workforce. This specification
illustrates which influence the non-linear modeling (i.e. using interactions) of the effects of the
variables gender mainstreaming, formalism, and proportion of part-time employment has, com-
pared with the models presented in previous studies, which only consider the base effect of the
variables. Table 2.3 provides an overview of the estimation results for the POLS, RE and FP
model. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.3 show the results of the POLS estimations. Columns
(3), (4) and (5), (6) contain the estimation results for the RE and FP models. Columns with
odd numbers show the specification without interactions and columns with even numbers show
the model with interactions added. Only selected coefficients are displayed. The full list of
coefficients is reported in table A.2 in the appendix.
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Table 2.3: Selected estimation results of the POLS, RE, and FP models in different
specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(POLS) (POLS) (RE) (RE) (FP) (FP)
Year2008 −0.0021 −0.0044 −0.0083∗∗∗ −0.0087∗∗∗ −0.0057 −0.0135
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0103) (0.0101)
Proportion of women (FS) −0.1639∗∗∗ −0.2614∗∗∗ −0.1593∗∗∗ −0.2310∗∗∗ −0.4962∗∗∗ −0.8329∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0168) (0.0135) (0.0159) (0.0347) (0.0457)
Gender Mainst. × FS 0.0483∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.1722∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0095) (0.0343)
Gender Mainstreaming −0.0081∗∗∗ −0.0284∗∗∗ −0.0024 −0.0143∗∗∗ −0.0255∗∗∗ −0.1028∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0058) (0.0023) (0.0043) (0.0087) (0.0188)
Formalism −0.0087∗∗∗ −0.0274∗∗∗ −0.0048∗ −0.0195∗∗∗ −0.0274∗∗∗ −0.0974∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0059) (0.0025) (0.0044) (0.0094) (0.0198)
Formalism × FS 0.0442∗∗∗ 0.0341∗∗∗ 0.1548∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0107) (0.0368)
Part-time share 0.0020 −0.2079∗∗∗ −0.0011 −0.1562∗∗∗ 0.0160 −0.6742∗∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0249) (0.0094) (0.0251) (0.0255) (0.0681)
Part-time share × FS 0.3242∗∗∗ 0.2397∗∗∗ 1.0563∗∗∗
(0.0378) (0.0385) (0.1012)
Establishment size(ln) −0.0229∗∗∗ −0.0244∗∗∗ −0.0221∗∗∗ −0.0231∗∗∗ −0.0667∗∗∗ −0.0709∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0060) (0.0059)
Age of establishment 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0503∗∗∗ 0.0509∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0109) (0.0108)
East Germany 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0622∗∗∗ 0.0578∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0111) (0.0110)
Top share 0.1172∗∗ 0.1224∗∗∗ 0.0989∗∗∗ 0.1022∗∗∗ 0.3249∗∗ 0.3402∗∗∗
(0.0455) (0.0451) (0.0365) (0.0368) (0.1278) (0.1267)
Top share2 −0.3178∗∗ −0.3387∗∗ −0.2865∗∗ −0.2970∗∗ −0.8580∗∗ −0.9248∗∗
(0.1466) (0.1454) (0.1187) (0.1198) (0.4076) (0.4043)
Top share3 0.1981∗ 0.2110∗∗ 0.1861∗∗ 0.1920∗∗ 0.55312∗ 0.5735∗∗
(0.1044) (0.1036) (0.0844) (0.0852) (0.2891) (0.2868)
N 9087 9087 9087 9087 9087 9087
R2 0.3975 0.4088
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Source: LIAB, own calculation.
All models control for industry sector, legal form, share of employees in typical male/female occupations, mean
and variation coefficient of employee age, number of occupational groups, collective bargaining, works council,
downsizing, share of graduates among employees and among female employees.
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We can see that particularly the relationship between segregation and the proportion of part-
time is strongly context-sensitive, i.e. it differs depending on the proportion of women in the
workforce. Without consideration of the interaction term, as in models (1), (3) and (5), no
significant effect is found in any of the models. This might be the result of positive and negative
effects balancing out in the total sample. Considering the interactions with the proportion of
women in the workforce, all three models yield highly significant results. The interpretation of
the coefficients on female share and part-time share is not straightforward. Thus, for a mean-
ingful interpretation, one has to consider the partial effects at different values of the variables.
Source: LIAB, own calculation.
Figure 2.3: Average partial effects of part-time share on the corrected dissimilarity
index (POLS, RE)
Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship based on the POLS and RE models as reported in column
(2) and (4) in table 2.3. The reported effects are the average partial effects of the part-time
share, evaluated at different values of the female share. The plotted values show the amount
of change in the level of segregation (measured in terms of DIi,COR) with a one unit change
in part-time share while holding the female share constant at different values. Along with the
theoretical argumentation, one can clearly see that the partial effects of an increase in part-time
share depend on the female share. Whereas in firms with a higher proportion of women, an
increase in the proportion of part-time jobs is associated with significantly higher segregation, it
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is negatively related to the segregation level in a male-dominated environment. This shows that
the coefficients of the proportion of women in the workforce and the proportion of part-time
jobs can only simultaneously be interpreted meaningfully.
For the coefficients of the variables gender mainstreaming and formalism, the interaction with
the proportion of women in the workforce also proves highly significant in all three estimation
procedures. As with the effect of part-time share, the effects of formalism and gender main-
streaming cannot be interpreted solely from the estimated beta coefficients. To see how the
effects vary by the proportion of women in the workforce, average partial effects have to be
calculated for different values of the female share. We find a significant effect of the implementa-
tion of gender mainstreaming on the corrected dissimilarity index which varies depending on the
female share in an establishment. Figure 2.4 shows these dependencies for the POLS and RE
model, i.e. models (2) and (4) in table 2.3. The average partial effects of gender mainstreaming
for different values of the female share are plotted. It can be seen that in firms with less than
60 percent women in the workforce gender mainstreaming goes along with a lesser extent of
segregation. However, the average partial effect becomes positive with a higher proportion of
women.
Source: LIAB, own calculation.
Figure 2.4: Average partial effects of gender mainstreaming on the corrected dis-
similarity index (POLS, RE)
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The effect of formalized procedures proves significant in all estimated models with and without
interaction. While models (1), (3) and (5) suggest a generally negative relationship between for-
malism and the level of segregation, a more nuanced picture emerges from models (2), (4) and
(6): Formalized processes in personnel selection correspond to a lower level of segregation when
applied in organizations with less than 60 percent women in the workforce. However, along with
a higher female share, positive partial effects of formalized processes on the segregation level are
observed. This can be seen in figure 2.5, which shows the average partial effects for formalized
processes in personnel selection (formalism as estimated in models (2) and (4), table 2.3). Again,
the partial effects are calculated at different values of the female share with all other variables
evaluated at their observed values.
Source: LIAB, own calculation.
Figure 2.5: Average partial effects of formalism on the corrected dissimilarity index
(POLS, RE)
The results suggest that the implementation of gender mainstreaming and formalized processes
in personnel selection are associated with, on average, lower segregation levels within establish-
ments. As those measures are organizational characteristics that can - at least theoretically-
be changed in the short term, they should be discussed as potential levers for the reduction of
segregation. However, it has to be considered, that the partial effects of the different variables
are highly context-sensitive with respect to the female share in the workforce. The insights
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from figures 2.4 and 2.5 allow two possible interpretations: On the one hand, the existence of
gender mainstreaming as well as formalized processes in personnel selection ease women’s entry
into male-dominated occupations in establishments where the workforce predominantly consists
of male workers. On the other hand, neither the implementation of formalized procedures nor
of gender mainstreaming measures are associated with a reduction of the segregation level in
establishments that already employ a high proportion of female workers.
Furthermore, the effect of the female share itself is of particular interest. As the proportion
of women in the workforce is interacted with three variables in our specification, a graphical
illustration of the partial effects is not possible in the two dimensional space. Table 2.4 reports
the average partial effects for selected coefficients of the POLS, RE and FP models. As for
the effect of the female share, the average partial effect is highly significant and around −0.14
throughout all models including interactions terms (columns 2, 4 and 6 of table 2.4). The extent
of the correlation is therefore to be regarded as dominant compared with the other estimated
coefficients. The negative relationship between the proportion of women in the workforce and
segregation is in line with previous results from, e.g., Achatz et al. (2010), who also report on
average lower segregation in establishments with a higher female share. This suggests that the
entry barriers for women into male-dominated occupations are higher than the ones for men into
female-dominated occupations .
To estimate the influence of vertical segregation, we utilize the proportion of women at the top
management level (topshare). We model the effect of the proportion of women in top manage-
ment positions as a third-degree polynomial and observe a significant correlation. The results
suggest that an increase in the proportion of women in management positions at low or high
base levels (< 0.20 or > 0.80) is associated with higher segregation. At a base level in between,
an increase of women in management positions corresponds with a lower level of segregation
(see figure 2.6 for POLS and RE). However, it should be noted, that low levels of the female
share in top management positions are rather common. The size of the estimated coefficient for
vertical segregation is comparable with the one for the female share in the workforce. Table 2.4
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reveals that the average partial effect is negative. This may be explained by the fact that the
mean female share in top positions is less than 15 percent in our sample (see table A.1 in the
appendix).
Source: LIAB, own calculation.
Figure 2.6: Estimated effect of the top share on the corrected dissimilarity index
(POLS, RE)
Corresponding to our theoretical considerations discussed in section 2.2, we also find a posi-
tive estimated coefficient for the age of the organization and a significant correlation with the
employees’ age structure (reported in table A.2 in the appendix). In accordance with previous
studies, we also find a significantly negative effect of the firm size on the corrected dissimilar-
ity index, a significantly higher level of segregation in East German companies, and significant
differences by industrial sectors (see table A.2). We can thus validate the previous empirical
studies with our results. Moreover, by expanding the examination regarding context-sensitive
relationships, namely the proportion of part-time jobs as well as formalized processes and gen-
der mainstreaming, we can contribute to a better understanding of differences in the level of
segregation in German firms.
The results discussed above prove stable across the POLS and RE estimation models, as demon-
strated in table 2.3. In addition, the directions of the estimated FP coefficients are also in line
with the other models’ results. However, those are not comparable in their magnitude. For a
meaningful interpretation of the FP model, average partial effects have to be calculated for all
42 CHAPTER 2. OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION
coefficients in order to account for the nonlinear structure of the model. Therefore, table 2.4
reports the average partial effects for selected coefficients. The full list of average partial effects
for the FP models is reported in table A.3 in the appendix. Figure 2.7 additionally provides
insight into selected partial effects of gender mainstreaming and formalism at different values
of the female share. It shows the non-linearity in the partial effects along the female share.
Nevertheless, the effects are close to the ones estimated by POLS and RE.
Table 2.4: Selected average partial effects of the POLS, RE and FP models in
different specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables POLS POLS RE RE FP FP
Gender Mainstreaming −0.0081∗∗∗ −0.0070∗∗ −0.0024 −0.0019 −0.0084∗∗∗ −0.0068∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Formalism −0.0087∗∗∗ −0.0079∗∗ −0.0048∗ −0.0044∗ −0.0091∗∗∗ −0.00076∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Proportion of women (FS) −0.1639∗∗∗ −0.1461∗∗∗ −0.1593∗∗∗ −0.1482∗∗∗ −0.1638∗∗∗ −0.1377∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0114) (0.0113)
Part-time share 0.0020 −0.0648∗∗∗ −0.0011 −0.0503∗∗∗ 0.0053 −0.0552∗∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0113) (0.0094) (0.0112) (0.0084) (0.0094)
Top share 0.0856∗∗ 0.0887∗∗∗ 0.0728∗∗∗ 0.0748∗∗∗ 0.0776∗∗ 0.0803∗∗∗
(0.0342) (0.0339) (0.0273) (0.0276) (0.0315) (0.0311)
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Source: LIAB, own calculation.
As can be seen in table 2.4 and figure 2.7, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in the
FP model is comparable to the one of the RE model and does not differ considerably from the
POLS estimates. While the non-linear modeling of the structural form as in equation (2.5),
which includes the interaction terms, seems to have a strong effect on the estimated coefficients
(compare even and odd columns in tables 2.3), the additional non-linear form of the FP model
does not lead to substantially different results regarding the average partial effects.
So far, the models discussed rely on the assumption of zero correlation between ci and the regres-
sors. However, as already discussed theoretically, the validity of the identification assumptions
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Source: LIAB, own calculation.
Figure 2.7: Average partial effects of gender mainstreaming and formalism on the
corrected dissimilarity index (FP)
of all three models must be questioned critically. From a theoretical point of view, the FE
model should be preferred to the RE model in order to consider a potential correlation between
firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity and the explaining variables. The same argument holds
for the non-linear model, where the panel fractional probit model (PFR) should be preferred
to the model presented above. Yet, as indicated in section 2.4, the estimation of FE models
did not prove useful. Many of the variables used in the estimation are practically time-constant
at the firm level (e.g. industrial sector, location, year of company foundation). Moreover, for
time-variable parameters, particularly the implementation of formalized processes and gender
mainstreaming, changes can only be observed in a small proportion of the firms (less than 15
percent of the sample6). For these firms, we can furthermore assume that the change might have
no directly measurable effect on the level of segregation yet, as it would becomes visible only in
the long run due to a changed recruitment policy. Therefore, the effect can be captured better
via inter-firm differences.
As expected, the estimation results reveal only few significant relationships because of the low
intra-firm variation. The results of the FE and panel fractional probit estimation can be found
in table A.4 in the appendix. It should be noted that some of the significant effects survive in
6Detailed statistics on the variation of the variables over time are available upon request.
44 CHAPTER 2. OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION
the fixed effects setting. Organizational demographics, especially the female share, but also the
female share in top management and the age structure show the same effects as in the models
discussed above. The effect of formalism turns out to be negative but insignificant. Gender
mainstreaming does not show significant effects as well. In order to state meaningful assump-
tions about possible causal effects of the implementation of such measures, it would certainly
be desirable to apply the model to a broader data basis with a longer time dimension and more
time variation.
2.6 Conclusion
This article describes the extent of horizontal occupational segregation in German firms on the
basis of the 2004 and 2008 LIAB data and analyzes the relationship between the extent of hori-
zontal segregation and organizational characteristics. The consistently high level of segregation
in Germany and the identification of potential levers in firms for its reduction are of high scien-
tific as well as sociopolitical relevance as horizontal gender segregation is not only accompanied
by differences in the distribution of the sexes across occupational groups, but also leads to in-
equalities in wages, status and career opportunities. We calculate the dissimilarity index in
accordance with Duncan and Duncan (1955) to measure the extent of horizontal segregation in
the German labor market and within firms and use Carrington and Troske (1997)’s correction
method to control for random fluctuations in the gender ratio of small occupational groups. We
can show that particularly the firm level results are affected by the correction procedure while
the results at labor market level remain rather unchanged.
We find substantial variation in the extent of horizontal segregation in German firms. A bi-
variate analysis shows that these differences occur systematically according to organizational
characteristics. Using panel data models, we estimate the influence of individual organizational
characteristics on the segregation level within the firms. Thereby, we address the problem of
existing firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity. In accordance with previous studies, we find
relationships between the extent of horizontal segregation and establishment size, industrial sec-
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tor, and legal form. We can also show that organizational demographics significantly influence
the level of segregation. In particular, the proportion of women in the workforce is of high
relevance. The results are especially meaningful as the estimated negative effect survives even
in the fixed effect framework. The negative relationship suggests that, for women, the access to
male-dominated fields is aggravated compared to men, which more easily enter female-dominated
occupations.
Furthermore, the female share in the workforce is highly relevant for the relationship between
part-time work and the level of segregation. We show that the share of part-time workers does
not prove significant if considered alone. However, once we allow for an interaction of part-time
share and female share, the results turn significant. In firms with a female-dominated workforce,
an increase in the proportion of part-time jobs is associated with significantly higher segrega-
tion. Conversely, we find it to be negatively related to the segregation level in a male-dominated
environment.
Another central aspect of our study is to analyze the association of human resource measures
with the extent of occupational segregation. Our results suggest a negative relationship between
these measures and the amount of within firm segregation, meaning that lower levels of segre-
gation are found in firms where gender mainstreaming and formalized recruitment procedures
are implemented. Yet, these effects appear to be context-sensitive and go along with an on
average lower segregation only in those firms that have less than 60 percent women in their
workforce. Consequently, the adoption of human resource measures with the aim of reducing
segregation must be discussed in the context of other organizational characteristics. It seems
that the implementation of gender mainstreaming or formalized recruitment procedures only
provide a ‘lead in’ for women in male-dominated firms. Nevertheless, gender mainstreaming and
formalism seem to be relevant factors that are of high interest for policy makers who want to
identify levers for changing the level of segregation within firms. Even though we cannot identify
causal relationships, we still find correlation structures that give interesting insight for future
research.
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Finally, we examine the relationship of horizontal and vertical segregation: The multivariate
models suggest that there is a non-linear relationship between the proportion of women at
top management level and the level of occupational segregation within firms. Beyond a crit-
ical threshold of around 20 percent women in management positions, higher female shares in
management are associated with a lower level of segregation in the firm. This relationship is
particularly interesting for the debate about a compulsory women’s quota. However, it requires
further research in order to identify the direction of the relationship between horizontal and
vertical segregation and possibly additional determinants of this relationship.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables
Table A.1: Summary statistics: panel data set
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
DICORit 0.705 0.159 0.020 1
Year (2008) 0.510 0.500 0 1
Female share 0.442 0.271 0.001 0.996
Gender Mainstreaming 0.446 0.497 0 1
Formalism 0.624 0.484 0 1
Part-time share 0.204 0.221 0.001 1
Male professions 0.400 0.330 0 1
Female professions 0.236 0.314 0 1
No. of occup. groups 12.971 8.526 2 65
Firm size 4.844 1.182 3.045 10.780
Industrial sector
Agriculture/forestry 0.014 0.118 0 1
Mining/energy 0.023 0.150 0 1
Food/luxury 0.032 0.175 0 1
Consumer goods 0.034 0.180 0 1
Investment goods 0.095 0.293 0 1
Inv./consumer goods 0.148 0.355 0 1
Building sector 0.033 0.180 0 1
Trade/manufacturing 0.094 0.291 0 1
Traffic/news 0.037 0.190 0 1
Financial/insurance 0.039 0.194 0 1
Restaurants 0.014 0.118 0 1
Educational institutions 0.043 0.204 0 1
Health/social sector 0.118 0.322 0 1
Services for concerns 0.095 0.293 0 1
Other services 0.029 0.168 0 1
Civil service 0.023 0.149 0 1
Social insurance 0.130 0.336 0 1
Legal form
Individually-owned firm 0.024 0.154 0 1
Partnership 0.022 0.148 0 1
Continued on next page...
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... table A.1 continued
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Limited liability company 0.570 0.495 0 1
Company limited by shares 0.068 0.251 0 1
Public corporation 0.214 0.410 0 1
Other legal form 0.101 0.301 0 1
Age of establishment 0.648 0.478 0 1
East Germany 0.342 0.474 0 1
Share of graduates 0.138 0.192 0 1
Share of female graduates 0.121 0.186 0 1
Collective bargaining 0.703 0.457 0 1
Works council 0.670 0.470 0 1
Downsizing 0.097 0.296 0 1
Top share 0.146 0.286 0 1
Mean age 41.973 4.216 19.417 55.452
Variation coeff. age 0.258 0.054 0.063 0.520
Number of observations 9087
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2004 and 2008, own calculation.
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Table A.2: Estimation results of the POLS, RE, and FP models in different spec-
ifications
(POLS) (POLS) (RE) (RE) (FP) (FP)
Year2008 −0.0021 −0.0044 −0.0083∗∗∗ −0.0087∗∗∗ −0.0057 −0.0135
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0103) (0.0101)
Proportion of women (FS) −0.1639∗∗∗ −0.2614∗∗∗ −0.1593∗∗∗ −0.2310∗∗∗ −0.4962∗∗∗ −0.8329∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0168) (0.0135) (0.0159) (0.0347) (0.0457)
Gender Mainst. × FS 0.0483∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.1722∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0095) (0.0343)
Gender Mainstreaming −0.0081∗∗∗ −0.0284∗∗∗ −0.0024 −0.0143∗∗∗ −0.0255∗∗∗ −0.1028∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0058) (0.0023) (0.0043) (0.0087) (0.0188)
Formalism −0.0087∗∗∗ −0.0274∗∗∗ −0.0048∗ −0.0195∗∗∗ −0.0274∗∗∗ −0.0974∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0059) (0.0025) (0.0044) (0.0094) (0.0198)
Formalism × FS 0.0442∗∗∗ 0.0341∗∗∗ 0.1548∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0107) (0.0368)
Part-time share 0.0020 −0.2079∗∗∗ −0.0011 −0.1562∗∗∗ 0.0160 −0.6742∗∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0249) (0.0094) (0.0251) (0.0255) (0.0681)
Part-time share × FS 0.3242∗∗∗ 0.2397∗∗∗ 1.0563∗∗∗
(0.0378) (0.0385) (0.1012)
Male professions 0.0972∗∗∗ 0.0916∗∗∗ 0.0966∗∗∗ 0.0933∗∗∗ 0.2862∗∗∗ 0.2688∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0286) (0.0280)
Female professions 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗ 0.0132∗∗ 0.0101 0.0971∗∗∗ 0.0607∗∗
(0.0091) (0.0088) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0246) (0.0241)
No. of occup. groups 0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Establishment size(ln) −0.0229∗∗∗ −0.0244∗∗∗ −0.0221∗∗∗ −0.0231∗∗∗ −0.0667∗∗∗ −0.0709∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0060) (0.0059)
Industrial sector (base category: agriculture/forestry)
Mining/energy 0.1431∗∗∗ 0.1419∗∗∗ 0.1509∗∗∗ 0.1477∗∗∗ 0.4639∗∗∗ 0.4640∗∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0443) (0.0447)
Food/luxury 0.1435∗∗∗ 0.1417∗∗∗ 0.1555∗∗∗ 0.1530∗∗∗ 0.4263∗∗∗ 0.4228∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0466) (0.0473)
Consumer goods 0.0404∗∗ 0.0388∗∗ 0.0552∗∗∗ 0.0520∗∗∗ 0.1174∗∗∗ 0.1139∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0451) (0.0458)
Investment goods 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0587∗∗∗ 0.0786∗∗∗ 0.0703∗∗∗ 0.2058∗∗∗ 0.1786∗∗∗
Continued on next page...
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... table A.2 continued
(POLS) (POLS) (RE) (RE) (FP) (FP)
(0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0424) (0.0430)
Inv./consumer goods 0.0932∗∗∗ 0.0819∗∗∗ 0.1025∗∗∗ 0.0927∗∗∗ 0.2956∗∗∗ 0.2606∗∗∗
(0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0415) (0.0422)
Building sector 0.2055∗∗∗ 0.1870∗∗∗ 0.2064∗∗∗ 0.1915∗∗∗ 0.8647∗∗∗ 0.8033∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0573) (0.0576)
Trade/manufacturing 0.0821∗∗∗ 0.0760∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.0858∗∗∗ 0.2466∗∗∗ 0.2294∗∗∗
(0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0409) (0.0414)
Traffic/news 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0745∗∗∗ 0.0875∗∗∗ 0.0831∗∗∗ 0.2368∗∗∗ 0.2281∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0468) (0.0469)
Financial/insurance 0.0188 0.0221 0.0189 0.0203 0.1009∗∗ 0.1159∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0415) (0.0421)
Restaurants 0.0285 0.0339 0.0470∗∗ 0.0486∗∗ 0.1024∗ 0.1243∗∗
(0.0224) (0.0222) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0541) (0.0542)
Educational institutions 0.0902∗∗∗ 0.0901∗∗∗ 0.0922∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.2693∗∗∗ 0.2731∗∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0442) (0.0444)
Health/social sector 0.0703∗∗∗ 0.0658∗∗∗ 0.0854∗∗∗ 0.0773∗∗∗ 0.2161∗∗∗ 0.2064∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0439) (0.0443)
Services for concerns 0.0634∗∗∗ 0.0631∗∗∗ 0.0692∗∗∗ 0.0671∗∗∗ 0.1927∗∗∗ 0.1946∗∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0413) (0.0418)
Other services 0.0708∗∗∗ 0.0721∗∗∗ 0.0792∗∗∗ 0.0774∗∗∗ 0.2099∗∗∗ 0.2182∗∗∗
(0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0460) (0.0461)
Civil service 0.0717∗∗∗ 0.0760∗∗∗ 0.0821∗∗∗ 0.0815∗∗∗ 0.2163∗∗∗ 0.2349∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0199) (0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0482) (0.0481)
Social insurance 0.1059∗∗∗ 0.1075∗∗∗ 0.1088∗∗∗ 0.1063∗∗∗ 0.3131∗∗∗ 0.3217∗∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0426) (0.0430)
Legal form (base category: individually-owned firm)
Partnership −0.0533∗∗∗ −0.0550∗∗∗ −0.0321∗∗ −0.0336∗∗ −0.1528∗∗∗ −0.1583∗∗∗
(0.0162) (0.0159) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0448) (0.0441)
Limited liability company −0.0259∗ −0.0287∗∗ −0.0145 −0.0166 −0.0744∗∗ −0.0877∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0133) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0376) (0.0373)
Company limited by shares −0.0465∗∗∗ −0.0489∗∗∗ −0.0288∗∗ −0.0308∗∗ −0.1395∗∗∗ −0.1487∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0400) (0.0398)
Continued on next page...
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... table A.2 continued
(POLS) (POLS) (RE) (RE) (FP) (FP)
Public corporation −0.0351∗∗ −0.0389∗∗∗ −0.0183 −0.0197 −0.1024∗∗ −0.1159∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0402) (0.0399)
Other legal form −0.0445∗∗∗ −0.0470∗∗∗ −0.0295∗∗ −0.0316∗∗∗ −0.1315∗∗∗ −0.1411∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0395) (0.0393)
Age of establishment 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0503∗∗∗ 0.0509∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0109) (0.0108)
East Germany 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0622∗∗∗ 0.0578∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0111) (0.0110)
Share of graduates −0.0083 0.0036 −0.0338∗∗ −0.0251∗ −0.0313 0.0073
(0.0174) (0.0172) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0511) (0.0511)
Share of female graduates −0.0594∗∗∗ −0.0672∗∗∗ −0.0224 −0.0287∗∗ −0.1620∗∗∗ −0.1874∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0536) (0.0534)
Collective bargaining 0.0052 0.0038 0.0011 0.0001 0.0159 0.0115
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0110) (0.0109)
Works council −0.0017 −0.0039 −0.0029 −0.0040 −0.0049 −0.0117
(0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0116) (0.0116)
Downsizing −0.0121∗∗∗ −0.0112∗∗ 0.0022 0.0023 −0.0367∗∗∗ −0.0399∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0138) (0.0137)
Top share 0.1172∗∗ 0.1224∗∗∗ 0.0989∗∗∗ 0.1022∗∗∗ 0.3249∗∗ 0.3402∗∗∗
(0.0455) (0.0451) (0.0365) (0.0368) (0.1278) (0.1267)
Top share2 −0.3178∗∗ −0.3387∗∗ −0.2865∗∗ −0.2970∗∗ −0.8580∗∗ −0.9248∗∗
(0.1466) (0.1454) (0.1187) (0.1198) (0.4076) (0.4043)
Top share3 0.1981∗ 0.2110∗∗ 0.1861∗∗ 0.1920∗∗ 0.55312∗ 0.5735∗∗
(0.1044) (0.1036) (0.0844) (0.0852) (0.2891) (0.2868)
Mean age 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Variation age 0.1063∗∗ 0.1078∗∗ 0.0893∗∗ 0.0890∗∗ 0.3307∗∗∗ 0.3301∗∗∗
(0.0442) (0.0437) (0.0413) (0.0411) (0.1201) (0.1189)
Constant 0.5931∗∗∗ 0.6576∗∗∗ 0.5693∗∗∗ 0.6175∗∗∗ 0.2063∗ 0.4297∗∗∗
(0.0422) (0.0424) (0.0403) (0.0405) (0.1116) (0.1126)
N 9087 9087 9087 9087 9087 9087
R2 0.3975 0.4088
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Source: LIAB, own calculation.
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Table A.3: Average partial effects of the fractional probit models
Variables (FP) (FP)
Year2008 −0.0019 −0.0045
(0.0034) (0.0033)
Gender Mainstreaming −0.0084∗∗∗ −0.0068∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0029)
Formalism −0.0091∗∗∗ −0.00076∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0031)
Proportion of women (FS) −0.1638∗∗∗ −0.1377∗∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0113)
Part-time share 0.0053 −0.0552∗∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0094)
Male professions 0.0944∗∗∗ 0.0886∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0092)
Female professions 0.0321∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0079)
No. of occup. groups 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Establishment size (ln) −0.0220∗∗∗ −0.0234∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0019)
Industrial sector (base category: agriculture/forestry)
Mining/energy 0.1560∗∗∗ 0.1547∗∗∗
(0.0157) (0.0158)
Food/luxury 0.1448∗∗∗ 0.1426∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0165)
Consumer goods 0.0427∗∗∗ 0.0411∗∗
(0.0166) (0.0167)
Investment goods 0.0736∗∗∗ 0.0637∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0167)
Inv./consumer goods 0.1037∗∗∗ 0.0914∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0154)
Building sector 0.2559∗∗∗ 0.2408∗∗∗
(0.0168) (0.0172)
Continued on next page...
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... table A.3 continued
Variables (FP) (FP)
Trade/manufacturing 0.0874∗∗∗ 0.0810∗∗∗
(0.0150) (0.0151)
Traffic/news 0.0841∗∗∗ 0.0806∗∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0169)
Financial/insurance 0.0368∗∗ 0.0419∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0154)
Restaurants 0.0374∗ 0.0448∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0195)
Educational institutions 0.0950∗∗∗ 0.0955∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0159)
Health/social sector 0.0771∗∗∗ 0.0732∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0161)
Services for concerns 0.0691∗∗∗ 0.0692∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0153)
Other services 0.0750∗∗∗ 0.0772∗∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0166)
Civil service 0.0772∗∗∗ 0.0829∗∗∗
(0.0174) (0.0171)
Social insurance 0.1094∗∗∗ 0.1113∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0155)
Legal form (base category: individually-owned firm)
Partnership −0.0501∗∗∗ −0.0516∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0141)
Limited liability company −0.0249∗∗ −0.0280∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0117)
Company limited by shares −0.0456∗∗∗ −0.0483∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0125)
Public corporation −0.0331∗∗∗ −0.0373∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0125)
Other legal form −0.0428∗∗∗ −0.0458∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0124)
Continued on next page...
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... table A.3 continued
Variables (FP) (FP)
Age of establishment 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.0168∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0036)
East Germany 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0191∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0036)
Share of graduates −0.0103 0.0024
(0.0169) (0.0168)
Share of female graduates −0.0535∗∗∗ −0.0618∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0176)
Collective bargaining 0.0052 0.0038
(0.0036) (0.0036)
Works council −0.0016 −0.0039
(0.0038) (0.0038)
Downsizing −0.0121∗∗∗ −0.0112∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0045)
Top share 0.0776∗∗ 0.0803∗∗∗
(0.0315) (0.0311)
Mean age 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Variation age 0.1092∗∗∗ 0.1088∗∗∗
(0.0396) (0.0392)
N 9087 9087
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01;
Source: LIAB, own calculation.
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Table A.4: Estimation results of the FE and panel fractional response models
(FE) (FE) (PFR) (PFR)
Year2008 −0.0141∗∗∗ −0.0140∗∗∗ −0.0444∗∗∗ −0.0441∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0100) (0.0100)
Proportion of women (FS) −0.1295∗∗∗ −0.1388∗∗∗ −0.3897∗∗ −0.4317∗∗∗
(0.0560) (0.0568) (0.1607) (0.1651)
Gender Mainst. × FS 0.0010 0.0021
(0.0125) (0.0370)
Gender Mainstreaming 0.0034 0.0030 0.0093 0.0087
(0.0029) (0.0052) (0.0085) (0.0174)
Formalism −0.0002 −0.0056 −0.0011 −0.0235
(0.0033) (0.0058) (0.0098) (0.0192)
Formalism × FS 0.0122 0.0472
(0.0155) (0.0453)
Part-time share 0.0080 0.0041 0.0248 −0.0078
(0.0179) (0.0478) (0.0497) (0.1425)
Part-time share × FS 0.0054 0.0480
(0.0827) (0.2368)
Male professions 0.0087 0.0094 0.0130 0.0157
(0.0446) (0.0449) (0.1307) (0.1314)
Female professions 0.0004 0.0006 −0.0041 −0.0036
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0206) (0.0206)
No. of occup. groups 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Establishment size(ln) −0.0069 −0.0070 −0.0202 −0.0208
(0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0257) (0.0256)
Legal form (base category: individually-owned firm)
Partnership 0.0173 0.0161 0.0532 0.0491
(0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0564) (0.0557)
Limited liability company 0.0183 0.0175 0.0561 0.0523
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0491) (0.0484)
Company limited by shares 0.0245 0.0240 0.0731 0.0704
(0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0604) (0.0599)
Continued on next page...
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(FE) (FE) (PFR) (PFR)
Public corporation 0.0284 0.0283 0.0839 0.0830
(0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0558) (0.0554)
Other legal form 0.0161 0.0157 0.0487 0.0468
(0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0560) (0.0555)
Age of establishment 0.0054 0.0058 0.0165 0.0176
(0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0182) (0.0181)
East Germany 0.0148 0.0150 0.0429 0.0438
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0437) (0.0440)
Share of graduates −0.0221 −0.0221 −0.0686 −0.0686
(0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0674) (0.0680)
Share of female graduates 0.0095 0.0092 0.0323 0.0310
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0650) (0.0655)
Collective bargaining −0.0022 −0.0023 −0.0074 −0.0078
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0163) (0.0163)
Works council 0.0033 0.0036 0.0100 0.0112
(0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0230) (0.0231)
Downsizing 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0412∗∗∗ 0.0413∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0135) (0.0135)
Top share 0.0951∗∗ 0.0972∗∗ 0.2742∗∗ 0.2845∗∗
(0.0463) (0.0463) (0.1329) (0.1336)
Top share2 −0.3172∗∗ −0.3232∗∗ −0.9125∗∗ −0.9419∗∗
(0.1519) (0.1512) (0.4301) (0.4309)
Top share3 0.2200∗∗ 0.2241∗∗ 0.6320∗∗ 0.6516∗∗
(0.1079) (0.1073) (0.3042) (0.3042)
Mean age 0.0031∗∗ 0.0031∗∗ 0.0094∗∗ 0.0093∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0045) (0.0045)
Variation age −0.0065 −0.0055 −0.0102 −0.0128
(0.0884) (0.0883) (0.2651) (0.2653)
Gender mainstr. −0.0516∗∗ −0.1320∗∗∗
(0.0206) (0.0439)
Formalism −0.0457∗∗ −0.0464
(0.0230) (0.0482)
Continued on next page...
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(FE) (FE) (PFR) (PFR)
FS −0.1618 −0.4497∗∗
(0.1709) (0.1901)
Part-time share 0.0665 −0.7191∗∗∗
(0.0695) (0.1832)
Male professions 0.2191 0.1843
(0.1399) (0.1405)
Female professions 0.1481∗∗ 0.0684
(0.0668) (0.0655)
No. of occup. groups 0.0071∗∗ 0.0082∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0028)
Establishment size(ln) −0.0445 −0.0507∗
(0.0282) (0.0281)
Partnership −0.3018∗∗∗ −0.2953∗∗∗
(0.1045) (0.1035)
Limited liability company −0.1770∗ −0.1806∗
(0.0954) (0.0945)
Company limited by shares −0.2846∗∗∗ −0.2865∗∗∗
(0.1059) (0.1052)
Public corporation −0.2583∗∗ −0.2748∗∗∗
(0.1024) (0.1016)
Other legal form −0.2408∗∗ −0.2483∗∗
(0.1003) (0.0996)
Age of establishment 0.0479∗ 0.0466∗
(0.0276) (0.0273)
East Germany 0.0487 0.0433
(0.0483) (0.0484)
Share of graduates 0.1774 0.2197∗
(0.1195) (0.1168)
Share of female graduates −0.3244∗∗∗ −0.3528∗∗∗
(0.1218) (0.1191)
Collective bargaining 0.0608∗∗ 0.0557∗∗
(0.0271) (0.0267)
Continued on next page...
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(FE) (FE) (PFR) (PFR)
Works council −0.0035 −0.0140
(0.0321) (0.0320)
Downsizing −0.1010∗∗∗ −0.0980∗∗∗
(0.0376) (0.0368)
Top share 0.3427 0.3554
(0.2969) (0.2947)
Top share2 −0.8093 −0.8597
(0.9420) (0.9346)
Top share3 0.4614 0.4938
(0.6643) (0.6588)
Mean age −0.0067 −0.0060
(0.0053) (0.0052)
Variation age 0.3380 0.4195
(0.3544) (0.3512)
Gender Mainst.× FS 0.1829∗∗
(0.0805)
Formalism× FS 0.0085
(0.0931)
Part-time share× FS 1.2119∗∗∗
(0.2962)
Constant 0.5958∗∗∗ 0.7281∗∗∗ 0.5301∗∗ 0.6847∗∗∗
(0.1057) (0.1086) (0.2202) (0.2236)
N 4618 4618 4618 4618
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01;
Source: LIAB, own calculation.
All models control for industrial sector, variable denotes time average.
Chapter 3
Potential Parenthood and Career
Progression of Men and Women - A
Simultaneous Hazards Approach
3.1 Introduction
Gender differences in the labor market remain a hot topic in labor economics. Women generally
earn less than men, their wage mobility is lower and they are underrepresented in top man-
agement positions (Blau and Kahn, 2000; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005; Manning
and Swaffield, 2008; Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Baerts et al., 2011). Some studies have found
the existence of a ‘glass ceiling’ to women’s career perspectives which excludes them from high
earnings and high-status positions (Albrecht et al., 2003; Arulampalam et al., 2007). Career
progression is linked to wage growth, status and job satisfaction. Understanding differences in
career transition patterns between men and women is a starting point for identifying the fac-
tors that hamper women’s career progression and may help to explain the gender gap at the
upper end of the career ladder. Fertility-related aspects have been considered to be a potential
This chapter is based on the article ’Potential Parenthood and Career Progression of Men and Women - A
Simultaneous Hazards Approach’ by Martin Biewen and Stefanie Seifert.
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main driver of gender differences in the career course. A number of studies have established a
relationship between career interruptions due to child rearing and slower wage growth or even
wage losses (for some recent examples, see Anderson et al., 2002; Lalive and Zweimu¨ller, 2009;
Bertrand et al., 2010; Fitzenberger et al., 2013; Drange and Rege, 2013).
While realized fertility is certainly a major candidate for explaining differences between men and
women after the birth of a child, the effect of potential fertility on career transitions has received
less attention. Different mechanisms may give rise to an effect of potential fertility on career
transitions. The most obvious one is that employers could shy away from hiring or promoting
women who have a high hazard of becoming a mother in the near future because they fear that
these women might become unavailable for work because of child birth or that their produc-
tivity after child birth could suffer due to parenting duties (Lazear and Rosen, 1990). Such a
mechanism follows the theory of statistical discrimination, i.e. employers might discriminate
against women with a high observable pregnancy hazard, no matter whether a given woman will
actually give birth to a child or not. There may also be voluntary effects of a high pregnancy
hazard on career transitions, i.e. at a time at which a woman considers the possibility to become
a mother to be high, she may choose not to make certain career transitions. Effects of potential
fertility on career transitions may also exist for men. Employers might interpret indicators of
a high hazard of imminent parenthood (e.g. marital status) as a positive signal indicating high
productivity and career commitment, or such men might voluntarily make or not make certain
career transitions.
The aim of this paper is to directly investigate the relationship between the hazard of becom-
ing a parent and the propensity for directional career movements, i.e. upward, downward and
horizontal career transitions. To our best knowledge, this has not been done in this form in the
literature before. We measure the career level of a person in terms of the number of subordi-
nates directly supervised and, alternatively, by an occupational prestige score (in our case the
Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale, SIOPS). We focus on career transitions of
men and women before the birth of a first child in order to separate, as completely as possible,
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the aspect of potential fertility from that of realized fertility. The more general research question
of our study is the comparative analysis of directional career transitions for men and women.
We pursue this research question in the framework of simultaneous hazards (Lillard, 1993), i.e.
the hazards of directional career movements are modeled jointly with the individual hazard of
becoming a parent, whereby the parenthood hazard directly enters the hazards of directional
career movements as an explanatory variable. We also take account of a large number of po-
tential other determinants of career transitions as well as of aspects such as state dependence,
duration dependence and lagged duration dependence.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2, we review some related literature. Section 3.3
describes our data. In section 3.4, we outline our econometric framework. Section 3.5 presents
our empirical results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
There is large literature on career development of men and women. Some studies focus on
promotion, some on wage growth, while others analyze job mobility covering job-to-job move-
ments irrespective of the rank. Summarizing results on promotions is difficult, because the term
promotion covers a range of different processes depending on the data used (see Gibbons and
Waldman, 1999, for a theoretical overview of the term promotion and Abele et al., 2011, on
career success). Many studies using survey data rely on self-reported promotions (e.g. Booth
et al., 2003; Blau and DeVaro, 2007), others use employer-provided or administrative informa-
tion (e.g. Pekkarinen and Vartiainen, 2006). If promotion is measured as a change in job prestige
covering a job-to-job change, one needs data that have comparable scales about the hierarchical
level or the job task description (see Granqvist and Persson, 2005; Pekkarinen and Vartiainen,
2006; Kunze, 2013).
An important distinction is the one between internal and external promotions (Acosta, 2010).
Internal promotions happen within the employment spell at the same employer, while external
promotions refer to promotions in connection with job changes. Due to data restrictions, in this
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paper we will only study job-to-job movements (for more details, see below). Each transition is
defined as either an upward, a downward or a horizontal movement. While upward movements
can be interpreted as promotions, horizontal transitions come closer to what is labeled as job
mobility in the literature. Promotions are often considered to be a main driver of wage growth
(e.g. McCue, 1996). However, job mobility is theoretically and empirically also found to be
closely connected to wage growth. According to the ‘job shopping’ theory, employees benefit
from early job mobility (see e.g. Johnson, 1978; Topel and Ward, 1992; Schmelzer, 2012; Bagger
et al., 2014). An important implication is that, in the possible case of employer discrimination
against women, reduced early job mobility may have more long-term consequences on the like-
lihood of upward and horizontal transitions.
Theoretically, lower career transition probabilities for women might be due to employers’ behav-
ior in processes of promotion and hiring, described by the theory of statistical discrimination
(Becker, 1971; Phelps, 1972).1 According to this argument, all women face lower promotion
probabilities compared to men because some women will interrupt their employment as a con-
sequence of giving birth to a child. Following Aigner and Cain (1977) this would not necessarily
result in an unwarranted discrimination of women as a group because employers need to take
account of the higher separation risk of women in their hiring and promotion decisions, leading
to the situation that women who do give birth later are granted a higher-than-warranted pro-
motion probability at the expense of other women who face a promotion probability that is too
low given their probability of quitting. However, in a life-cycle perspective, the women who do
quit for fertility reasons later will not actually benefit from their earlier ‘preferential’ treatment,
so that there may be a net loss for the group of women as a whole. Moreover, for many, the idea
that a given individual should be ‘penalized’ for group characteristics or for tasks considered to
be essential for the reproduction of society may seem questionable.
The central theoretical contribution in the literature modeling the consequences of higher female
separation rates for job promotions is Lazear and Rosen (1990). In their model, women are as-
1For the following, see also the discussion in Winter-Ebmer and Zweimu¨ller (1997).
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sumed to have more out-of-work possibilities than men and are therefore more likely to quit in
their later employment path. Employers take this into account in their hiring and promotion
decisions with the consequence that women have to be more able than men to get promoted to
the next career stage. As a consequence, the final career rank and compensation is lower for
women than for men, even under the assumption of an equal ability distribution for men and
women.
The existing empirical literature generally shows that women are underrepresented in top-
management and executive positions and have lower unconditional promotion rates (e.g. Cobb-
Clark, 2001; Blau and DeVaro, 2007; Smith et al., 2013; Kunze and Miller, 2014). The picture
becomes less clear with respect to conditional promotion probabilities. Maassen van den Brink
and Groot (1996) find that women are less frequently in jobs that offer promotion possibilities,
but if they are, they do not face lower promotion probabilities. The results in Blau and DeVaro
(2007) suggest lower probabilities of promotion for women, but no gender differences in wage
growth with or without promotions. Booth et al. (2003) present a theory and empirical evidence
for the ‘sticky floor’ hypothesis. According to their model, women are as likely as men to get
promoted but they end up at the bottom of the pay scale in the new grade. Other representative
examples of literature are Hersch and Viscusi (1996), Cobb-Clark (2001), Francesconi (2001) and
Johnston and Lee (2012). Results on job mobility confirm the ‘job shopping’ hypothesis and
reveal substantial gender differences. Schmelzer (2012) finds positive wage effects of direct job
mobility in the early career. According to Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016) voluntary moves tend to
be upward and connected to wage gains.
Focusing on gender differences in more detail, Granqvist and Persson (2005) show that family-
related factors, such as being married, have contradictory effects on men’s and women’s transition
probabilities to higher ranked jobs. They also find negative effects of career interruptions due
to child birth on women’s career mobility. The result that especially variables related to family
responsibilities affect men and women in a different way is also confirmed in Kunze (2013), who
finds that the probability of progressing on the career ladder is reduced through children for
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women but not for men. On the contrary, men with one or two children are most likely to climb
the career ladder. Related to these findings, there may also be effects of partnership on career
progression. The hypotheses that men benefit from being in a relationship while women’s career
courses are negatively affected by cohabitation are often referred to as ‘marriage premium’ and
‘marriage penalty’ respectively. The theoretical arguments are based on human capital theory,
but empirical evidence is mixed (Verbakel and De Graaf, 2008). Finally, Kunze and Troske
(2012) exploit firm closures as a natural experiment in order to investigate gender differences in
job search behavior. Their results suggest that gender differences in job search and mobility are
related to fertility decisions and are apparent in prime-childbearing years.
As indicated above, most of the empirical literature focuses on the effects of realized but not
on potential or future fertility on career paths. Exceptions are Francesconi (2002) and Adda
et al. (2011), who present theoretical and empirical models of intertemporal career decisions and
fertility behavior. Our more modest goal in this paper is to directly investigate the potential
link between the contemporaneous probability of becoming a parent and the probabilities for
different career movements. To our best knowledge, this has not been done in this form in
the literature before. The study that comes closest to what we have in mind is Winter-Ebmer
and Zweimu¨ller (1997) who investigate the determinants of the current career rank of men and
women, and who include as an explanatory variable aggregate fertility indicators for women.
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimu¨ller (1997) do not consider transitions between ranks or potential
fertility effects on men’s career outcomes, and they do not explicitly model individual fertility
hazards. There are also two experimental studies based on artificial job applications whose im-
plicit research questions resemble the one considered by us.
Petit (2007) presents evidence for hiring discrimination against women aged 25 applying for
high-skilled administrative jobs but no discrimination of women among single and childless ap-
plicants aged 37. Baert (2014) finds evidence for discrimination of young heterosexual women
(compared to homosexual women) when applying for job vacancies. Compared to the cited
articles, our goal is to explicitly model the relationship between the individual hazard of becom-
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ing a mother or a father and the hazards for different career movements in a joint way using
the simultaneous hazards approach introduced by Lillard (1993).2 In view of the literature,
our hypothesis is that the probability of upward and horizontal career transitions is negatively
related to the parenthood hazard for women, while we conjecture that high contemporaneous
parenthood hazards might constitute a positive career signal for men. We further expect (other)
family-related variables to differently affect men’s and women’s career transitions.
3.3 Data
For our analysis, we need data covering personal employment, partnership and fertility informa-
tion in one data set. For this purpose, we use the survey ‘Working and Learning in a Changing
World’ (ALWA) provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) at the German
Federal Employment Agency3 which contains life-cycle information of more than 10,400 indi-
viduals (Kleinert et al., 2011). Besides information on schooling and training, the data set
includes detailed monthly information on labor market behavior as well as on processes of fam-
ily formation and regional mobility. In addition, we merged variables on aggregate and regional
unemployment, employment and fertility available from the statistical offices to our data set.
The employment history is reported per episode, with a new episode defined by a change of
employer, a change in the task performed or by an employment interruption such as unemploy-
ment, parental leave or military service. As a preparatory step, we first generated a complete
employment history for every individual for which we adjusted parallel spells by defining main
and secondary employment resolving cases of overlapping schooling or training spells. In our
final data set, every month from age fifteen onwards is uniquely identified as either an employ-
ment or a non-employment spell. In certain cases, e.g. if an employment spell was followed by a
short interruptive spell of search unemployment, we extended the first spell to also include the
short intermediate spell. We did this in order to avoid an employment spell to be classified as
2Applications of this approach are, for example, Lillard and Waite (1993), and Aassve et al. (2006) who model
the hazard of conception along with the hazard of marital disruption for married couples.
3This study uses the factually anonymous data of the Study ’Working and Learning in a Changing World’
(ALWA). Data access was provided via a Scientific Use File supplied by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the
German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).
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censored, although from a substantive point of view, there was a career transition to a subse-
quent employment spell. If an employment spell was artificially extended, we controlled for this
and the exact reason why it was extended in our hazard model estimates. Employment spells
that were followed by non-employment spells were treated as being censored.
For every employment episode we have information on the occupational task performed by a per-
son as well as on individual and establishment characteristics. In order to classify job changes as
upward, downward or horizontal transitions, we defined the career level during a given job spell
by the number of subordinates supervised by the person in question. A change in this number
by three or more people defines an upward or a downward movement. In the case of no change
or a change by no more than two subordinates, an employment transition was classified as a
‘horizontal’ career movement. We experimented with different definitions of upward/downward
movements but found this definition to be a good compromise between the substantive concept
of an upward/downward transition and the resulting number of transitions.
As an alternative indicator of the career level, we used the Standard International Occupational
Prestige Scale (SIOPS) which was designed for coding internationally comparable measures
of occupational status based on the International Standard Classification of Occupation 1988
(ISCO88). The SIOPS scale, originally developed by Treiman (1977), ranges from 0 to 100. Its
construction is based on results from national surveys on the rating of different occupations in
terms of rank (for a detailed description of the coding procedures see Ganzeboom and Treiman,
1996). We define upward and downward transitions as any upward or downward change in the
SIOPS score.
We restrict our sample to the birth cohorts 1956 to 1988 and to individuals living in West Ger-
many or East Germany after 1990. We only consider individuals (men and women) before they
become parents for the first time. We do this in order to exclusively focus on the effects of
potential rather than of realized fertility. Moreover, in this way we avoid difficult problems of
sample selection as the group of individuals who continue to work after first birth is likely to be
highly selective (especially for women). Our final sample includes 2,883 women and 2,734 men.
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We observe 2.2 career spells per individual on average. Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics on
the number and duration of employment spells. Descriptive statistics of all relevant variables
are summarized in table B.1 in the appendix.
Table 3.1: Career spell durations in months
Dependent variable: number of subordinates
Women Men
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
All spells 67.61 73.23 5482 62.59 72.62 6194
Up 33.32 31.89 377 34.66 35.34 716
Down 45.49 45.63 248 40.27 39.18 364
Horizontal 30.35 36.60 1730 29.41 31.05 1961
Censored 94.11 81.99 3127 92.15 86.65 3153
Dependent variable: SIOPS
Women Men
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
All spells 67.63 73.23 5480 62.58 72.57 6190
Up 29.49 32.98 539 31.81 35.63 685
Down 31.97 33.55 403 30.91 31.25 480
Horizontal 33.24 38.39 1407 32.07 32.55 1869
Censored 94.24 82.10 3131 92.14 86.58 3156
Source: ALWA, own calculation.
For the 2,883 (2,734) women (men) in our sample we observe 5,482 (6,194) job spells. 2,355
(3,041) of those end with a transition to a subsequent job episode that can be characterized
as an upward, downward or horizontal transition as measured by a change in the number of
subordinates (see top panel of table 3.1). Censored spells are followed by an episode without
employment which could be unemployment, educational spells or other interruptions. Censored
spells are on average three times as long as spells ending in an upward or horizontal transition
and twice as long as spells leading to a downward transition. This pattern is observed for both
women and men. It suggests that individuals who ‘climb the career ladder’ do so very quickly,
while those who plan to exit the labor market or to step down on the career ladder remain
longer in their current position. The numbers for changes in the SIOPS shown in the lower
panel of table 3.1 are slightly different due to differential missing values and due to the different
definition of transitions. In order to figure out whether these transitions are driven by a pattern
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of duration dependence, or whether and which other factors influence the duration or exit route
of a job spell, further covariates have to be considered in a multivariate setup.
3.4 Econometric Framework
Mixed Multivariate Proportional Hazard Model
Our goal is to model the pregnancy hazard – or more generally the parenthood hazard4 –
simultaneously with the hazards of making an upward, downward or horizontal career transition.
For this purpose, we estimate a multivariate proportional hazard model with competing risks,
in which the parenthood hazard enters as an explanatory variable in the hazards for making one
of the three career transitions (see Van den Berg, 2001; Lillard, 1993).
Our simultaneous model looks as follows:
lnhp(t|xit, zit) = xitγpx + zitγpz (3.1)
lnhu(t|xit, vi) = xitβu + δu lnhp(t|xit, zit) + vui (3.2)
lnhd(t|xit, vi) = xitβd + δd lnhp(t|xit, zit) + vdi (3.3)
lnhh(t|xit, vi) = xitβh + δh lnhp(t|xit, zit) + vhi (3.4)
In this model, hp(t|xit, zit) denotes individual i’s hazard of starting parenthood at time t given
characteristics xit and zit. The variables xit and zit used to predict this hazard are assumed to
be observable information available in a CV in order to mimic employers’ predictions of how
likely it is for a person with characteristics xit and zit to start parenthood at time t, where
zit is assumed to contain variables that do not appear in the hazards for the different career
transitions. The terms hu(t|xit, vi), hd(t|xit, vi), hh(t|xit, vi) denote the hazards of making an
upward, downward or horizontal career transition at time t given explanatory variables xit and
conditional on unobserved heterogeneity vi = (v
u
i , v
d
i , v
h
i ).
As explanatory variables xit we consider socioeconomic information (educational and employ-
4We define the observed time of birth of a child minus nine months as the beginning of parenthood. In this
way we also cover the time of pregnancy, which seems to make most sense especially in the case of women.
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ment history, age, experience, partner information, employer characteristics) as well as regional
information based on the person’s residential history (see below for more details). We also con-
sider the dependence of career transitions on the time already spent at the given or in previous
career levels (duration dependence and lagged duration dependence). In addition, the contem-
poraneous parenthood hazard hp(t|xit, zit) enters as an explanatory variable in each of the three
directional career hazards. The vector vi = (v
u
i , v
d
i , v
h
i ) denotes individual-specific terms that
capture potentially correlated unobserved characteristics vui , v
d
i and v
h
i influencing certain ca-
reer movements. Such unobserved heterogeneity may arise if different types of persons with
time-constant preferences for career transitions exist, i.e. individuals who are generally more
or less mobile, or more upwards or downwards mobile conditional on observed characteristics
xit. Given the structure of the model, we include instrumental variables zit in the equation for
the pregnancy hazard, which are, in our empirical implementation, the birthrate by year and
federal state as well as the amount of potential child allowance in a given year. The full list of
explanatory variables used in the four hazard equations is given in table 3.2.
Table 3.2: List of regressors
Variable Description Parenthood
Hazard
Career
Hazard
Age categories (base category: under 26 years)
Age2-Age6 [26; 30], [31; 35], [36; 40], [41; 45]; [46+] x x
Education (base category: no formal degree)
Educ.low Vocational training and/or Abitur x x
Educ.high University of applied sciences or University degree x
Exper Work experience in months x x
East Dummy East Germany x x
Religion Dummy for being religious (self reported) x x
Married Dummy for being married x
Birthrate Birth rate per 1,000 inhabitants by year and federal
state
x
Potca Potential child allowance x
Preghaz Pregnancy/parenthood hazard x
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... table 3.2 continued
Variable Description Parenthood
Hazard
Career
Hazard
Partner high Partner with university degree x
Partner low Partner without degree x
Duration dependence employment spell in years (base category: less than 3 years)
Car2-4 [3; 5), [5; 7), [7+] x
Mobil Mobility indicator x
LDnosub Lagged duration dependence: cumulated spells with-
out supervisory responsibilities (in months)
x
LDsub Lagged duration dependence: cumulated spells with
supervisory responsibilities (in months)
x
Current number of subordinates (base category: none)
Level2-5 [1; 3], [4; 9], [10; 24], [25+] x
Sector Dummies (base category: retailing)
Manufacturing Manufacturing x
Construction Construction x
Agriculture Agricultural x
Service Service x
Social Social x
Pubsec Dummy for job in public service x
Comp.maths Competence measure maths (high values=low com-
petence)
x
Comp.verbal Verbal competence measure (high values=low compe-
tence)
x
Unempl Regional unemployment rate x
Unempl.dev Deviation unemployment rate from smooth trend x
Fem.emplyoment Female labor market participation at federal state1 x
Firmsize Firm size x
Year (Quadratic) time trend x
INTER∗ Indicators for short interruptive intervals x
Parttime Indicator for part-time work x
#inter Number if interruptions before current job spell x
#pastjobs Number if jobs held before current job spell x
1 Included in female sample to account for differences in female labor market behavior between federal states.
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For the three career hazards we assume a competing risks structure, i.e. the probability of
making a particular career transition at time t is computed as the product of the probability
of making this transition at t and the probability of not making any of the other two career
transitions until t. The resulting likelihood contribution for month t of individual i is given by
L(t|xit, vi) = hu(t|xit, vui )upit × hd(t|xit, vdi )downit × hh(t|xit, vhi )horizit × hp(t|xit, zit)pit
× exp{−
∑
j=u,d,h
∫ t
t−1
hj(t|xit, vji )} × exp{−
∫ t
t−1
hp(t|xit, zit)}, (3.5)
where upit, downit, horizit and pit are dummies indicating an upward, downward, horizontal or
parenthood transition at the end of month t. In order to integrate out the unobserved effect
v = (vu, vd, vh) we assume a discrete mass point distribution A∗(v) with two mass points leading
to the likelihood conditional on observed information
L(t|xit) =
∫
v
L(t|xit, v) dA∗(v). (3.6)
Fixed Effects SUR Model
We also consider a fixed effects panel data model in which we jointly model the monthly probabil-
ities of upward, downward and horizontal career transitions along with the monthly probability
of starting parenthood. This addresses the aspect that the individual hazard of becoming a
mother or father may be correlated with unobserved individual characteristics (such as time-
constant preferences).
The resulting model is given by
pit = xitγ
p
x + zitγ
p
z + 
p
it, hˆ
p
it = xitγ
p
x + zitγ
p
z (3.7)
upit = xitβ
u + δuhˆpit + 
u
it + c
u
i (3.8)
downit = xitβ
d + δdhˆpit + 
d
it + c
d
i (3.9)
horizit = xitβ
h + δhhˆpit + 
h
it + c
h
i , (3.10)
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where cei (e = u, d, h) denote time-constant person-specific fixed effects for the different career
directions and eit (e = p, u, d, h) are idiosyncratic error terms.
Demeaning the explanatory variables in the career equations leads to the following system of
equations which we estimate by efficient NLSUR (e.g. Greene, 2012):
pit = xitγ
p
x + zitγ
p
z + 
p
it (3.11)
(upit − upi) = (xit − x¯i)βu + δu(hˆpit − hˆpi ) + (uit − ui ) (3.12)
(downit − downi) = (xit − x¯i)βd + δd(hˆpit − hˆpi ) + (dit − di ) (3.13)
(horizit − horizi) = (xit − x¯i)βh + δh(hˆpit − hˆpi ) + (hit − hi ). (3.14)
The model has the straightforward interpretation that we measure, within individuals’ career
trajectories, to what extent the probability of making a particular career transition is above
or below its individual-specific average at times at which the individual’s pregnancy hazard is
above or below its individual-specific average. As a variation, we consider spell fixed effects,
i.e. cei (e = u, d, h) are assumed to be constant within career spells, but may be different across
career spells. We compute standard errors clustered at the level of the individual throughout all
our estimations.
3.5 Empirical Results
Figure 3.1 presents the unconditional hazard rates for the different exit routes separately for men
and women for the case in which we measure career status by the number of subordinates. The
graphs generally suggest lower career mobility for women than for men, especially with respect
to upward and horizontal movements.
In order to identify the influence of certain regressors on the hazard rates of the different career
directions, we estimate the models described in the previous section. Our main regressor of
interest is the contemporaneous probability of parenthood, which is modeled as a conditional
hazard rate. Figure 3.2 illustrates the distribution of predicted parenthood hazards as estimated
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by (3.7). For both men and women, the distribution of predicted parenthood hazards has two
peaks which turn out to be the masses of married and unmarried individuals.
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Figure 3.1: Unconditional hazard rate (number of subordinates)
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Figure 3.2: Parenthood hazard
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Table 3.3 reports the determinants of the parenthood hazard as estimated in (3.1) for the case in
which we measure career status by the number of subordinates.5 We find a nonlinear relationship
between the parenthood hazard and age. For women, no births are reported in our data for
individuals older than 45 years, thus we group the last two age categories in order to avoid
perfect predictions. The results also suggest a concave experience pattern in the probability of
parenthood as well as significant and strong effects of religion, the regional birth rate, being
married and living in East Germany.
Table 3.3: Mixed multivariate proportional hazard model: parenthood hazard
Women Men
Age2 0.123∗ (0.0688) 0.244∗∗∗ (0.0916)
Age3 0.0399 (0.107) 0.208∗ (0.123)
Age4 −0.517∗∗∗ (0.194) −0.332∗ (0.183)
Age5/6 −3.281∗∗∗ (1.020) −1.136∗∗∗ (0.331)
Age6 −1.824∗∗ (0.767)
Educ.low −0.0317 (0.0994) 0.184 (0.149)
Educ.high −0.0892 (0.126) 0.491∗∗∗ (0.171)
Exper 0.0101∗∗∗ (0.00194) 0.00804∗∗∗ (0.00185)
Exper squared −0.000062∗∗∗ (9.96e− 06) −0.000036∗∗∗ (8.16e− 06)
East 0.830∗∗∗ (0.132) 0.481∗∗∗ (0.157)
Religion 0.272∗∗∗ (0.0720) 0.239∗∗∗ (0.0707)
Birthrate 0.109∗∗∗ (0.0258) 0.0666∗∗∗ (0.0253)
Potca 0.0309∗ (0.0187) −0.0151 (0.0209)
Married 1.414∗∗∗ (0.0512) 1.824∗∗∗ (0.0616)
Constant −7.264∗∗∗ (0.299) −7.505∗∗∗ (0.307)
N 273207 276443
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: ALWA, own calculation.
While the effects on the timing of first birth are relatively similar in the male and female
subsample, gender differences are more prevalent in the estimated coefficients of the career
hazard equations. We find that many of the effects on the three transition directions are different
5The results from the estimation based on changes in the occupational rank as described by the SIOPS were
almost identical.
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between men and women, both in significance and magnitude. Especially variables related to
fertility turn out to interact with the career development in different ways. The results for the
mixed multivariate proportional hazard model are shown in table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Mixed multivariate proportional hazard model (number of subordi-
nates)
Women Men
Up Down Horizontal Up Down Horizontal
ln(preghaz) −0.122 0.0401 −0.175∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.00460 −0.0368
(0.107) (0.136) (0.0541) (0.0633) (0.0899) (0.0475)
Partner high 0.335∗∗ 0.0244 0.0467 0.286∗ 0.0300 −0.00708
(0.154) (0.214) (0.0849) (0.152) (0.203) (0.117)
Partner low −0.464∗∗∗ −0.263 −0.146∗∗ 0.242∗∗ −0.149 0.0937
(0.147) (0.184) (0.0647) (0.102) (0.142) (0.0633)
Car2 0.00562 −0.118 −0.273∗∗∗ 0.0571 0.0609 −0.0921
(0.178) (0.211) (0.0847) (0.125) (0.161) (0.0838)
Car3 0.257 −0.179 −0.565∗∗∗ 0.00567 −0.541∗∗ −0.230∗
(0.235) (0.267) (0.123) (0.173) (0.239) (0.121)
Car4 −0.136 −0.719∗ −0.667∗∗∗ −0.653∗∗ −0.693∗ −0.447∗∗
(0.379) (0.396) (0.173) (0.291) (0.354) (0.181)
Exper −0.00395 −0.00186 −0.000904 −0.00119 0.00624 −0.00471∗∗
(0.00472) (0.00552) (0.00217) (0.00346) (0.00455) (0.00201)
Exper squared −0.000027 0.00000705 −0.00000912 6.025e− 06 −0.0000241 6.35e− 06
(0.0000187) (0.0000185) (0.00000802) (0.0000131) (0.0000158) (7.61e− 06)
Mobil 0.266∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.0303
(0.0996) (0.133) (0.0494) (0.0740) (0.0993) (0.0538)
LDnosub −0.00125 0.00276 0.000340 −0.00371 −0.00741∗∗ −0.00235
(0.00356) (0.00324) (0.00149) (0.00284) (0.00311) (0.00162)
LDsub 0.00565∗ 0.00145 −0.000913 0.000214 −0.00931∗∗∗ 0.0000500
(0.00302) (0.00325) (0.00142) (0.00252) (0.00329) (0.00160)
Pubsec −0.544∗∗∗ −0.0838 −0.389∗∗∗ −0.295 −0.252 −0.345∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.242) (0.0915) (0.183) (0.280) (0.116)
Educ.low −0.126 0.861∗ 0.532∗∗∗ 1.0928∗∗∗ 0.487 0.133
(0.273) (0.479) (0.147) (0.318) (0.411) (0.110)
Educ.high −0.0733 0.841 0.808∗∗∗ 1.453∗∗∗ 0.635 0.407
(0.319) (0.530) (0.171) (0.350) (0.452) (0.148)
East −0.683 −1.132∗ −0.212 −0.212 −0.723∗∗ −0.186
(0.433) (0.620) (0.205) (0.247) (0.331) (0.131)
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.4 continued
Women Men
Up Down Horizontal Up Down Horizontal
Manufacturing −0.253 0.164 −0.134 0.0218 −0.0255 −0.186∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.274) (0.0891) (0.130) (0.194) (0.0721)
Construction 0.245 0.332 0.0370 0.0164 0.337 −0.0883
(0.329) (0.431) (0.155) (0.153) (0.211) (0.0789)
Agriculture 0.316 0.416 −0.233 0.123 0.202 −0.123
(0.316) (0.366) (0.169) (0.201) (0.299) (0.113)
Service 0.107 0.179 −0.0867 0.137 0.0325 −0.0248
0.162 (0.212) (0.0747) (0.139) (0.202) (0.0792)
Social −0.0261 −0.260 −0.106 −0.256 0.213 −0.107
(0.207) (0.271) (0.093) (0.226) (0.315) (0.134)
Religion −0.505∗∗∗ −0.441∗∗ −0.151∗∗ −0.0570 −0.126 −0.0674
(0.137) (0.188) (0.0729) (0.0980) (0.138) (0.0578)
Comp.maths −0.144∗∗∗ −0.0107 −0.00498 −0.0910∗∗ 0.0817 −0.0217
(0.0516) (0.0695) (0.0247) (0.0448) (0.0630) (0.0251)
Comp.verbal −0.366∗∗∗ 0.00164 −0.0360 −0.152∗∗∗ 0.0865 −0.00675
(0.0726) (0.0939) (0.0321) (0.0483) (0.0653) (0.0274)
Unempl −0.00605 0.0454 −0.00845 −0.0157 0.0313 0.0121
(0.0317) (0.0430) (0.0156) (0.0195) (0.0259) (0.0113)
Unempl.dev −0.0159 −0.169∗∗∗ −0.0720∗∗∗ −0.000941 −0.0202 −0.00144
(0.0496) (0.0638) (0.0237) (0.0349) (0.0497) (0.0206)
Fem.emplyoment −0.00377 0.0208 0.00696
(0.0142) (0.0193) (0.00656)
Firmsize −0.0494 −0.121∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.0448∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.0952∗∗∗
(0.0325) (0.0483) (0.0157) (0.0242) (0.0390) (0.0140)
Year 0.116∗∗ −0.0217 0.0128 0.0364 0.0486 −0.00887
(0.0476) (0.0610) (0.0203) (0.0317) (0.00299) (0.0171)
Year squared −0.00198∗∗ 0.000252 −0.000283 −0.000793 0.000979 0.000276
(0.000939) (0.00118) (0.000406) (0.000664) (0.000432) (0.000362)
Level2 −0.581∗∗∗ −0.399∗∗∗ −0.597∗∗∗ −0.208
(0.147) (0.0644) (0.119) (0.0615)
Level3 −0.438∗∗ 0.100 −1.133∗∗∗ −0.668∗∗∗ 0.140 −0.865∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.187) (0.116) (0.125) (0.173) (0.0897)
Level4 −0.689∗∗∗ 0.0846 −1.503∗∗∗ −1.168∗∗∗ 0.310∗ −1.235∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.217) (0.184) (0.174) (0.184) (0.132)
Level5 −1.191∗∗ 0.149 −2.747∗∗∗ −1.462∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ −1.652∗∗∗
(0.467) (0.295) (0.582) (0.266) (0.215) (0.247)
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.4 continued
Women Men
Up Down Horizontal Up Down Horizontal
Age2 0.231 −0.0293 0.0445 −0.167 −0.103 −0.0934
(0.159) (0.220) (0.0795) (0.125) (0.179) (0.0778)
Age3 0.108 0.144 −0.285∗∗ −0.238 0.00475 −0.0997
(0.260) (0.336) (0.139) (0.186) (0.253) (0.118)
Age4 0.396 0.735 0.132 −0.468 0.110 −0.500∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.470) (0.198) (0.292) (0.348) (0.187)
Age56 0.350 0.306 −0.479 −0.665 0.121 −0.680∗∗
(0.707) (0.894) (0.395) (0.487) (0.528) (0.306)
Age6 −1.666 0.0537 −0.940∗
(1.154) (0.974) (0.507)
INTERunempl 2.245∗∗∗ 3.374∗∗∗ 2.789∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.202) (0.0699)
INTERser.oth −0.660 1.501∗∗ 1.308∗∗∗
(1.004) (0.600) (0.193)
INTERany1 1.446∗∗∗ 2.308∗∗∗ 2.439∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.146) (0.0518)
Parttime −0.106 0.107 0.235∗ 0.351 1.0418∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.484) (0.128) (0.321) (0.398) (0.176)
#inter −0.104 −0.372 −0.134 −0.203∗ 0.00411 −0.144∗∗
(0.207) (0.301) (0.107) (0.119) (0.139) (0.0618)
#pastjobs −0.0320 −0.287∗∗∗ −0.0741∗ 0.0641 0.155∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.103) (0.0432) (0.0478) (0.0561) (0.0239)
v1 −6.335∗∗∗ −6.978∗∗∗ −5.838∗∗∗ −4.758∗∗∗ −6.871∗∗∗ −4.843∗∗∗
(1.085) (1.479) (0.516) (0.673) (0.975) (0.413)
v2 −4.990∗∗∗ −5.211∗∗∗ −4.817∗∗∗ −6.514∗∗∗ −9.139∗∗∗ −4.431∗∗∗
(1.110) (1.478) (0.532) (0.961) (1.743) (0.417)
p = Prob(v = v1) 0.891∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗
(0.0332) (0.120)
N 273207 276443
1 Summarizes interruptions due to military service, unemployment and other in male sample
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Source: ALWA, own calculation.
For our main variable of interest, the results suggest that the parenthood hazard is significantly
negatively related to women’s horizontal job mobility. Given the log-log specification, a one
percent higher parenthood hazard is associated with a 0.18 percent lower hazard for horizontal
career transitions. For upward transitions, we find a negative but statistically insignificant re-
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lationship. For downward transitions, the association is small and positive but also statistically
insignificant. For men, the results suggest a significant positive association of the parenthood
hazard with upward transitions and insignificant effects for downward and horizontal transitions.
The results imply that for men, a one percent higher parenthood hazard translates into a 0.20
percent higher hazard for climbing up the career ladder. These results are consistent with the
hypothesis that for employers, anticipated parental responsibilities of a male employee may be
a positive signal of reliability and stability, fostering job transitions to higher hierarchical levels.
For women, the results suggest that horizontal (but not upward) mobility is hampered by a high
probability of becoming a mother in the near future.
Table 3.4 also shows other interesting effects. To identify the effect of cohabitation we use in-
dividuals with no partner as the reference category compared to those with partners with high
or low education. The education variable is supposed to capture differences in human capital
(Verbakel and De Graaf, 2008). It turns out that cohabiting with a partner with low education
decreases women’s propensity to change to a job with a higher level of personnel responsibility,
while it makes an upward transition for men more likely. For women, the same relationship is
observed for horizontal transitions, but of a smaller magnitude. This asymmetry may reflect
that men are often unwilling to be ‘overtaken’ by their female partners. By contrast, cohabiting
with a highly educated partner increases the likelihood of upward career transitions for men and
women. These cases may reflect career competition within relationships or support through the
high level of human capital of the partner. We find no age effects when it comes to upward or
downward career movements after we control for the parenthood hazard. A stable result across
all equations and both genders is the significant effect of the mobility indicator (i.e. number
of residential changes in the last 24 months). This effect is likely to pick up the potential link
between career changes and residential mobility.
The likelihood of making an upward, downward or horizontal transition strongly depends on
the current position in the career hierarchy. We find strong effects of negative state dependence
(Level) for upward and horizontal transitions for both men and women. This mostly reflects the
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fact that with increasing personnel responsibility further improvements become harder because
the number of vacancies at higher hierarchical levels is smaller. For men, we additionally find a
positive state dependence at higher ranks for downward transitions. As to the effect of duration
dependence (Car), we observe no strong duration dependence effects for upward or downward
transitions for women, suggesting that no ‘career automatism’ exists. If anything, we observe
negative duration dependence for the horizontal transitions. For men, the negative duration de-
pendence can be observed for all transition types. This indicates that career mobility is stronger
in the early phase of an employment spell, whereas individuals tend to become less mobile with
rising tenure. We also consider effects of lagged duration dependence (LDsub, LDnosub). We do
so separately for past spells with and without personnel responsibility. Having already worked
in a job with subordinates is weakly positively related to the hazard of upward transitions for
women. This suggests dynamic effects in career paths implying that earlier disadvantages (such
as the negative parenthood effect for women’s horizontal transitions) have additional long-term
consequences. For men, we find a generally negative effect of past spell lengths with downward
movements, irrespective of whether they were with or without subordinates.
As to the effect of educational qualifications on career transitions, our results suggest that the
likelihood of making horizontal transitions increases with the degree of formal education for
women. For men, we find that the likelihood of upward transitions rises with a higher edu-
cational level. For horizontal movements we especially find a positive association with tertiary
education. Our results for the self-reported indicators of maths skills and verbal abilities conform
to prior expectations: individuals with higher ability are significantly more likely to climb up
the career ladder, while we find no effects of our ability indicators on downward and horizontal
transitions.6 Interestingly, high verbal competence scores are much more important for upward
transitions of women than for those of men. This directly corresponds to the well-known feature
of Lazear and Rosen (1990)’s model that women have to pass a higher ability threshold than
men in order to proceed to a higher career level.
6Note that in our data, high values of the competence score mean low ability.
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We observe a positive association of the number of past jobs with downward and horizontal job
changes for men, suggesting a general pattern of mobility or immobility respectively. However,
for women, the number of past jobs is negatively related to downward and horizontal job move-
ments, which may be interpreted as a career pattern in which mobility tends to decrease over
time. For both men and women, we do not estimate a separate effect of the number of past
jobs on the likelihood of upward movements. This may be interpreted as evidence against the
hypothesis that ‘job shopping’ has positive effects on further career progression. The effects for
the other covariates shown in table 3.4 are mostly in line with expectations and are therefore
not discussed here.
Table 3.4 also shows our results for the two mass points of the unobserved heterogeneity term v.7
Our results suggest two types of women, one with v1 = (vu, vd, vh) = (−6.335,−6.978,−5.838)
and one with v2 = (−4.990,−5.221,−4.817). The proportion of type 1 in the population of
women is p = 0.891, that of type 2 is (1 − p) = 0.109. Type 2 is uniformly more mobile than
type 1. There are no differential effects of unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the different
mobility directions. This is remarkable as, in principle, it would be possible that one of the
types is more upward but less downward mobile than the other type. The pattern of unobserved
heterogeneity is slightly different for men. Here, type 1 with v1 = (−4.785,−6.871,−4.843) is
more mobile than type 2 with v2 = (−6.514,−9.139,−4.431) except for the slightly stronger
tendency of not changing to lower personnel responsibility.
Table 3.5: Mixed multivariate proportional hazard model (SIOPS)
Women Men
Up Down Horizontal Up Down Horizontal
ln(preghaz) −0.111 0.0521 −0.167∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗ −0.0239 −0.0500
(0.107) (0.135) (0.0538) (0.066) (0.095) (0.060)
Partner high 0.348∗∗ 0.0106 0.0587 0.325∗ 0.196 −0.0821
(0.154) (0.212) (0.0846) (0.155) (0.213) (0.143)
Continued on next page...
7We also experimented with more than two mass points but found it very hard to achieve convergence of our
estimation routine. This is not surprising given the complexity of the estimated model and the large number of
estimated parameters. In the cases in which we achieved convergence, there were usually two mass points which
looked very similar indicating that we cannot identify more than two sufficiently different latent groups in our
data.
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... table 3.5 continued
Women Men
Up Down Horizontal Up Down Horizontal
Partner low −0.451∗∗∗ −0.261 −0.136∗∗ 0.211 0.0134 0.0306
(0.147) (0.183) (0.0649) (0.110) (0.152) (0.086)
Car2 −0.0113 −0.143 −0.285∗∗∗ 0.07845 −0.0344 −0.00314
(0.178) (0.210) (0.0848) (0.130) (0.178) (0.105)
Car3 0.244 −0.178 −0.577∗∗∗ 0.0450 −0.510∗ −0.0949
(0.234) (0.265) (0.123) (0.174) (0.258) (0.145)
Car4 −0.155 −0.672∗ −0.666∗∗∗ −0.549 −0.479 −0.351
(0.379) (0.395) (0.173) (0.290) (0.372) (0.220)
Exper −0.00413 −0.00227 −0.00125 −0.000794 0.00683 −0.00927∗∗∗
(0.00469) (0.00554) (0.00215) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
Exper squared −0.0000249 0.00000899 −0.00000714 −0.0000053 −0.0000396∗ 0.0000196∗
(0.0000186) (0.0000185) (0.00000800) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mobil 0.258∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗
(0.0999) (0.133) (0.0497) (0.087) (0.098) (0.070)
LDnosub −0.00128 0.00329 0.000306 0.000239 0.00227 −0.00161
(0.00350) (0.00322) (0.00149) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
LDsub 0.00560∗ 0.00177 −0.00102 0.00191 0.000727 −0.0000278
(0.00301) (0.00321) (0.00144) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Pubsec −0.574∗∗∗ −0.129 −0.402∗∗∗ −0.336 −0.426 −0.613∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.241) (0.0915) (0.195) (0.280) (0.162)
Educ.low† −0.107 0.889∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.0875∗ 0.0152 0.0551
(0.274) (0.473) (0.148) (0.042) (0.058) (0.035)
Educ.high −0.0437 0.931∗ 0.813∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.522) (0.171)
East −0.634 −1.016 −0.161 −0.171 −0.556 −0.369
(0.437) (0.626) (0.206) (0.282) (0.374) (0.205)
Manufacturing −0.215 0.214 −0.103 0.0275 −0.123 −0.389∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.243) (0.271) (0.139) (0.200) (0.104)
Construction 0.266 0.296 0.0783 −0.0566 0.0511 −0.375∗∗
(0.329) (0.424) (0.154) (0.168) (0.230) (0.123)
Agriculture 0.297 0.369 −0.244 −0.0277 −0.0380 −0.173
(0.316) (0.360) (0.169) (0.225) (0.323) (0.163)
Service 0.132 0.198 −0.0715 0.174 −0.0136 −0.181
(0.162) (0.210) (0.0745) (0.148) (0.209) (0.111)
Social 0.00000116 −0.226 −0.0937 −0.256 0.197 −0.192
(0.206) (0.269) (0.0928) (0.237) (0.320) (0.183)
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.5 continued
Women Men
Up Down Horizontal Up Down Horizontal
Religion −0.505∗∗∗ −0.444∗∗ −0.150∗∗ −0.128 −0.0457 −0.119
(0.136) (0.184) (0.0726) (0.101) (0.145) (0.083)
Comp.maths −0.148∗∗∗ −0.00169 −0.00881 −0.0641 −0.00319 −0.00243
(0.0515) (0.0687) (0.0246) (0.047) (0.065) (0.037)
Comp.verbal −0.361∗∗∗ 0.00661 −0.0323 −0.132∗∗ −0.0403 −0.0333
(0.0730) (0.0930) (0.0322) (0.051) (0.072) (0.041)
Unempl −0.00545 0.0426 −0.00669 −0.0417∗ 0.0300 0.0127
(0.0320) (0.0435) (0.0157) (0.021) (0.028) (0.017)
Unempl.dev −0.00839 −0.153∗∗ −0.0668∗∗∗ 0.0152 −0.0777 0.00426
(0.0497) (0.0639) (0.0237) (0.038) (0.054) (0.029)
Firmsize −0.0620∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.0569∗ −0.0797∗ −0.166∗∗∗
(0.0325) (0.0480) (0.0157) (0.026) (0.039) (0.020)
Year 0.117∗∗ −0.0244 0.0150 0.0326 −0.0273 −0.0280
(0.0476) (0.0608) (0.0203) (0.036) (0.054) (0.025)
Year squared −0.00196∗∗ 0.000333 −0.000301 −0.000733 0.000779 0.000553
(0.000939) (0.00118) (0.000406) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Level2 −0.600∗∗∗ −0.409∗∗∗ −0.505∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ −0.511∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.0645) (0.127) (0.217) (0.091)
Level3 −0.460∗∗∗ 0.116 −1.145∗∗∗ −0.512∗∗∗ 1.827∗∗∗ −1.308∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.185) (0.116) (0.125) (0.173) (0.130)
Level4 −0.688∗∗∗ 0.137 −1.491∗∗∗ −0.964∗∗∗ 2.009∗∗∗ −2.096∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.214) (0.184) (0.178) (0.183) (0.238)
Level5‡ −1.187∗∗ 0.189 −2.738∗∗∗
(0.468) (0.290) (0.582)
Age2 0.209 −0.0822 0.0281 −0.230 −0.0259 −0.0334
(0.158) (0.216) (0.0788) (0.135) (0.196) (0.104)
Age3 0.0879 0.115 −0.292∗∗ −0.263 0.0363 0.148
(0.257) (0.331) (0.138) (0.198) (0.277) (0.155)
Age4 0.369 0.693 0.130 −0.547 0.0347 −0.0984
(0.387) (0.464) (0.198) (0.312) (0.380) (0.242)
Age56 0.367 0.234 −0.495 −0.654 0.241 −0.412
(0.707) (0.885) (0.395) (0.521) (0.554) (0.387)
Age6 −1.217 −0.316 −0.530
(1.162) (1.187) (0.628)
INTERser.oth.unempl.‡ 2.128∗∗∗ 3.041∗∗∗ 2.532∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.191) (0.0662)
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.5 continued
Women Men
Up Down Horizontal Up Down Horizontal
Parttime −0.382 −0.287 0.0129 0.402 0.817∗ 0.671∗∗∗
(0.293) (0.481) (0.114) (0.312) (0.361) (0.196)
#inter −0.0381 −0.331 −0.0937 −0.210 0.00481 0.0133
(0.208) (0.295) (0.106) (0.121) (0.135) (0.086)
#pastjobs‡ −0.0369 −0.272∗∗∗ −0.0726∗
(0.0715) (0.102) (0.0414)
femEMPLOYMENT −0.00528 0.0194 0.00570
(0.0143) (0.0193) (0.00659)
v1 −6.182∗∗∗ −6.791∗∗∗ −5.720∗∗∗ −4.0463∗∗∗ −7.598∗∗∗ −3.009∗∗∗
(1.089) (1.471) (0.518) (0.687) (1.015) (0.539)
v2 −4.760∗∗∗ −5.047∗∗∗ −4.639∗∗∗ −3.980∗∗∗ −7.822∗∗∗ −4.428∗∗∗
(1.112) (1.471) (0.532) (0.654) (0.978) (0.599)
p = Prob(v = v1) 0.906∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(0.0283) (0.145)
N 273162 263374
† Education was included as an ordinal variable with six categories in male sample to avoid convergence problems
‡ These variables had to be dropped in male sample to avoid convergence problems
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Source: ALWA, own calculation.
Table 3.5 shows the mixed multivariate proportional hazard estimates for the specification with
changes in the occupational rank described by the SIOPS. With very few exceptions, the results
are remarkably consistent with the ones obtained in the model with the number of subordinates
as the dependent variable. This is particularly true for the estimated association of the parent-
hood hazard with the likelihood for different career transitions. As in the specification with the
number of subordinates, we find a statistically significant negative association of the likelihood
of becoming a parent with horizontal job movements for women, and a significantly positive
association with upward mobility for men. Note that the effects of the parenthood hazard on
job transitions from this specification and from all other specifications estimated by us are re-
produced in table 3.6.
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Table 3.6: Pregnancy hazard: model comparison
Women
Up Down Horizontal
MMPHM −0.122 (0.107) 0.040 (0.136) −0.175∗∗∗ (0.054)
Person FE −0.035 (0.028) −0.017 (0.072) −0.243∗∗∗ (0.056)
Spell FE −0.055∗∗ (0.022) 0.044 (0.075) −0.191∗∗∗ (0.048)
MMPHM (SIOPS) −0.111 (0.107) 0.052 (0.135) −0.167∗∗∗ (0.054)
Person FE (SIOPS) −0.081∗∗∗ (0.030) −0.002 (0.040) −0.214∗∗∗ (0.050)
Spell FE (SIOPS) −0.056∗∗ (0.026) −0.010 (0.040) −0.183∗∗∗ (0.046)
Men
Up Down Horizontal
MMPHM 0.199∗∗∗ (0.063) 0.005 (0.090) −0.037 (0.048)
Person FE 0.082∗∗∗ (0.038) −0.039 (0.054) −0.026 (0.049)
Spell FE 0.117∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.040 (0.057) 0.039 (0.046)
MMPHM (SIOPS) 0.184∗∗ (0.066) −0.024 (0.095) −0.050 (0.060)
Person FE (SIOPS) 0.042 (0.031) −0.003 (0.031) −0.058 (0.050)
Spell FE (SIOPS) 0.080∗∗ (0.035) 0.008 (0.035) 0.029 (0.047)
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: ALWA, own calculation.
We now turn to the fixed effects approach to estimating our system of hazard equations. The
advantage of the fixed effects model (3.7) to (3.10) is that the parenthood hazard (and all other
explanatory variables) may be arbitrarily correlated with unobserved time-constant (or, alter-
natively, spell-constant) determinants of individual career transitions. In this way, we difference
out unobserved person-specific characteristics such as time-constant personal preferences or per-
sonal circumstances, which may also influence career transitions. Results for these estimations
are given in table B.2 in the appendix.
The most important result in these estimations is that our main findings concerning the effect
of the parenthood hazard on career transitions also survive in a fixed effects setting. The es-
timates for women based on the number of subordinates suggest that the monthly probability
of a horizontal job transition is significantly negatively related to the monthly probability of
starting parenthood. More concretely, if the probability of becoming a mother is increased by
one percentage point, the probability of a horizontal job transition is reduced by 0.24 percentage
points. It is not significantly related to upward or downward transitions. For men, the parent-
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hood hazard is significantly positively related to upward transitions but unrelated to downward
or horizontal transitions. In particular, the probability of an upward transition is increased by
about 0.08 percentage points if the parenthood hazard is raised by one percentage point. Note
that many of the other estimated effects in table B.2 are relatively insignificant, which is a typ-
ical result for within-estimates of explanatory variables with limited temporal variation.
The results for the case in which we allow the fixed effects to vary over career spells are given in
table B.3 in the appendix. The main effects are reproduced in table 3.6. In this specification,
there may be person-specific effects that are constant within career spells, but different across
career spells. Again, the results confirm our previous findings about the relationship between
the parenthood hazard and career transitions. As before, a higher parenthood hazard for women
is significantly related to lower horizontal career mobility. Moreover, the (smaller) negative re-
lationship between the parenthood hazard and upward transitions, which appeared in similar
form in the mixed multivariate proportional hazard model and in the model with person-specific
fixed effects, turns significant in the model with spell-specific fixed effects. For men, the re-
sults confirm the finding of the mixed multivariate proportional hazard model and the model
with person-specific fixed effects that a higher parenthood hazard is positively associated with
a higher likelihood of upward transitions.
Table 3.6 also shows the fixed effects results based on changes in the SIOPS as the dependent
variable (the full results for these specifications are available upon request). Both in the person
fixed effects and in the spell fixed effects case, we obtain a negative association of the parent-
hood hazard with horizontal transitions for women which is of the same magnitude as in the
specification with changes in the number of subordinates as the dependent variable. Moreover,
in the SIOPS fixed effects case the (much smaller) negative effect of the parenthood hazard on
women’s upward transitions becomes statistically significant. For men, the fixed effects results
for the SIOPS case look more mixed and are much less significant.
Taken together, the results in table 3.6 suggest a robust and statistically significant positive
relationship between the probability of parenthood and horizontal job changes for women. In
86 CHAPTER 3. POTENTIAL PARENTHOOD AND CAREER PROGRESSION
some specifications, we also observe a smaller negative relationship between the likelihood of
becoming a mother and upward mobility. For men, the results suggest a significant positive
relationship between the parenthood hazard and upward mobility which is robust across almost
all specifications.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes career progression patterns of childless men and women in Germany. The
descriptive analysis of career transition hazards confirms previous findings in the literature that
women generally exhibit lower career mobility than men. In order to investigate the determinants
of individual career transitions in more detail, we estimated a mixed multivariate proportional
hazard model with competing risks for upward, downward and horizontal job transitions while
simultaneously modeling the hazard of first births and its effect on career transitions. As an
alternative specification, we considered a fixed effects approach. Our results suggest that a high
contemporaneous probability of becoming a parent significantly lowers horizontal but not up-
ward or downward career mobility for women. In some specifications we also find a significant
but smaller negative association with female upward career mobility. For men, we find that
a higher contemporaneous probability of becoming a parent increases the likelihood of upward
but not of downward or horizontal career transitions. These results persist if we allow for a
correlation of parenthood hazards with unobserved individual characteristics such as time- or
spell-constant personal preferences in a fixed effects model.
We believe that our findings contribute to the literature on the relationship between fertility
hazards and career transition patterns. To the extent that our estimations net out unobserved
differences in preferences, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that women’s career
mobility is to a certain extent hampered by the hazard of becoming a mother while that of
men is increased by a high probability of becoming a father. We would certainly not go so
far as to interpret these findings as clear evidence for employer discrimination. Such an inter-
pretation would rest, among other things, on the assumption that career preferences are time-
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or spell-constant, which would be hard to defend. Incorporating time-varying preferences into
an empirical analysis seems extremely hard but might be an interesting challenge for future
research. On the other hand, in the case of substantial employer discrimination, we would prob-
ably expect the association of fertility hazards with female horizontal or upward job mobility
to be more pronounced. Independent of the sources of the effects measured by us, we obtain
the important result that there are clear gender differences in the relationship between potential
fertility and individual career patterns. This is a highly relevant point for labor market policy.
Regardless of whether employer discrimination exists, in the labor market studied by us even
prospective fertility is not gender neutral with respect to further career progression.
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Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table B.1: Summary statistics: female and male sample
Female Male
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age2 0.278 0.448 0.288 0.453
Age3 0.141 0.348 0.186 0.389
Age4 0.074 0.262 0.101 0.301
Age5 0.038 0.192 0.047 0.212
Age6 0.014 0.117 0.016 0.125
Age 27.527 6.473 28.779 6.608
Educ.low 0.804 0.397 0.763 0.425
Educ.high 0.142 0.35 0.19 0.392
Exper 80.341 70.911 81.463 70.114
East 0.034 0.182 0.051 0.22
Religion 0.820 0.384 0.74 0.439
Birthrate 9.967 1.104 9.868 1.18
Potca 3.02 1.641 3.242 1.687
Married 0.287 0.453 0.198 0.398
Partner high 0.16 0.367 0.079 0.269
Partner low 0.353 0.478 0.311 0.463
Mobil 0.148 0.399 0.125 0.394
LDnosub 9.15 26.364 11.348 27.643
LDsub 8.283 27.615 8.85 25.483
Pubsec 0.292 0.455 0.193 0.395
Manufacturing 0.175 0.38 0.339 0.473
Construction 0.023 0.15 0.126 0.332
Agriculture 0.027 0.161 0.046 0.209
Service 0.285 0.452 0.192 0.394
Social 0.323 0.468 0.163 0.369
Comp.maths 2.713 1.067 2.207 0.96
Comp.verbal 2.033 0.836 2.179 0.882
Unempl 8.734 3.14 9.129 3.254
Unempl.dev 0.269 1.355 0.283 1.343
Continued on next page...
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... table B.1 continued
Female Male
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Fem.emplyoment 58.080 7.115 58.884 7.151
Firmsize 4.428 1.805 4.891 1.755
INTERunempl 0.011 0.104 0.028 0.164
INTERser.oth 0.004 0.066 0.006 0.075
Parttime 0.037 0.19 0.013 0.113
Level2 0.237 0.425 0.169 0.375
Level3 0.131 0.337 0.171 0.377
Level4 0.081 0.272 0.117 0.322
Level5 0.029 0.168 0.059 0.236
#inter 0.101 0.342 0.183 0.475
#pastjobs 0.881 1.213 1.155 1.386
Number of subordinates 4.425 17.928 9.908 100.0853
SIOPS 44.400 10.295 43.388 11.419
N 273207 276443
Person-month observations, Source: ALWA, own calculation.
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Table B.2: Person fixed effects estimation (number of subordinates)
Women Men
Up Down Horizontal Up Down Horizontal
preghaz −0.0351 −0.0172 −0.243∗∗∗ 0.0820∗∗ −0.0390 −0.0264
(0.0284) (0.0717) (0.0560) (0.0375) (0.0538) (0.0485)
Partner high 0.00101∗ 0.00106 0.00122 0.000415 −0.00127 −0.000143
(0.000572) (0.00119) (0.00108) (0.000873) (0.00128) (0.00113)
Partner low −0.000644∗∗ 0.0000609 0.000205 −0.000414 −0.000376 0.000318
(0.000314) (0.000850) (0.000675) (0.000395) (0.000633) (0.000613)
Car2 −0.000307 −0.000612 −0.00189∗∗∗ −0.0000754 0.000414 −0.000343
(0.000273) (0.000720) (0.000568) (0.000353) (0.000617) (0.000519)
Car3 −0.000722∗ −0.00202∗∗ −0.00510∗∗∗ −0.000950∗∗ −0.00197∗∗∗ −0.00195∗∗∗
(0.000387) (0.000996) (0.000821) (0.000432) (0.000750) (0.000711)
Car4 −0.00235∗∗∗ −0.00575∗∗∗ −0.0106∗∗∗ −0.00356∗∗∗ −0.00476∗∗∗ −0.00492∗∗∗
(0.000532) (0.00144) (0.00134) (0.000577) (0.00112) (0.00116)
Exper 0.0000763∗∗∗ 0.000154∗ 0.000152∗∗ 0.0000585∗∗ 0.000193∗∗∗ −0.000201∗∗∗
(0.0000234) (0.0000881) (0.0000653) (0.0000230) (0.0000472) (0.0000604)
Exper squared −8.14e− 08∗∗∗ −0.00000018∗∗∗ −0.00000033∗∗∗ −0.00000011∗∗∗ −0.00000019∗∗∗ −9.55e− 08∗
(2.95e− 08) (6.51e− 08) (7.15e− 08) (2.63e− 08) (5.57e− 08) (5.20e− 08)
Mobil 0.000219 0.000685 0.00134∗∗ 0.00116∗∗∗ 0.000440 −0.0000553
(0.000286) (0.000805) (0.000615) (0.000424) (0.000518) (0.000604)
LDnosub 0.0000230∗∗∗ −0.0000135 0.000129∗∗∗ 0.0000551∗∗∗ −0.0000959∗∗∗ 0.0000305∗
(0.00000849) (0.0000245) (0.0000266) (0.0000122) (0.0000168) (0.0000177)
LDsub −0.0000744∗∗∗ 0.00000885 0.000105∗∗∗ −0.0000924∗∗∗ −0.0000595∗∗∗ 0.0000849∗∗∗
(0.0000102) (0.0000185) (0.0000193) (0.00000970) (0.0000140) (0.0000155)
Pubsec −0.00114 −0.00186 −0.00462∗∗ 0.0000747 0.000634 −0.00527∗∗
(0.00112) (0.00327) (0.00221) (0.00150) (0.00354) (0.00259)
Educ.low 0.000960 0.0156∗ −0.00522 0.000876 0.00655 −0.00896
(0.00409) (0.00823) (0.0180) (0.00375) (0.00624) (0.00846)
Educ.high 0.000617 0.00397 −0.00727 0.00163 0.00674 −0.0244∗∗
(0.00468) (0.0115) (0.0194) (0.00496) (0.00831) (0.0100)
East 0.00101 −0.00157 −0.00250 −0.00628∗∗ −0.00619∗∗ 0.00231
(0.00225) (0.0204) (0.00526) (0.00259) (0.00299) (0.00506)
Manufacturing 0.00137 −0.00642∗ −0.00708∗∗∗ −0.000360 0.000614 −0.00479∗∗
(0.00105) (0.00362) (0.00271) (0.00112) (0.00229) (0.00217)
Construction 0.00104 0.00365 −0.000612 0.000679 0.00610∗∗ −0.00197
(0.00185) (0.00520) (0.00364) (0.00127) (0.00309) (0.00235)
Agriculture 0.00425∗ 0.00381 −0.00339 −0.000489 −0.000801 −0.00669∗
(0.00221) (0.00789) (0.00486) (0.00189) (0.00404) (0.00363)
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... table B.2 continued
Women Men
Up Down Horizontal Up Down Horizontal
Service 0.00113 −0.00393 −0.00354 −0.00106 0.000754 −0.00239
(0.00116) (0.00348) (0.00238) (0.00122) (0.00285) (0.00232)
Social 0.000615 −0.00674 −0.00569∗ −0.00289∗ 0.00162 −0.00406
(0.00150) (0.00472) (0.00312) (0.00174) (0.00392) (0.00336)
Unempl −0.000128 0.000605 −0.000618 0.000286 0.000573 0.000656∗
(0.000231) (0.000855) (0.000550) (0.000239) (0.000434) (0.000349)
Unempl.dev −0.0000179 −0.000978 0.0000846 −0.000421 −0.000694 −0.000689∗
(0.000247) (0.000851) (0.000574) (0.000257) (0.000462) (0.000376)
Fem.emplyoment −0.0000845 0.000165 0.000243
(0.0000807) (0.000195) (0.000178)
Firmsize −0.000324∗ −0.00115∗∗ −0.000770∗ −0.000453∗∗ −0.000388 −0.00119∗∗∗
(0.000195) (0.000581) (0.000431) (0.000229) (0.000418) (0.000379)
Year −0.000215 −0.000996 0.000476 0.000170 −0.00166∗∗∗ 0.00367∗∗∗
(0.000287) (0.00112) (0.000835) (0.000292) (0.000598) (0.000769)
Year squared −0.00000174 0.00000511 −0.00000372 7.12e− 07 0.0000119∗ 0.00000133
(0.00000305) (0.00000884) (0.00000710) (3.63e− 06) (0.00000637) (0.00000622)
Level2 −0.00696∗∗∗ −0.00868∗∗∗ −0.00959∗∗∗ −0.00320∗∗
(0.000948) (0.00185) (0.00107) (0.00163)
Level3 −0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0172∗∗∗ −0.00730∗∗∗ −0.0168∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ −0.00242∗
(0.00122) (0.00190) (0.00199) (0.00111) (0.00147) (0.00132)
Level4 −0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ −0.00509∗∗ −0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.000680
(0.00158) (0.00198) (0.00201) (0.00142) (0.00169) (0.00162)
Level5 −0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.00367 −0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0245∗∗∗ 0.000493
(0.00226) (0.00281) (0.00297) (0.00174) (0.00190) (0.00168)
Age2 0.000456 0.0000192 0.000994 −0.000299 0.000193 −0.00116∗
(0.000341) (0.000842) (0.000679) (0.000471) (0.000764) (0.000705)
Age3 −0.0000313 0.000254 −0.000195 −0.000791 0.000338 −0.00282∗∗
(0.000579) (0.00144) (0.00112) (0.000761) (0.00123) (0.00118)
Age4 −0.000204 0.00228 0.000208 −0.00158 0.000546 −0.00682∗∗∗
(0.000830) (0.00228) (0.00175) (0.00103) (0.00169) (0.00168)
Age5 0.000171 0.00149 −0.000140 −0.00224∗ −0.0000502 −0.0101∗∗∗
(0.00128) (0.00309) (0.00259) (0.00136) (0.00237) (0.00232)
Age6 0.0000717 0.00366 −0.00194 −0.00245 −0.000169 −0.0135∗∗∗
(0.00171) (0.00464) (0.00371) (0.00177) (0.00317) (0.00325)
INTERunempl 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗ 0.0669∗∗∗ 0.0968∗∗∗
(0.00259) (0.0118) (0.00684) (0.00277) (0.00894) (0.00608)
Continued on next page...
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... table B.2 continued
Women Men
Up Down Horizontal Up Down Horizontal
INTERservice 0.00197∗∗ 0.000534 0.0479∗∗∗
(0.000909) (0.00199) (0.00223)
INTERoth1 −0.000796 0.0113 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.000657 0.00230 0.0323∗∗∗
(0.00103) (0.00700) (0.00478) (0.00155) (0.00220) (0.00506)
Parttime 0.00115 0.00343 0.00284 0.00173 −0.00428 0.0145∗∗∗
(0.00110) (0.00314) (0.00260) (0.00269) (0.00575) (0.00484)
#inter 0.00485∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.00383∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗
(0.000993) (0.00320) (0.00229) (0.000849) (0.00186) (0.00169)
#pastjobs −0.00203∗∗∗ −0.00963∗∗∗ −0.0199∗∗∗ −0.00241∗∗∗ −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0125∗∗∗
(0.000411) (0.00121) (0.00118) (0.000323) (0.000770) (0.000785)
N 273207 276443
1 Summarizes interruptions due to service and other in female sample
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Source: ALWA, own calculation.
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Table B.3: Spell fixed effects estimation (number of subordinates)
Women Men
Up Down Horizontal Up Down Horizontal
preghaz −0.0546∗∗ 0.0441 −0.191∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.0403 0.0388
(0.0224) (0.0745) (0.0479) (0.0386) (0.0570) (0.0463)
Partner high 0.000775 0.000907 0.00211∗∗ 0.000923 0.000197 −0.000298
(0.000586) (0.00146) (0.00102) (0.000879) (0.00139) (0.00105)
Partner low −0.000448∗ 0.000192 0.00103 −0.000364 −0.000101 0.000206
(0.000273) (0.000805) (0.000631) (0.000410) (0.000649) (0.000588)
Car2 −0.000172 0.00000510 −0.00131∗∗ 0.000441 0.000991 −0.000821∗
(0.000241) (0.000683) (0.000532) (0.000382) (0.000642) (0.000499)
Car3 −0.000862∗∗ −0.00156 −0.00618∗∗∗ −0.000912∗ −0.00176∗∗ −0.00428∗∗∗
(0.000336) (0.000991) (0.000760) (0.000480) (0.000816) (0.000689)
Car4 −0.00255∗∗∗ −0.00494∗∗∗ −0.0121∗∗∗ −0.00424∗∗∗ −0.00428∗∗∗ −0.00959∗∗∗
(0.000457) (0.00149) (0.00114) (0.000650) (0.00121) (0.00107)
Exper 0.000122∗∗∗ 0.000245∗∗∗ 0.000445∗∗∗ 0.000188∗∗∗ 0.000251∗∗∗ −0.000260∗∗∗
(0.0000219) (0.0000624) (0.0000500) (0.0000309) (0.0000544) (0.0000599)
Exper squared −0.00000018∗∗∗ −0.00000035∗∗∗ −0.00000072∗∗∗ −0.00000025∗∗∗ −0.00000030∗∗∗ −0.00000046∗∗∗
(2.25e− 08) (6.69e− 08) (5.39e− 08) (2.71e− 08) (5.56e− 08) (4.49e− 08)
Mobil 0.0000386 0.000512 0.00252∗∗∗ 0.00154∗∗∗ −0.000504 −0.0000107
(0.000282) (0.000958) (0.000553) (0.000436) (0.000555) (0.000595)
East 0.00454 −0.0408 0.00215 −0.00506 −0.00757∗∗∗ −0.00892
(0.00434) (0.0689) (0.0102) (0.00392) (0.00285) (0.00816)
Unempl 0.000170 −0.00141∗∗ −0.000428 0.000330 0.00107 0.000742
(0.000221) (0.000612) (0.000507) (0.000371) (0.000684) (0.000556)
Unempl.dev −0.000305 0.00109∗ −0.000220 −0.000506 −0.00113 −0.000936∗
(0.000236) (0.000634) (0.000530) (0.000378) (0.000688) (0.000561)
Fem.emplyoment −0.0000581 −0.0000467 0.000217
(0.0000995) (0.000255) (0.000181)
Year −0.000937∗∗∗ −0.000727 −0.00149∗∗ −0.000851∗∗ −0.00236∗∗∗ 0.00540∗∗∗
(0.000272) (0.000821) (0.000630) (0.000428) (0.000739) (0.000775)
Year squared 0.00000910∗∗∗ −0.00000597 0.000000424 0.00000139 0.0000195∗∗ 0.00000575
(0.00000286) (0.00000694) (0.00000610) (0.00000462) (0.00000804) (0.00000655)
Age2 0.000465 −0.00110 −0.00151∗∗ −0.000843∗ 0.000222 0.000566
(0.000338) (0.000821) (0.000614) (0.000455) (0.000855) (0.000708)
Age3 −0.000255 −0.00101 −0.00548∗∗∗ −0.00121∗ −0.000521 0.000577
(0.000553) (0.00145) (0.000968) (0.000734) (0.00132) (0.00112)
Age4 −0.00121 0.000556 −0.00692∗∗∗ −0.00182∗ −0.00105 −0.000415
(0.000815) (0.00224) (0.00145) (0.000995) (0.00179) (0.00152)
Continued on next page...
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... table B.3 continued
Women Men
Up Down Horizontal Up Down Horizontal
Age5 −0.000483 0.00165 −0.00541∗∗∗ −0.00181 −0.000966 0.000360
(0.00119) (0.00286) (0.00210) (0.00129) (0.00249) (0.00199)
Age6 0.0000735 0.00608 −0.00202 −0.00138 −0.000492 0.00220
(0.00151) (0.00469) (0.00278) (0.00160) (0.00326) (0.00253)
INTERunempl 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.0766∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗∗ 0.0746∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.00275) (0.0129) (0.00741) (0.00292) (0.00962) (0.00663)
INTERservice 0.00617∗∗∗ 0.00669∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗
(0.00104) (0.00194) (0.00331)
INTERoth1 0.000586 0.0106 0.0251∗∗∗ 0.00262 0.00122 0.0343∗∗∗
(0.00104) (0.00689) (0.00507) (0.00169) (0.00230) (0.00564)
N 273207 276443
1 Summarizes interruptions due to service and other in female sample
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Source: ALWA, own calculation.
Chapter 4
Mind the Gap - Gender Wage Gap
and Unemployment Rate in Local
Labor Markets
4.1 Introduction
The gender wage gap is one of the most widely researched phenomena of all gender differences in
labor market outcomes. Differences in pay do not only reflect ongoing inequalities in the labor
market, they are also related to long term outcomes such as the gender pension gap. A cen-
tral issue in existing theories and empirical applications is the attempt to pin down the factors
that cause the wage gap and to identify the extent to which wage differentials are a result of
discrimination. Gender differences in preferences and non-cognitive skills are another possible
explanation considered recently (see Blau and Kahn, 2016). This paper offers a new view on
explaining the gender wage gap by incorporating the influence of local labor market conditions,
particularly the local unemployment rate and gender-specific responses to changes in the unem-
ployment rate.
Generally, wages and unemployment are two of the most important quantities in economics.
Their relationship is described in different theories, and their empirical investigation remains
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an area of active research. The wage curve, introduced by the seminal paper of Blanchflower
and Oswald (1994) describes the inverse relationship between the level of local unemployment
and the level of wages. It is empirically found that differences in the wage curves of various
subpopulations exist according to their bargaining power, whereby men’s wages are more elas-
tic than women’s. Despite the fact that the relationship between wages and unemployment is
intensively discussed in economic literature, to my best knowledge the gender wage gap has not
been analyzed in this context. This paper is motivated by the idea that if men’s and women’s
wages respond differently to changes in unemployment, the wage gap is expected to be affected
analogously. The goal of this paper is to derive a relationship between the gender wage gap and
the level of local unemployment. This contributes to the literature, since the share of the gen-
der wage gap that cannot fully be accounted for by observable characteristics is not necessarily
attributed to discrimination, but can be partly explained by gender differences in the elasticity
of wages with respect to unemployment.
Based on theoretical considerations, I state hypotheses on the association between the unem-
ployment rate and the gender wage gap in local labor markets. I further consider spatial spillover
effects of unemployment and investigate the relationship between the gender wage gap and the
unemployment rate in the commuting area. Using a German linked employer-employee data set
(LIAB from the IAB), I apply decomposition techniques to calculate a human capital-adjusted
gender wage gap based on district- and time-specific wage functions. At the district level, I cal-
culate the adjusted gap at the mean as well as at different parts of the distribution. Additionally,
I construct intra-firm wage gaps using district- and time-specific wage functions with firm fixed
effects. The resulting adjusted wage gaps are then related to the local unemployment rate by
means of regression analysis. The spatial unemployment rate is considered as an additional
regressor. In case of the intra-firm gender wage gap, I control for a range of firm characteristics
that already capture a substantial part of the observed heterogeneity in the wage differentials.
The results suggest that the gender wage gap is negatively associated with the local unemploy-
ment rate and positively correlated with spatial unemployment. Firm characteristics affect the
intra-firm gender wage gap and moderate the effect of the unemployment rate. Additionally, I
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conduct several robustness checks. The negative relationship between the local unemployment
rate and the gender wage gap is also found for different specifications of the adjusted gap as well
as for the raw gender wage gap. Moreover, the positive association of spatial unemployment
retains with different measures of the wage gap. However, a spatial unemployment rate that is
calculated regardless of existing commuting structures is not significantly related to the gender
wage gap.
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections: Section 4.2 summarizes the exist-
ing literature, section 4.3 introduces the data, in section 4.4 theoretical considerations and the
econometric framework are described and section 4.5 presents the results. Finally, section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
The gender wage gap has been subject to economic research for a number of decades and it re-
mains of high interest to researchers and policymakers. Blau and Kahn (2016) give an overview
over the extent and development of the gender wage differential in the U.S. labor market and pro-
vide an excellent summary of theoretical explanations and empirical evidence. A meta-analysis
of international studies between the 1960s and the 1990s is carried out by Weichselbaumer and
Winter-Ebmer (2005). In general, a reduction of the gender gap as a long-term trend in eco-
nomically advanced nations can be observed, yet considerable gender wage differentials exist.
Gender differences in human capital and labor force attachment are central for understanding
this phenomenon. Human capital theory suggests that women have more discontinuous em-
ployment trajectories and therefore fewer opportunities and lower incentives to invest in human
capital. Penalties for workforce interruptions are more of a concern for women than for men.
The same is true for part-time work. Moreover, differences in occupational choices considerably
contribute to the gender wage gap. However, also within occupations, gender differences exist
in the representation along hierarchies leading to ’glass ceiling’ effects. Summarizing empirical
evidence, one can say that a substantial part of the wage gap can be attributed to observable dif-
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ferences in human capital characteristics and labor force attachment. Yet, a non-negligible share
remains which is not fully understood and requires more research. Alternative explanations for
gender wage differentials are offered by theories on social norms and psychological attributes such
as personality traits and non-cognitive skills. Discrimination theory provides an explanation for
the part of the gender wage gap that cannot fully be accounted for by productivity differences,
human capital or other observed factors (see the concept of taste based discrimination described
by Becker, 1971, or statistical discrimination introduced by Phelps, 1972). Regional and macro
economic conditions such as the local unemployment rate have been neglected so far in theo-
retical and empirical explanations of the gender wage gap. To my best knowledge, one of the
few exceptions is Hirsch et al. (2013) who find empirical evidence on regional differences in the
gender wage gap.
An overview of the wage gap in Germany is given by Boll and Leppin (2015). In 2014, women
earned on average 22 percent less than men. This gap is more pronounced in West Germany
than in East Germany. During the last decade the raw gap in earnings has been relatively
stable and has been above the European average, which was around 15 percent in 2010 (see
Boll et al., 2016). Gartner (2016) summarizes the development of gender-specific wages based
on linked employer-employee data from the Institute for Employment Research. According to
these data, the mean wage differential between 1993 and 2010 was about 24 percent in West
Germany. Differences in human capital cannot fully account for this, but given the same age
and qualification the wage gap shrinks to 17 percent.
Various studies try to unravel this effect and to identify the main drivers. In general, empirical
evidence is mostly based on regression methods and decomposition techniques. The residual
resulting from methods like the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition may reflect differences in human
capital that are not accounted for. Yet, it is also often taken as an estimate of labor market
discrimination. More advanced techniques have been developed to disentangle the detailed con-
tribution of individual factors, to look at distributional characteristics other than the mean or
to account for selection bias into the labor force (recent examples are Antonczyk et al., 2010, or
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Grimm et al., 2015, for Germany, and Albrecht et al., 2009, for the Netherlands).
While most studies focus on employee characteristics to explain the gender gap, some authors
call attention to employer’s and organizational attributes. Hirsch (2013) finds an impact of fe-
male management representation on the within-job gender pay gap. Hirsch and Mueller (2014)
investigate the differences in the unexplained gender pay gap between firms run by managers and
firms run by the owner. Other studies explore the effect of segregation into lower-paying firms
(Javdani, 2015) or the relationship between the gender wage gap and firm characteristics such as
the existence of a works council and collective bargaining (Heinze and Wolf, 2010; Grimm et al.,
2015). In the case of Heinze and Wolf (2010), special attention is drawn to within-firm wage
differentials. Their results suggest that the intra-firm wage differential is lower than the overall
gap, which means that women tend to select into lower-paying firms. Concerning organizational
characteristics, they find evidence that firms with a works council and those covered by collective
wage agreements have smaller gender wage gaps on average. In general, studies on the effect
of organizational characteristics on the gender wage gap (e.g. Heinze and Wolf, 2010; Javdani,
2015) show that firm heterogeneity explains a substantial amount of the variation in intra-firm
wage gaps.
In the following, I review contributions from the wage curve literature that are relevant for my
analysis. The wage curve was introduced by the seminal paper of Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994). It describes the inverse relationship between the local unemployment rate and the level
of wages. This stands in contrast to the well-known Phillips curve, which describes the rela-
tionship between unemployment and the rate of change of wages. While the Phillips curve uses
macroeconomic time series data, the wage curve is estimated based on pooled cross sectional
microeconomic data. The estimation procedure corresponds to a standard wage equation, where
the log of the local unemployment rate is added as additional regressor. Blanchflower and Os-
wald (1994) use data from several countries and find a relationship between log wages and log
unemployment, which is remarkably stable around -0.1. This can be interpreted in the way that
a doubling of the unemployment rate in a given region implies a ten percent drop in the level
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of wages. Among others, they consider a bargaining model and an efficiency wage approach as
theoretical explanations to rationalize their empirical findings. The bargaining model describes
a situation where employees are scared by a high level of unemployment in their regional labor
market, which in turn may lead to unions being more concerned about unemployment than
about the negotiation of the wage level. An alternative explanation is based on the efficiency
wage model. Here, firms pay above market wages to avoid turnover and shirking. The higher
the level of unemployment, the lower this efficiency wage has to be because workers put in more
effort under such circumstances, even if wages are lower.
Since the seminal paper of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), the wage curve has been reconsid-
ered in numerous empirical and theoretical works (see Nijkamp and Poot, 2005, for a review).
As the present paper considers the German labor market, I review related work for Germany.
Based on a random sample from the IAB employment sample from 1981 to 1990, Baltagi and
Blien (1998) find evidence for a German wage curve. Their sample covers 40,852 observations in
142 administrative districts. The elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment is estimated
as -0.07 but varies among subgroups and specifications. Studies on U.S. data find that men’s
wages are more responsive to the unemployment rate than women’s wages (e.g. Card, 1995).
Baltagi and Blien (1998)’s results confirm this finding for Germany. Baltagi et al. (2009) re-
consider the wage curve for West Germany for the years 1980 to 2004. Their data base covers
almost one million employees in 326 regions. In contrast to Blanchflower and Oswald (1994),
who do not find significant effects of the lagged wages in their model, Baltagi et al. (2009) use
a dynamic approach. Based on a two step approach, they conclude that the wage regression is
highly autoregressive, still far from unit root. The estimated elasticities vary between subgroups,
showing higher elasticities for those with the weaker bargaining power.
Another aspect considered in the literature is the effect of spatial interactions. Baltagi et al.
(2012) consider spatial spillover effects between regions. The data base is as in Baltagi et al.
(2009). Again, their findings confirm the existence of a dynamic wage curve and subgroup-
specific elasticities with men’s wages being more sensitive to the unemployment rate than
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women’s wages. However, in most of the specifications, spatial unemployment is not signifi-
cantly related to the level of wages in the West German regions. Other studies using a spatial
approach are Longhi et al. (2006) or Pannenberg and Schwarze (2000). Another extension of
the wage curve is done by using subsample-specific unemployment rates, as suggested by Card
(1995). An application of gender-specific unemployment rates is Baltagi and Rokicki (2014) for
the case of Poland. The concept of the wage curve is applied to others than just the level of
market wages. Blien et al. (2012) study the relationship between reservation wages and regional
unemployment. They use a large German panel survey with information on regional reservation
wages and find evidence for a reservation wage curve. Just as the paid wages, reservation wages
are sensitive to the level of regional unemployment. They respond even stronger than market
wages. In line with the studies mentioned before, Blien et al. (2012) find evidence that men’s
reservation wages seem to be more elastic than women’s.
4.3 Data
This study uses the Linked Employer-Employee Data (LIAB) (cross-sectional model 2) from the
IAB1. The data set combines information from the establishment panel with individual data
from the Federal Employment Agency. The establishment panel is a representative employer
survey on around 16,000 establishments. It covers all branches and sizes. The yearly survey
captures questions on the number of employees, wage policies, training, investments, innovation
and other employment policies. In addition, questions on specific topics are asked on an irregular
basis. Data are available as of 1993 for West Germany and as of 1996 for East Germany. The
location of each establishment is reported at the district level (Kreise and Kreisfreie Sta¨dte),
which allows one carrying out detailed analyses at the level of local labor markets. Due to
administrative reforms, the affiliation of municipalities to districts is not constant over time. In
almost all relevant cases, municipalities have been merged with neighboring districts, implying
that the level of analysis becomes slightly coarser. For my analysis, I apply the structure of the
latest district information to all survey waves considered. For the years before district mergers,
1Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Center (FDZ) of the German Federal Employ-
ment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and subsequently remote data access.
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I use the mean unemployment rate over the respective districts. Still, the number of districts
varies over the years because some districts drop out of the analysis if too few observations are
available in a given year.
The individual wage data, that are linked via a unique establishment identifier, originate from
labor administration and social security data processing. They include a number of individual
characteristics as well as information on employment and wages.2 Most important for my pur-
pose is the information on the daily gross wage, which is right-censored at the assessment ceiling
(Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). Therefore, a wage imputation procedure following Gartner (2005)
is applied. Another limitation is that no exact information on working time is provided. I there-
fore restrict my sample to full-time workers. Due to data constraints, the final sample is further
restricted to establishments in West Germany and to the years 2002 to 2008. For the firm level
analysis, only establishments with at least 20 male and 20 female employees are considered. The
final sample covers around 8 million person-year observations, which are summarized in table
C.2 in the appendix. The calculation of the adjusted gender wage gap is based on the individ-
ual level data and results in 2,192 district-year observations and 13,202 firm-year observations.
These data are then linked to organizational characteristics taken from the establishment panel
and to further regional information. Tables C.4 and C.3 in the appendix report the summary
statistics for all variables used in the regression analysis.
Information on unemployment rates (at the district level and separated by gender) is available
from the Federal Employment Agency. During the observation period, the district level unem-
ployment rates show a variation between 1.8 (Eichsta¨tt, Bavaria in 2010) and 24.6 (Bremerhaven
in 2005). Figure 4.1 exemplarily illustrates the regional variation in 2008. Since I additionally
consider spatial spillover effects of unemployment in the analysis, I need to apply a measure
of spatial unemployment. For this purpose, I define the mean unemployment rate in the com-
muting area in which a district is located as the spatial unemployment rate. As commuting
area I use regional planning units (Raumordnungsregionen), which are composed of one or sev-
2For a detailed description of the data, see Heining et al. (2013)
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eral districts and reflect regional commuting flows. During the observation period, there are 97
regional planning units in Germany, 75 of which are located in West Germany. I calculate a
population weighted average of the local unemployment rates of all districts in the commuting
area, excluding the own district, and define the resulting rate as spatial unemployment rate.
Alternatively, I calculate a spatial unemployment rate that is the population weighted average
of all first neighbors, i.e. of all districts that have a common border with the district of interest.
This measure does not account for commuting flows and is used for the purpose of robustness
checks.
(8.4,17.1]
(6.1,8.4]
(4.2,6.1]
[1.8,4.2]
Source: Federal Statistical Office, own calculation.
Figure 4.1: Local unemployment rates, West Germany 2008
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4.4 Econometric Framework
Theoretical considerations
In the literature cited in chapter 4.2, one repeatedly finds that men’s wages respond stronger to
changes in the local unemployment rate than women’s wages. This implies that the gender wage
gap is also potentially related to the level of unemployment. In a situation where a wage gap in
favor of men exists, an increase in the level of unemployment would stronger affect men’s wages
and should therefore reduce the wage differential. Consequently, I expect a negative relationship
between the local unemployment rate and the gender wage gap. My theoretical considerations
are thereby based on two assumptions that I derive from the literature outlined in section 4.2.
A1 The local unemployment rate and the level of wages are negatively correlated (Blanchflower
and Oswald, 1994)
A2 Men’s wages respond stronger to changes in the unemployment rate than women’s wages
(Baltagi and Blien, 1998)
Based on the assumptions (A1) that the unemployment rate and the level of wages are negatively
correlated, and (A2) that men’s wages are more elastic, one can rewrite the gender-specific wage
curves (equations 4.1 and 4.2) as the difference in mean wages as follows
ln(wmir ) = X
m
ir β
m + γm ln(Ur) + 
m
ir (4.1)
ln(wfir) = X
f
irβ
f + γf ln(Ur) + 
f
ir (4.2)
ln(wmr )− ln(wfr ) = Xmr βm −Xfr βf + (γm − γf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 if A1,A2: γm<γf
ln(Ur) + mr − fr . (4.3)
In the notation, ln(wmir )
(
ln(wfir)
)
denotes the log wage of men (women). i is an individual
subscript and r a regional one. Xmi (X
f
i ) are male (female) characteristics and 
m
i (
f
i ) is the
error term in the wage regression. γm (γf ) describes the effect of unemployment on men’s
(women’s) wages. Writing the gap as the differential between mean wages
(
ln(w
m/f
r )
)
as in
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equation (4.3), the resulting negative coefficient, (γm − γf ) < 0, makes sense if we built on the
assumptions of the efficiency wage theory: In times of high unemployment the wage premium
can be reduced because fewer vacancies in the labor market go along with diminished outside
options and may weaken the negotiation power of employees. If men’s wages are more elastic
than women’s, employers may pay a lower wage premium for men, while for women’s wages the
adjustment is less pronounced. Therefore the gender-specific wage differential narrows.
As shown in the wage curve literature, not only the local unemployment rate is theoretically
supposed to affect the wage level, but also the spatial unemployment rate might influence wages.
This is particularly true if we look at small labor markets with strongly marked commuting
structures to adjacent regions. Thus, I hypothesize that a relationship between the spatial
unemployment rate and the gender wage differential exists both at the regional level as well
as within firms. The direction of the effect is theoretically less clear and will be investigated
empirically in this paper. Moreover, in case of the intra-firm gender wage gap, organizational
characteristics should be influential as well. Especially variables related to the wage setting
process such as the existence of a works council and collective bargaining could moderate the
effect of the unemployment rate.
Calculation of the gender wage gap
To investigate the theoretical considerations, I define measures for the gender wage gap at the
district and firm level, which are later used as dependent variables in regression models. The
simplest measure for the gender wage gap is the raw gender wage gap, i.e. the observed gap
between gender-specific mean wages. At the regional level this is given for the r = 1, . . . , R
districts in t = 1, . . . , T years by
raw gaprt = ln(w
m
rt)− ln(wfrt). (4.4)
The intra-firm wage gap is calculated analogously for the j = 1, . . . , J firms in year t = 1, . . . , T
as
raw gapjrt = ln(w
m
jrt)− ln(wfjrt). (4.5)
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Part of this observed gap may be due to differences in the employees’ human capital endowments
across districts or firms. Using the method introduced by the seminal papers of Oaxaca (1973)
and Blinder (1973), I decompose the raw gender gap in the mean wages into a part resulting
from differences in observable characteristics (explained part) and a part that reflects different
evaluations of these characteristics (unexplained part). The unexplained part can be interpreted
as the share of the gap resulting from different wage functions. It reflects the gender wage gap
that would result if women had the same observable characteristics as men, i.e. the human
capital-adjusted gender wage gap. The decomposition can generally be written as
∆ˆO︸︷︷︸
Overall difference
= ∆ˆS︸︷︷︸
Unexplained
+ ∆ˆX︸︷︷︸
Explained
. (4.6)
At the district level, the adjusted wage gap results from
adj. gaprt = ∆ˆ
S
rt =
(
βˆmrt − βˆfrt
)
Xfrt =
(
ln(wmrt)− ln(wfrt)
)
−
(
βˆmrtX
m
rt − βˆmrtXfrt
)
(4.7)
for the r = 1, . . . , R administrative districts (Kreise/Kreisfreie Sta¨dte). It is calculated sepa-
rately for each year t and results in R ·T different wage gaps. The βˆmrt are estimated in a Mincer
regression at the district level
ln(wmitr) = β0 + β
m
rtXirt + irt, for r = 1, . . . , R and t = 1, . . . , T. (4.8)
As explanatory variables, I use education, experience (quadratic), job tenure, occupational
group, firm size and sector.
The intra-firm gender wage gap is decomposed analogously for the j = 1, . . . , J firms in each
year t = 1, . . . , T . The underlying wage function is estimated in gender-specific wage regressions
at the district level with additional firm fixed effects λjrt
ln(wmijrt) = β0 + β
m
rtXijrt + λ
m
jrt + ijrt, for r = 1, . . . , R and t = 1, . . . , T. (4.9)
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The human capital-adjusted intra-firm wage gap is then calculated as
adj. gapjrt = ∆ˆ
S
jrt = (βˆ
m
rt−βˆfrt)Xfjrt+(λmjrt−λfjrt) =
(
ln(wmjrt)− ln(wfjrt)
)
−
(
βˆmrtX
m
jrt − βˆmrtXfjrt
)
.
(4.10)
The control variables include human capital characteristics as in equation (4.8), but the infor-
mation on firm size and sector is omitted as both are constant within firms. This procedure
results in a sample of T · J intra-firm gender wage gaps.
Econometric literature offers a wide range of methods to go beyond the decomposition of the
mean (see Fortin et al., 2011, for an overview). I calculate the gender wage gap at different
quantiles along the distribution following the reweighting method introduced by DiNardo et al.
(1996). The decomposition in (4.6) can be more generally written in terms of differences in any
distributional statistic ν
ν(Fmm)− ν(Fff )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Overall difference
= ν(Fmm)− ν(Ffm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unexplained
+ ν(Ffm)− ν(Fff )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Explained
, (4.11)
with Fmm (Fff ) being the distribution of wages for men (women) where both observable factors
and the wage function are the one for men (women), and Fmf is the counterfactual distribution
resulting from the women’s wage function with observable characteristics of men. The counter-
factual distribution is calculated using the following reweighting approach with the reweighting
factor Ψ(x).
Ffm =
∫
x
Ψ(x) · F (ln(w)|x,m = 1) · dF (x|m = 1) (4.12)
Ψ(x) =
P (m = 0|x)
P (m = 1|x) ·
P (m = 1)
P (m = 0)
(4.13)
Estimation strategy
The resulting human capital-adjusted gender wage gaps (∆ˆS) from (4.7), (4.10) and (4.11) are
in a second step regressed on the log of the local unemployment rate.
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For the district level, the model is
∆ˆSrt = β0 + β
rXrt + γ
r ln(U)rt + µc + ηt + rt, (4.14)
with Xrt being regional characteristics, Urt the local unemployment rate and µc, ηt commuting
area and time fixed effects. The regression is estimated by ordinary least squares with standard
errors clustered at the district level. The relationship between the gap at different quantiles
resulting from (4.11) and the local unemployment rate is considered analogously.
At the firm level, I estimate
∆ˆSjrt = β0 + β
rXrt + β
jXjrt + γ
r ln(U)rt + µc + ηt + jrt, (4.15)
with Xjrt denoting firm characteristics, namely firm size (quadratic), sector, existence of a works
council, female share in the workforce, legal structure, founding age and collective bargaining.
The full list of regressors is described in table C.1 in the appendix. The estimation procedure,
again, follows ordinary least squares with clustered standard errors at the firm level.
In order to test my hypothesis about the effect of the unemployment rate in the commuting area,
I extend both models by the log of the spatial unemployment rate. In the case of the district
level, I estimate
∆ˆSrt = β0 + β
rXrt + γ
r ln(U)rt + γ
c ln(U)ct + µc + ηt + rt, (4.16)
where Uct denotes the spatial unemployment rate.
I further extend the model by accounting for gender-specific unemployment rates instead of the
overall unemployment rates. For the intra-firm gender wage gap, I additionally include interac-
tions of institutional characteristics and the unemployment rate to test whether the existence of
a works council moderates the effect of unemployment on the wage gap.
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The estimation procedure described above is characterized by the use of district- and time-
specific wage functions. An alternative approach to investigating the relationship between the
unemployment rate and the gender wage gap would be to directly control for the unemployment
rate in the wage decomposition. However, this would come at the cost that the wage func-
tions can no longer be estimated individually for every region and year, as the unemployment
rate would be constant in a separate analysis for a given district at a time. To account for
regional-specific wage functions, one would have to include interactions of explanatory variables
and district dummies in the wage function for the pooled sample of individuals over regions
and years. Due to the high number of districts and categories of sectors and occupations, this
procedure would result in a model of high dimension. Due to computational restrictions it was
not possible to estimate this via remote data access. As a robustness check to my main analysis,
I also estimated a model including district dummies but without interactions. The results of the
detailed decomposition show a negative relationship between local unemployment rate and the
gender wage gap at the district level. These results are available on request.
4.5 Empirical Results
The gender wage gap at district and firm level
At the district level I find a mean raw gap of about 0.246, which can be decomposed into an
explained part of around 0.034 and an unexplained part of 0.211 on average. These numbers
result from the Oaxaca Blinder decomposition as described in equations (4.4) and (4.10) us-
ing education, experience (quadratic), tenure, occupation, sector and firm size as explanatory
variables. Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 report the mean gender wage gaps over regions by year. On
average, the regional gender wage gap is relatively stable over time, but considerable variation
between the districts exists. The distribution of the raw gap and the adjusted gap are shown in
figure 4.2.
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Table 4.1: Raw gap across districts
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2002 0.235 0.090 −0.007 0.608 316
2003 0.247 0.094 −0.019 0.687 314
2004 0.247 0.099 −0.027 0.698 315
2005 0.247 0.099 −0.001 0.691 314
2006 0.249 0.104 −0.060 0.830 313
2007 0.249 0.110 −0.126 0.763 311
2008 0.244 0.110 −0.109 0.735 309
overall 0.246 0.101 −0.126 0.830 2192
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
Table 4.2: Unexplained part across districts
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2002 0.216 0.108 −0.069 1.180 316
2003 0.220 0.080 −0.173 0.770 314
2004 0.207 0.088 −0.461 0.542 315
2005 0.215 0.101 −0.414 1.058 314
2006 0.210 0.091 −0.694 0.628 313
2007 0.203 0.169 −2.424 0.545 311
2008 0.207 0.202 −1.788 2.112 309
overall 0.211 0.127 −2.424 2.112 2192
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
Table 4.3: Explained part across districts
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2002 0.019 0.110 −0.902 0.404 316
2003 0.027 0.090 −0.398 0.474 314
2004 0.040 0.103 −0.232 0.707 315
2005 0.032 0.116 −0.684 0.594 314
2006 0.040 0.103 −0.313 0.888 313
2007 0.047 0.184 −0.478 2.684 311
2008 0.037 0.220 −1.897 2.088 309
overall 0.034 0.140 −1.897 2.684 2192
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of raw gap and adjusted gap across districts
For the intra-firm wage gap, I find a raw gap that is 0.213 on average, with a mean unexplained
part of 0.195. The intra-firm wage gap is therefore smaller on average than the mean gender
wage gap at the district level. This finding is in line with the results of previous studies (e.g.
Heinze and Wolf, 2010) and can be interpreted to mean that women select into lower paying
firms3. Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 show the decomposition results by year. Compared to the results
of previous studies such as Heinze and Wolf (2010), the magnitude of the unexplained gap is
rather at the upper bound. This seems to be driven by the fact that I additionally consider
the occupational group as regressor in the decomposition analysis. Leaving out this category
reproduces the results by Heinze and Wolf (2010).4 Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of the raw
and adjusted intra-firm gap over the observation period.
3The mean district level wage gap, however, is comparable in magnitude to the overall gap for the German
labor market. Selection does therefore only appear at the firm level while a selection into regions is not suggested
by the data.
4I decided to use occupational groups in the wage regression to control for occupational sorting as a potential
source of the gender gap. The choice of occupation is possibly related to unobserved characteristics such as risk
aversion that may influence the wage level (see Blau and Kahn, 2016). On the other hand, the choice of industry
or occupation can be affected by discrimination; see also Gartner (2016) for the relationship between occupation
and wage in the LIAB data. To account for possible endogeneity problems, I additionally calculate the wage
gap without controlling for occupation and use it in the regression analysis as robustness check (see below). The
results turn out to be robust along the different approaches used.
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Table 4.4: Intra-firm raw gap
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2002 0.211 0.125 −0.256 0.823 2148
2003 0.217 0.125 −0.161 0.858 1924
2004 0.218 0.130 −0.233 1.004 2040
2005 0.214 0.133 −0.280 0.795 2044
2006 0.214 0.137 −0.381 1.031 1926
2007 0.210 0.138 −0.424 1.083 1788
2008 0.206 0.140 −0.924 1.113 1748
overall 0.213 0.132 −0.924 1.113 13618
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
Table 4.5: Unexplained part of intra-firm gap
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2002 0.191 0.105 −0.248 0.839 2148
2003 0.199 0.104 −0.101 0.792 1924
2004 0.196 0.108 −0.398 0.788 2040
2005 0.197 0.113 −0.734 0.954 2044
2006 0.196 0.116 −0.738 0.886 1926
2007 0.195 0.119 −0.502 0.979 1788
2008 0.190 0.121 −0.788 0.924 1748
overall 0.195 0.112 −0.788 0.979 13618
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
Table 4.6: Explained part of intra-firm gap
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2002 0.021 0.090 −0.318 0.462 2148
2003 0.018 0.094 −0.340 0.353 1924
2004 0.022 0.098 −0.414 0.861 2040
2005 0.017 0.096 −0.417 0.922 2044
2006 0.018 0.100 −0.622 0.924 1926
2007 0.015 0.100 −0.738 1.067 1788
2008 0.017 0.108 −0.591 0.937 1748
overall 0.018 0.098 −0.738 1.067 13618
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of raw gap and adjusted gap across firms
The results of the decomposition along the distribution following equation (4.12) are presented
in figure 4.4. It can be seen that the raw gender wage gap is highest at the lower part of the
distribution. This is in line with results from current studies on the German labor market, as
Boll and Leppin (2015).
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Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
Figure 4.4: Mean raw gap and adjusted gap at different quantiles, district level
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Local unemployment and the district level wage gap
The adjusted gender wage gap that results from equation (4.7) is now regressed on the local
unemployment rate and further explanatory variables following (4.14). I control for time trends,
commuting area fixed effects, and an indicator for growing or shrinking labor markets. As can
be seen from in 4.7, the local unemployment rate is negatively associated with the gender wage
gap at the district level. The estimated coefficient is −0.057 and highly significant, implying
that a doubling of the unemployment rate is associated with a 6 points drop in the adjusted
gender wage gap at the district level. Since the wage gap is measured as the difference in log
wages, a 6 point decrease can therefore approximately be interpreted as a decline in the adjusted
wage differential of 6 percentage points. This is substantial given that the mean gap is about
21 percentage points.
The estimated negative coefficient is in line with the theoretical considerations outlined in section
4.4. According to the wage curve literature, an increase in the unemployment rate goes along
with lower wages. Yet, this effect is expected to be more pronounced for men. This provides
the intuition for the negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the wage gap.
Theoretically, a drop in the wage gap can be rationalized by the efficiency wage theory: In times
of high unemployment, employers may pay a lower wage premium for men while for women’s
wages the adjustment is less pronounced as both groups face different outside options.
The observed negative association of local unemployment with the adjusted wage gap also holds
if group-specific unemployment rates are considered. Model (2) in table 4.7 shows a negative
relationship of the gender wage gap and the male unemployment rate. In model (3), I consider
solely the female unemployment rate and observe a negative coefficient as well. Finally, in
model (4), both gender-specific unemployment rates are included simultaneously. The negative
coefficient of the male unemployment rate remains significant. The female unemployment rate is
now positively, though not significantly, related to the gender wage gap. Following the efficiency
wage theory, this seems plausible. The coefficient of the female unemployment rate has to be
interpreted ceteris paribus. If the male unemployment rate is held constant, but the female
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unemployment rate increases, mainly female wages will adjust, i.e. decrease, which leads to
a growing wage gap. However, the fact that only the male unemployment rate is significantly
related to the wage gap may be due to a multicollinearity problem caused by the high correlation
of the two measures (around 0.9).
Table 4.7: Regression results district level (adj. gap)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnU −0.0569∗∗∗ −0.0454∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0186)
lnUm −0.0508∗∗∗ −0.0646∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0233)
lnUf −0.0548∗∗ 0.0199
(0.0220) (0.0390)
Spatial lnU 0.0691∗∗
(0.0270)
Region FE
√ √ √ √ √
Time FE
√ √ √ √ √
Controls
√ √ √ √ √
N 2192 2192 2192 2192 2178
R2 0.077 0.078 0.074 0.078 0.079
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
I further extend the model by a measure for spatial unemployment as reported in model (5),
table 4.7. I add the log of the mean unemployment rate in the commuting area (excluding
the own district). As in the other models, the estimated effect of the local unemployment rate
is negative. The coefficient is now -0.045 and the effect of the spatial unemployment rate is
estimated as 0.069, both being statistically significant. To rationalize the positive effect of the
spatial unemployment rate, one may consider the commuting behavior of individuals. Empirical
studies suggest that men devote more time to commuting and commute longer distances than
women (e.g. Gimenez-Nadal and Molina, 2015; Crane, 2007). This is theoretically rationalized
by differences in the assignment of household activities within couples or different preferences in
the degree of job specialization. Following the reasoning of the wage curve approach, an increase
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in the unemployment rate in adjacent regions is expected to go along with lower wages there.
Hence, we may expect an increasing number of individuals commuting into the observed local
district. These commuting individuals are likely to be men with a relatively high (reservation)
wage because longer commuting distances correspond to higher wages (Reichelt and Haas, 2015).
Assuming that more high-earning men from neighboring regions commute into the local labor
market, one can expect the gender-specific wage gap to increase.5
As to the decomposition results from the reweighting procedure, one can observe that not only
the level of the gender wage gap varies over the distribution but also its relationship to the
local unemployment rate. The results at selected percentiles are reported in table 4.8. The
negative association with the unemployment rate can be found along the whole distribution,
but it becomes weaker with increasing percentiles. A positive relationship with the spatial
unemployment exists, yet being only significant in some parts of the distribution (see table 4.9).
Table 4.8: Regression results district level (adj. gap at different quantiles)
p10 p25 p40 p50 p60 p75
lnU −0.225∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.0953∗∗∗ −0.0590∗∗
(0.0521) (0.0400) (0.0310) (0.0256) (0.0238) (0.0233)
Region FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Time FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
N 2192 2192 2192 2192 2192 2192
R2 0.094 0.134 0.125 0.114 0.135 0.162
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
5This argumentation is based on the idea that individuals commute from adjacent regions into the local labor
market. In the case of better labor market conditions in the neighboring regions compared to the local labor
market, one would expect the commuting flow in the reverse direction. The theoretical considerations adjust
accordingly: An increase in the unemployment rate in the other districts of the commuting area leads to a
decreasing commuting flow and more high-earning men remain in the local labor market, which widens the wage
gap.
4.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 117
Table 4.9: Regression results with spatial unemployment (adj. gap at different
quantiles)
p10 p25 p40 p50 p60 p75
lnU −0.209∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.0961∗∗∗ −0.0841∗∗∗ −0.0505∗∗
(0.0550) (0.0422) (0.0316) (0.0263) (0.0250) (0.0242)
Spatial lnU 0.0960 0.173∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.0692 0.0528
(0.103) (0.0734) (0.0560) (0.0510) (0.0428) (0.0396)
Region FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Time FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
N 2178 2178 2178 2178 2178 2178
R2 0.093 0.137 0.128 0.117 0.137 0.163
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
Local unemployment and the intra-firm wage gap
For the intra-firm gender wage gap I observe a similar association with the unemployment rate
as at the district level (see table 4.106). The estimated relationship between the log unemploy-
ment rate and the adjusted gender wage gap is estimated as -0.037. The magnitude of the effect
varies depending on the additional regressors used, but a negative and significant relationship is
found throughout all specifications.
As to the effect of firm characteristics, which are controlled for to capture observed firm hetero-
geneity, the estimated coefficients are in line with previous findings in Heinze and Wolf (2010).
Establishments with a works council show on average a lower gender wage gap, as can be seen
throughout all models in table 4.10. This is also true for firms covered by collective bargaining
(either industry-wide or company agreement) compared to those with no collective wage agree-
ment. The coefficient for firm size is negative and the squared coefficient is positive. Taken
together, the relationship between firm size and the gender wage gap is U-shaped with a turning
point at around 11,000 employees. Establishments founded before 1990 are found to have larger
gender wage differentials on average, which might be explained by differences in the organiza-
tional culture.
6Only relevant coefficients are reported in order to save space. The full list of coefficients can be found in table
C.5 in the appendix.
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As a variation of model (1), I use gender-specific unemployment rates instead of the overall rate.
The results are in line with those found at the district level: Models (2) and (3) give negative
and significant coefficients on the male- and female-specific unemployment rate respectively. In-
cluding both in model (4), I find a negative association with the male unemployment rate, but
a positive one with the female-specific rate. As outlined in section 4.2, the relationship between
unemployment and wage gap might differ according to firm characteristics. This can be seen in
model (5) where an interaction term between works council and unemployment is added. The
estimated coefficient of the interaction term turns out to be positive while the one for the works
council retains its negative sign. This suggests that the otherwise negative effect of unemploy-
ment is moderated by the existence of a works council.
Model (6) includes further regressors on female representation in top management and second
management positions. Unfortunately, questions concerning gender mainstreaming are only
part of the 2004 and 2008 establishment panel questionnaire. This shrinks the sample to 3,361
observations. Although being based on a smaller sample, the estimated coefficient of local un-
employment remains negative and significant. Female representation both in first and second
management is negatively related to the gender wage gap. Yet, the female share in second level
management positions appears to be more influential. This result is in line with earlier findings
by Hirsch (2013). Thereby, Hirsch argues that second level managers are more likely to be in-
volved in hiring or promotion decisions and have more direct interaction with non-managerial
workers.
Finally, considering the spatial unemployment rate in model (7) leads to an estimated coefficient
of -0.025 for the local unemployment rate and 0.050 for spatial unemployment. Again, the direc-
tion of the effects is in line with those at the district level. However, the estimated coefficients
at the intra-firm level are smaller in magnitude.
Robustness checks
As introduced in section 4.4, the mean wage differential can result from gender differences in the
human capital allocation across regions or firms. By using the human capital-adjusted gender
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Table 4.10: Regression results firm level (adj. gap)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
lnU −0.0371∗∗∗ −0.0681∗∗∗ −0.0310∗∗∗ −0.0266∗∗∗
(0.00727) (0.0144) (0.00883) (0.00726)
Works council −0.0236∗∗∗ −0.0235∗∗∗ −0.0237∗∗∗ −0.0232∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.0325∗∗∗ −0.0267∗∗∗
(0.00609) (0.00608) (0.00611) (0.00606) (0.0300) (0.00790) (0.00641)
Works council× lnU 0.0358∗∗∗
(0.0136)
lnUm −0.0354∗∗∗ −0.0726∗∗∗
(0.00634) (0.0136)
lnUf −0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0548∗∗∗
(0.00793) (0.0168)
Spatial lnU 0.0467∗∗∗
(0.0130)
Female share
Top management −0.0194∗
(0.0110)
2nd management −0.0680∗∗∗
(0.0110)
Region FE
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Time FE
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Firm characteristics
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
N 13202 13202 13202 13202 13202 3361 12253
R2 0.270 0.271 0.268 0.272 0.271 0.293 0.271
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: LIAB 2002-2008 (model 6: 2004,2008), own calculation.
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wage gap, I focus on the wage differential between women and men with the same observable
characteristics. Still, the raw gap is worth having a look at. I replicate the described above
analysis using the raw gap as dependent variable. The results are reported in table 4.11. The
main results from the analysis based on the adjusted gender wage gap hold true for the raw gap.
I observe a negative association between the raw gender wage gap and the local unemployment
rate and a positive relationship with the spatial unemployment rate, both at the district level
as well as within firms.7
Table 4.11: Regression results with raw differential as dependent variable
district level firm level
lnU −0.0417∗∗ −0.0326∗ −0.0299∗∗∗ −0.0224∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.186) (0.00881) (0.00863)
Spatial lnU 0.0548∗ 0.0335∗∗
(0.0288) (0.0149)
Region FE
√ √ √ √
Time FE
√ √ √ √
Firm characteristics
√ √
N 2192 2178 13202 12253
R2 0.157 0.159 0.282 0.285
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
Using the human capital-adjusted gender wage gap in the regression analysis may cause the
results to depend on the covariates included in the original wage regression underlying the de-
composition analysis. To account for this, I calculate different versions of the adjusted wage
gap based on different wage functions. In the following, I present the results of the regression
analysis with an adjusted gender wage gap resulting from a decomposition with no occupational
control in the wage function. As we can see from table 4.12, the results compare with previous
findings, irrespective of the choice of the underlying wage function.
7This is also true for the replication of the regressions with the gender wage gap at different quantiles (not
reported, results are available on request).
4.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 121
Table 4.12: Regression results with different underlying wage functions
district level firm level
lnU −0.0444∗∗∗ −0.0371∗∗∗ −0.0205∗∗∗ −0.0151∗∗
(0.0122) (0.0132) (0.00733) (0.00727)
Spatial lnU 0.0438∗∗ 0.0253∗
(0.0199) (0.0126)
Region FE
√ √ √ √
Time FE
√ √ √ √
Firm characteristics
√ √
N 2192 2178 13202 12253
R2 0.081 0.082 0.266 0.272
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
As further robustness check, I apply a different concept of spatial unemployment. What I called
spatial unemployment so far was the population weighted average of the unemployment rates of
districts in the same commuting area. Alternatively, I now calculate the mean unemployment
rate of all districts with a common border (irrespective of commuting structures) using a conti-
guity matrix. Including this unemployment rate in the regression models leads to similar results
for the coefficient on the local unemployment rate as reported in table 4.13.
Table 4.13: Regression results with different spatial unemployment rates
district level firm level
lnU −0.0454∗∗ −0.0572∗∗∗ −0.0266∗∗∗ −0.0362∗∗∗
(0.0186) (0.0182) (0.00726) (0.00729)
Spatial lnU 0.0691∗∗ 0.0467∗∗∗
(Commuting area) (0.0270) (0.0130)
Spatial lnU 0.0269 0.0197∗∗
(Direct neighbors) (0.0180) (0.00918)
Region FE
√ √ √ √
Time FE
√ √ √ √
Firm characteristics
√ √
N 2178 2185 12253 13163
R2 0.079 0.078 0.271 0.271
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
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The estimated coefficient of the direct neighbors unemployment is smaller, yet not significant at
the district level. At the firm level the effect remains significant, but it is also smaller in mag-
nitude. This might be due to the fact that the unemployment rate based on direct neighbors
does not account for commuting structures. The results support the theoretical considerations
that the positive association between spatial unemployment and gender wage gap partly results
from the commuting behavior of employees.
4.6 Conclusion
Based on data for West Germany from 2002 to 2008, I find a highly stable negative relationship
between the gender wage gap and the local unemployment rate. Furthermore, there is a positive
association with the unemployment rate in the commuting area. The relationship between the
local unemployment rate and the wage gap is present both at the district level and at the
firm level. The results are robust across different measures of the gender wage gap and across
varieties of the regression specification. The relationship between unemployment rate and the
raw gender wage gap follows the same direction as for the human-capital adjusted gap. In
the latter case, it is stable throughout different wage functions underlying the decomposition
analysis. The effect on the intra-firm gap is smaller than the one found at the district level, and it
is moderated by firm characteristics such as the existence of a works council. The positive effect
of the spatial unemployment rate can be rationalized by the commuting behavior of employees.
This explanation is in line with the fact that I find stronger effects for a measure of spatial
unemployment that accounts for commuting structures than for a measure based on regional
proximity.
Taken together, I believe that my results contribute to the literature on the gender wage gap as,
to my best knowledge, the implications of the wage curve approach have not been considered in
this context so far. My results suggest that the differences in the gender-specific wage differential
across regions and firms can partly be explained by characteristics of the local labor market and
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the gender-specific reaction to changes in these measures. Furthermore, considering the local
unemployment rate offers an explanation of the particular share of the gender wage gap that
cannot fully be accounted for by productivity differences, human capital or other observed
factors, and that is therefore often attributed to discrimination. Future research should focus
on the underlying theory of the relationship between the gender wage gap and local as well as
spatial unemployment rates and the mechanisms through which local labor market conditions
influence wage differentials between men and women.
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Appendix C: Additional Tables
Table C.1: List of regressors
Variables used in the decomposition analysis
Log wage Log of daily gross wage
Educational level: 6 categories Lower Secondary Education
Lower Secondary Education plus vocational training
Abitur
Abitur plus vocational training
University of applied sciences degree
University degree
Experience Experience in days
Job tenure Time with current employer (in days)
Occupational group: 19 categories Agricultural professions
Stone ceramics and glass manufactures
Chemical workers and plastic processors
Paper processors and printing professions
Metal professions
Electrical professions
Textile/leather manufacturers and processors
Nutrional/food professions
Building/constructions and wood professions
Engineering, technical and scientific professions
Traders and service professions
Transport and logistic professions
Administrative professions and office workers
Security and public order professions
Media, humanistic and artistic professions
Health professions
Social and education-related professions
Body caring, housekeepers and cleaners
Other
Firm size Number of employees
Continued on next page...
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... table C.1 continued
Regional control variables
Shrinking Indicator for growing or shrinking labor market region
0 - strongly shrinking; 1 - shrinking
2 - stable; 3 - growing; 4 - strongly growing
Region FE Fixed effect for commuting area (regional planning unit)
Time FE Year fixed effect
Firm control variables
Works council Existence of works council
Female share Female share in workforce
Legal form: 6 categories Individually-owned firm
Partnership
Limited liability company
Company limited by shares
Public corporation
Other legal form
Collective bargaining: 3 categories Industry-wide Wage agreement
Company agreement
No collective agreement
Firm age Indicator: founded before 1990
Female share 1st female share in first management
Female share 2nd female share in second management
Sector: 41 categories Agriculture/forestry
Mining/energy
Food/luxury
Textiles/clothing
Paper/printing
Wood sector
Chemical sector
Plastics industry
Glass/stones/ore extraction
Metal production
Continued on next page...
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... table C.1 continued
Recycling
Metal goods/steel production
Engineering
Vehicle engineering
Other vehicle production
Electrical engineering
Precision engineering/optics
Furniture/jewelry/toys
Main building sector
Building/installation
Car-rent/-reparation/gas-station
Wholesale trade
Retailing/reparation
Traffic
Telecommunication
Financial sector
Insurance
Data processing
Research/development
Judiciary/advertising
Realties/flats
Renting
Restaurants
Educational institutions
Health/social
Waste-management
Culture/sports/entertaining
Other services
Organisations
Private households
Civil service/social insurance
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Table C.2: Summary statistics: individual characteristics used for wage regression
Variable Men Women
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Log wage 4.757 0.373 4.510 0.416
Experience 6393.410 3245.414 5360.880 3263.595
Job tenure 4072.336 3166.544 3248.229 2928.810
Firm size 6569.400 12109.250 3667.018 8410.307
Educational level
Lower Secondary Education 0.125 0.331 0.155 0.362
Lower Secondary Education and voc. training 0.652 0.476 0.614 0.487
Abitur 0.010 0.101 0.017 0.131
Abitur plus voc. training 0.049 0.216 0.102 0.302
University of applied sciences degree 0.065 0.247 0.035 0.183
University degree 0.097 0.297 0.077 0.267
Occupational group
Agricultural professions 0.007 0.086 0.004 0.061
Stone ceramics and glass manufacturers 0.005 0.067 0.003 0.053
Chemical workers and plastic manufacturers 0.042 0.201 0.019 0.137
Paper processors and printing professions 0.013 0.114 0.005 0.073
Metal professions 0.186 0.389 0.015 0.122
Electrical professions 0.085 0.279 0.052 0.221
Textile/leather manufacturers 0.002 0.045 0.005 0.072
Nutritional/food professions 0.011 0.107 0.026 0.160
Building/constructions and wood professions 0.096 0.295 0.044 0.204
Engineering, technical and scientific professions 0.175 0.380 0.057 0.231
Traders and service professions 0.072 0.259 0.140 0.347
Transport and logistic professions 0.077 0.267 0.026 0.158
Administrative professions and office workers 0.137 0.344 0.349 0.477
Continued on next page...
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... table C.2 continued
Variable Men Women
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Security and public order professions 0.019 0.135 0.007 0.084
Media, humanistic and artistic professions 0.006 0.076 0.012 0.108
Health professions 0.024 0.154 0.133 0.339
Social and education-related professions 0.021 0.144 0.068 0.251
Body caring, housekeepers and cleaners 0.011 0.102 0.034 0.181
Other 0.010 0.100 0.003 0.052
Oberservations 6114836 2088274
Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
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Table C.3: Summary statistics: regional level
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Unexplained 0.211 0.127 −2.424 2.112 2192
Explained 0.034 0.140 −1.897 2.684 2192
Raw gap 0.246 0.101 −0.126 0.830 2192
lnU 2.071 0.391 0.588 3.203 2192
lnUf 2.091 0.349 0.956 3.250 2192
lnUm 2.043 0.454 0.182 3.258 2192
Spatial lnU 2.087 0.330 0.787 3.048 2178
Shrinking 2.635 1.018 0 4 2192
District-year observations, Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
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Table C.4: Summary statistics: firm level
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Unexplained 0.195 0.112 −0.788 0.979 13202
Explained 0.018 0.097 −0.738 1.067 13202
Raw gap 0.213 0.132 −0.924 1.113 13202
lnU 2.182 0.365 0.588 3.203 13202
lnUf 2.162 0.323 0.956 3.250 13202
lnUm 2.191 0.424 0.182 3.258 13202
Spatial lnU 2.103 0.309 0.787 3.048 12253
Works council 0.877 0.329 0 1 13202
Firm size 828.754 2115.379 46 50524 13202
Firm age 0.872 0.334 0 1 13202
Legal form:
Individually-owned firm 0.006 0.076 0 1 13202
Partnership 0.033 0.178 0 1 13202
Limited liability company 0.504 0.500 0 1 13202
Company limited by shares 0.120 0.325 0 1 13202
Public corporation 0.257 0.437 0 1 13202
Other legal form 0.080 0.271 0 1 13202
Collective bargaining:
Industry-wide wage agreement 0.723 0.447 0 1 13202
Company agreement 0.111 0.314 0 1 13202
No collective agreement 0.166 0.372 0 1 13202
Female share 1st 0.083 0.197 0 1 3604
Female share 2nd 0.175 0.212 0 1 3430
Firm-year observations, Source: LIAB 2002-2008, own calculation.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusion
This thesis is concerned with econometric analyses of gender differences in the German labor
market. A particular focus is on the the role of organizations and the impact of organizational
characteristics on intra-firm gender differences.
In chapter 2 the amount of horizontal segregation within establishments is investigated. We are
interested in occupational gender segregation, i.e. the unequal distribution of men and women
along occupational groups. Therefore, a corrected version of the dissimilarity index is calcu-
lated following Carrington and Troske (1997), which accounts for random allocation of men and
women into small occupational groups. We show that the correction procedure particularly influ-
ences the firm level results, while the segregation index at the labor market level remains largely
unchanged. At the firm level we find a substantial variation in the amount of segregation which
varies according to organizational characteristics. A bivariate analysis shows that the amount
of segregation crucially differs among industries and across firms with different proportions of
women in the workforce. We apply different panel data models in order to disentangle the effect
of individual organizational characteristics. Thereby, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity,
e.g. in the form of corporate culture, has to be carefully considered. Based on random effects,
pooled OLS and fractional response models, we validate the results of previous research, as we
find a negative relationship between firm size and segregation or a significantly higher level of
segregation in East German companies. As to the effect of part-time work, the results clearly
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suggest that it has to be considered jointly with the female share in the establishment in order
to get meaningful results. Further, we contribute to the literature by exploring the relationship
between the implementation of gender mainstreaming measures and formalized recruitment pro-
cedures. Both turn out to be associated with lower levels of segregation. The use of fixed effects
and correlated random effects techniques did not yield significant results, which is most likely
due to missing time variation in the data. However, the effect of organizational demography on
segregation, in particular the negative effect of the female share in the workforce, is confirmed
by these models.
While chapter 2 focuses on horizontal segregation, chapter 3 is concerned with gender differences
in career trajectories and is therefore closely related to the concept of vertical segregation. The
main research questions are whether potential parenthood is a determinant of career transitions
and whether gender differences exist in this context. Based on the ALWA data set we create
complete employment histories of childless men and women in Germany. Each transition be-
tween two subsequent employment spells is defined as either upward, downward or horizontal
movement according to the change in personnel responsibility or job prestige respectively. We
estimate a mixed multivariate proportional hazard model with competing risks for the three
transition equations while simultaneously modeling the hazard of first birth, which enters the
other equations as the main regressor of interest. As an alternative specification, we apply a
fixed effects framework. The regressors used to predict the parenthood hazard include only CV
relevant information to mimic employers’ prediction. We find that a higher contemporaneous
probability of pregnancy corresponds to a decrease in women’s job mobility in terms of horizontal
transitions. As opposed to this, for men the propensity of upward transitions is significantly pos-
itively related to the likelihood of becoming a father. The results are robust along the different
estimation methods and transition measures. Our results suggest that the perceived probability
of parenthood differently effects men’s and women’s career trajectories. While it seems that
women’s career mobility is hampered by the hazard of becoming a mother, men even exhibit
higher upward mobility if they have a high probability of being a father soon. Our data does
not allow it to be seen whether the observed effects are driven by discriminating behaviors of
137
the employer or by prescient decisions of the employee. In either case, we can conclude that
career transitions are not gender neutral with respect to effect of potential fertility.
Chapter 4 addresses gender differences in pay. The gender wage gap has been the subject of
much theoretical and empirical literature. This study brings up a new aspect for explaining the
wage gap, namely the effect of local labor market conditions. The local unemployment rate is
considered as a potential driver of the gap. This hypothesis is derived from the wage curve liter-
ature. The existence of gender-specific wage curves, i.e. the fact that men’s and women’s wages
adjust differently to changes in the local unemployment rate, suggests that the wage differential
should also be related to the unemployment rate. I calculate a human capital-adjusted wage
gap at the district level as well as intra-firm wage gaps. These are related to the log of the local
unemployment rate and a measure of spatial unemployment by means of regression analysis.
At the firm level, I also consider the effect of organizational characteristics. I consistently find
a negative relationship between the wage gap and the local unemployment rate throughout all
estimated models. This is in line with theoretical considerations based on the efficiency wage
theory. The unemployment rate in the commuting area, however, is positively related to the
wage gap. Furthermore, I find that organizational characteristics explain a substantial share of
the variation in intra-firm wage gaps. From the very robust relationship between unemployment
and the gender wage differential throughout all models, I conclude that gender-specific reactions
to local labor market conditions should be considered, in addition to common factors when try-
ing to explain the gender wage gap.
Summarizing, I can say that the studies presented in this thesis have two main common subjects:
Firstly, the investigation of gender differences in the German labor market, and secondly, the
consideration of organizational characteristics in the explanation of gender differences within and
between establishments. With respect to gender differences in general, one can conclude that
although men and women are legally equal and we observe convergence in their characteristics,
such as educational levels or participation rates, one still finds considerable differences in labor
market outcomes. Chapter 2 shows that women face barriers to the entry into an occupation
138 CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
dominated by men, while men more easily integrate into female-dominated fields. Furthermore,
as chapter 3 demonstrates, the effects of the perceived probability of parenthood works in op-
posite directions for men and women. Finally, chapter 4 does not only show the persistency
of gender differences in pay, but also suggests that men and women are differently affected by
local labor market conditions. Based on the results presented in this thesis, one has to admit
that labor market mechanism seem to work in different ways for men and women. This is true
regardless of whether the discussed effects are of a causal nature or not .
A second conclusion one can draw from my results, is that considering the organization as a so-
cial unit is a useful approach as firm characteristics play a major role in explaining the observed
heterogeneity across firms. The results presented in chapter 2 show that variation in firm level
segregation crucially varies by organizational characteristics. Also, substantial variation in the
intra-firm wage gaps are found. As chapter 4 shows, organizational heterogeneity captures a lot
of this variation. Thus, information on the relationship between organizational characteristics
and gender differences are of high political relevance, as policy measures affecting the organiza-
tional level might help to promote gender equality in the labor market.
Nevertheless, analyses at the firm level suffer particularly from the existence of unobserved firm
heterogeneity in the form of, e.g., corporate culture. In order to get closer to causal interpre-
tations, future research should consider this carefully by using panel techniques and data with
long time dimensions. As to the research questions covered in chapter 2, the LIAB data will
hopefully provide information on gender mainstreaming in upcoming survey waves. This could
solve the problem of absent time variation in the regressors and makes fixed effects estimation
more promising. Chapter 3 gives interesting insight on gender differences in job transitions. To
investigate the sources of vertical segregation in more detail, it would be desirable to expand
the analysis to a definition of career transitions that also captures internal promotions. With
respect to the research question in chapter 4, follow-up research should concentrate on the theo-
retical background of the unemployment rate as a driving factor of the wage gap. The empirical
results suggest highly stable correlation patterns, that may be addressed more thoroughly in
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a theoretical framework in the future. A joint investigation of the different fields of research
covered in this thesis, namely horizontal segregation, career development, and the gender gap
in pay, seems promising as well. For instance, segregation effects can be directly related to the
gender wage gap, both at the horizontal and vertical level, but this should be subject to future
research.
I conclude that gender differences in the labor market remain a topic of high political as well as
social relevance. The development of more elaborated research techniques and the availability
of linked employer-employee data open up the possibilities for future research. In summary, this
thesis shows that despite all attempts of gender equalization policies, gender differences exist
in the German labor market with respect to labor market dynamics and outcomes. The pre-
sented studies reveal possible mechanisms to foster gender equality and emphasize the impact
of organizational characteristics in explaining firm level heterogeneity in segregation levels and
intra-firm wage gaps.
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